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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation is a study of Martin Heidegger’s understanding of the concept of 
authenticity, and how that understanding may have changed over time, via a careful investigation 
of Heidegger’s written works, from Being and Time in the 1920s to works of the mid-1960s. This 
study has two goals. Narrowly, it argues that the key elements of Heidegger’s account of 
authenticity do not change over the period under consideration—while the nature of his 
elaboration shifts dramatically, the key content stays the same. Broadly, since a fundamental 
change in the understanding of authenticity, especially how it relates to history and to human 
volition (referred to below as the active/passive dimension), is central in most interpretations that 
argue for a strong turn, or Kehre, in Heidegger’s later works, this study provides substantial 
evidence that there was not nearly as dramatic a shift in Heidegger’s views as many argue. 
 Chapter 1 introduces the issue by discussing Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity in 
general, ways history and the active/passive dimension could relate to authenticity, the general 
outlines of strong interpretations in relation to these two issues, and what various interpreters 
who hold such interpretations argue. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examine Heidegger’s views on 
authenticity, history, and the active/passive dimension, in roughly the 1920s, mid to late-1930s, 
and 1940s-1960s, respectively. Chapter 5 concludes, discussing in broad terms why strong 
interpretations of the Kehre are tempting even if misguided, and sketching a reading of the Kehre 
better suggested by the views argued for in this study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A PLURALITY OF HEIDEGGERS 
 
 
 
 In April of 1962, Martin Heidegger wrote a letter to Father William J. Richardson, an 
American scholar preparing to publish a study of Heidegger’s work, to be titled “Heidegger: 
From Phenomenology to Thought.” In the letter, Heidegger proposes to answer two questions 
that Father Richardson had sent him. The second of those questions, in Heidegger’s words, 
“looks for information about the much discussed “reversal” [in my development].”1 
 When Heidegger goes on to address the question about the reversal, or Kehre
2
, his 
method of response might be said to be typical Heidegger: he begins with a brief, apparently 
straightforward statement, and then goes on at great length to qualify it in subtle and difficult 
ways, to the point where it is unclear if he really meant what he originally said at all, or if all of 
the qualification is just an attempt to carefully back away from his own position. After noting 
that the Kehre had been underway in some form for at least a decade prior to 1947, he says that 
“The thinking of the [Kehre] is a change in my thought. But,” he continues, “this change is not a 
consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of Being 
and Time.” 3 Rather, it is a sort of continuation of the work that was started there, and which was 
to continue through the unfinished third division of Being and Time, to be titled “Time and 
Being.” The Kehre was already there in the earlier work, Heidegger says: “The reversal is in play 
within the matter itself,”4 however that may be (as Heidegger does not proceed to explain what 
he means by that ambiguous sentence). For this reason, Heidegger suggests that Father 
                                                 
1
 Richardson, William. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, Fourth Edition (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2003) viii. 
2
 Now more often translated ‘turn;’ I will typically use the German term, including in quotations. 
3
 Through Phenomenology to Thought xvi. 
4
 Through Phenomenology to Thought xviii. 
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Richardson change the title of his work to its current title, “Through Phenomenology to 
Thought,” so that one does not get the sense that the earlier work was simply left behind. To 
conclude the matter, Heidegger summarizes his position by borrowing Father Richardson’s terms 
“Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II,” in a passage that has spawned speculation ever since: 
 
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that 
this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain 
access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes 
possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.
5
 
 
 
“Meanwhile,” Heidegger starts the next paragraph, “every formulation is open to 
misunderstanding.” Indeed. 
 What is Heidegger’s Kehre? It is generally taken for granted, and appears to be 
confirmed by Heidegger himself (he is, after all, the one who introduced the term ‘Kehre’), that 
there was some significant change in the course of his work, a change that had definitely come 
about by the mid to late 1930s. And when one looks at his works before, during, and after that 
period, things are definitely drastically different, at least on the surface. The works of the 1920s 
and early 1930s have, for the most part, the character of formal treatises; though their use of 
language and their idea of what constitutes philosophical argument may be novel, they are still 
recognizably philosophical treatises with recognizably philosophical subjects. In the late 1930s, 
however, there seems to be a sudden and dramatic change; the structure of Heidegger’s works 
becomes unmoored, with a profusion of styles, subjects, and approaches that carries on 
throughout this period. The so-called “be-ing-historical treatises” of the late 30s, Contributions 
to Philosophy (from Enowning) and Mindfulness, read more like chunks of Nietzsche’s Nachlass 
                                                 
5
 Through Phenomenology to Thought xxii. 
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translated into Heideggerian than formal philosophical work. Heidegger spends more time 
tackling ancient Greek thought and 19
th
 century German poetry than Descartes, Kant, or 
contemporary philosophy. By the end of Heidegger’s life the new approach is less volatile, but 
maintains its focus on non-philosophical topics and its avoidance of standard philosophical 
method by any measure. Something has happened, sure enough. But what? Heidegger’s 
explanation in the letter to Father Richardson hardly explains anything. Heidegger says there is a 
Kehre, but that it is not an alternation of either the standpoint or the fundamental concerns of is 
previous work. What is the change, then? If such a change was already at work in Being and 
Time, was there any sign of it? If the change was to be carried out in “Time and Being,” why 
wasn’t it just published there? Was Being and Time insufficient? Was there some other concern? 
What, ultimately, is the relationship between Heidegger I and Heidegger II? 
 To these questions, interpreters have offered an impressive variety of answers, differing 
on what leads to the Kehre, when the Kehre starts, even how many Kehres there are. However, 
many, perhaps most, of the best-known answers center on a specific cluster of assumptions about 
Heidegger’s work and development. These assumptions lead to a view of Heidegger’s Kehre as 
marking a substantial shift in both the form and content of his thought (what I will call a ‘strong 
Kehre’ thesis, following Lee Braver) from Being and Time-era work to the ‘Later Heidegger’ of 
the 1930s on. In particular, these interpretations usually include (but are not limited to) two 
important shifts in Heidegger’s views: first, how human beings relate to, appropriate, and work 
within the confines of their socio-historical situation, whether as individualists asserting their 
own values or respondents receiving all values and meanings from history; second, the manner in 
which human beings must engage with their circumstances, whether as active participants and 
4 
 
Nietzschean-style ‘value creators’ or as passive, open recipients of world-historical movements 
and events beyond their power. 
 In what follows, I will approach the issue of Heidegger’s Kehre and the standard 
interpretations of it by way of a close interpretive investigation of one of the most important 
concepts in Heidegger’s works: authenticity. In so doing, I will be working towards two aims 
simultaneously. Narrowly speaking I will provide a detailed description of Heidegger’s concept 
of authenticity, both as it shows up in Being and Time and later in what appear to be its 
correlates, under terms such as ‘mindfulness’ and ‘Gelassenheit,’ in Heidegger’s later works. At 
the same time I will be working towards a broader aim, that of arguing for a new understanding 
of Heidegger’s Kehre. Authenticity touches both on the issue of how individuals relate to socio-
historical circumstances or factors for Heidegger, and on the issue of activism (sometimes 
referred to in the literature as voluntarism
6) versus passivism with regard to pursuing one’s 
possibilities. By understanding the ways in which authenticity, a central element of Heidegger’s 
thought and of the Kehre, changes or doesn’t change in the course of his writings, we will be 
better placed to understand the nature of the Kehre more generally. It is my contention that, at 
least when it comes to authenticity and probably more broadly, the Kehre is not nearly as strong 
as most interpreters think. To say that there is no change of any sort would be absurd; the change 
in style and approach is beyond question. But to say that there is a change in content as well is a 
thesis that requires further support. My contention is that such support isn’t there; in fact, close 
readings of essential texts in Heidegger’s corpus will reveal that the basic picture stays almost 
(though not entirely) untouched. As style changes, the substance stays the same. 
                                                 
6
 ‘Voluntarism’ is a stronger term, and typically used to describe the strongest form of activism considered in this 
study. Since I will be considering more than that form alone, the broader term is desirable, as it encompasses all of 
the variants of the view and what they share. These variants are explained in more depth later in this chapter and in 
Chapter Two. 
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 Which is not to say that there are no significant content changes whatsoever from the late 
1920s on. Though that may be the case, and though it is my suspicion that it is at least likely, I do 
not argue for that here. The sheer work required for such a wide-ranging discussion of 
Heidegger’s views, which he expounded in over one hundred volumes of lectures, addresses, and 
written works, would be a monumental task. Thus the issue, for example, of whether Dasein has 
a ‘hard essence’ in Being and Time, but no such essence in the later works, will not be touched (I 
briefly discuss below why not). And in terms of the exact nature of the Kehre itself, little can be 
given here besides a bare sketch in the Conclusion to this study, and in hints throughout. This 
study, for the sake of precision and detail, is a narrowly focused one; it gestures at larger issues 
surrounding the Kehre, but for the most part will not engage them, besides indirectly. Perhaps 
such an approach is not terribly exciting, but in maintaining such a narrow focus, it is hoped that 
this study will help keep the discussion focused on precision, clarity, and accuracy. Granted, 
Heidegger was not always clear in his own work. Even granted, as I believe, that there may have 
been justifiable reasons embedded within Heidegger’s views themselves that would recommend 
his particular approach. But that does not mean that Heidegger scholarship should cease pursuing 
clarity to the extent that it can be realized. 
 The broad conclusions of the study are as follows. First, authenticity in Being and Time 
has a much greater connection to socio-historical factors than is typically acknowledged; in fact, 
they are central to it. Authentic Dasein is not a lone individual, struggling to free itself from the 
grip of history; it is historical all the way through, and Dasein’s authentic stance, which is 
resolute with regard to a socio-historically determined set of possibilities called “the Situation,” 
can never go beyond that.  
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 Second, though there is in fact a form of activism in Being and Time, it is extremely 
limited, the activism of maintaining an authentic resolute stance against a tendency to become 
inauthentic. There is nothing like an existentialist-style asserting of one’s free possibilities, or 
even a freedom to recognize or fail to recognize what one’s possibilities are; these things do not 
arise on account of Dasein’s choice. Dasein can only choose to persist in them, once revealed, or 
not. 
 Third, although for the most part Heidegger drops the language of authenticity and 
inauthenticity in his later work, most of the actual content of these concepts carries over to his 
later work in various forms, right on through to his interview with Der Spiegel, given in 1966. 
Heidegger does drop authenticity’ and the related terminology of Being and Time, but virtually 
the entire account of inauthenticity, authenticity, and the transition from one to the other, are 
preserved as they were found in Being and Time. This is true both for the account of history’s 
relationship to authenticity and that of activity and passivity. 
 Fourth, the previous point implies that, although the actual account of history is greatly 
expanded in the later work, and the tone of Heidegger’s language takes on a much more passivist 
aspect, that is not because these elements arise from a new, radically different place in 
Heidegger’s thought. In the case of history, the expanded account in the later works is just that: 
expanded, grown in both scope and depth beyond the terse discussion of authentic historicality 
found late in Being and Time. This does not equate to a great change in the actual relationship 
between authenticity and history. Authenticity, as noted above, was always historical; what 
happens after Being and Time is that Heidegger shifts towards a strong emphasis on the historical 
aspect of it in general, and on how it (and inauthenticity) manifests in the current historical epoch 
in particular. History does take center stage in the later work. However, I contend that history 
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was always there to begin with, having largely the same role throughout; now it is simply under a 
direct spotlight. Likewise for the aspect of passivity; although it is now front and center, that is 
not because Dasein was an independent active chooser before. The ‘activity of resistance’ found 
in Being and Time’s account of resoluteness persists in the later works, and the passivism found 
in the latter is passivity of the same nature as in Being and Time. In Heidegger’s terms, Dasein’s 
openness to the History of Being is resolute grasping of the historical Situation, and holding 
oneself open to Being against the pull of technology is holding oneself open to Being against the 
pull of das Man. 
 Before conclusions can be argued for, however, the ground must be cleared. First, the two 
purported changes that constitute the Kehre with regard to authenticity must be better explained, 
particularly in terms of the role they play in the secondary literature. 
 
1.1 THE RUGGED INDIVIDUAL AND THE WORLD-HISTORICAL MAN 
 
 It is frequently said of Heidegger’s later works, and taken to be one of the clearest signs 
of the Kehre, that man
7
 is replaced by history. But to say ‘man is replaced by history’ is 
ambiguous; what is role does man play in Heidegger’s early work, what history, and in what way 
is on the former replaced by the latter? 
 There are two ways in which this claim about the individual-history relation, which forms 
one typical part of the strong Kehre thesis, has been understood. Since the two are frequently, 
                                                 
7
 When it comes to using the terms ‘man’ [Mensch] and ‘Dasein,’ I will typically use ‘Dasein’ when referring 
specifically to Being and Time, and ‘man’ when discussing later works. I will alsouse ‘man’ when talking about 
humanity and human beings outside of specific textual references, since the general topic is what common language 
would refer to as ‘man,’ ‘humanity,’ or ‘mankind,’ and the latter terms make for awkward and not always helpful 
elocutions. It should be kept in mind throughout that both ‘Dasein’ and ‘man’ refer, for the most part, to the same 
thing. Times when this is not the case will be discussed as they appear. (Side note: when using third-personal 
pronouns, I will usually use ‘he,’ ‘his,’ and so on to keep in agreement with the typical translation of the gender 
neutral ‘Mensch’ as ‘man.’) 
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perhaps almost always, conflated, and as I will only be focusing on one of them, it is important 
to distinguish them. The first, which I will call the ‘ethical’ version for reasons to be explained 
shortly, begins by saying that in Heidegger’s early work, particularly in Being and Time, the 
individual is the starting point, initiator, and sustainer of action when it comes to pursuing 
possibilities. Possibilities, broadly speaking, are undertakings as a type of activity, what one can 
be in the sense of maintaining oneself as x through action—the activity involved in, say, being a 
philosopher, being the leader of a people, and being a good father are examples of possibilities in 
this sense. They are what you can do, insofar as you can undertake in doing them.
8
 And in Being 
and Time, it is the individual that decides what possibilities are available to be pursued. History, 
insofar as it has any role at all in Being and Time, is taken in the strong Kehre interpretation as a 
negative influence, one that attempts to prevent the individual from acting on his possibilities. 
This view of how Heidegger presents the relationship between the individual and history is then 
taken to be reversed in the later work. There, the story goes, Heidegger’s emphasis totally shifts 
to the unembodied, impersonal flow of history and its events as the focal point out of which our 
possibilities appear and changes in them occur; the way the world is grasped and what 
possibilities can be pursued in light of that grasp, or in other words what the individual ought to 
do and be, are determined not by individuals but by history itself, or rather by Being itself as it 
manifests in various ways through the course of history. In the early work, it is individual 
persons who determine the course of history; in the later work, history determines the course of 
individual persons, and this reversal is taken as one key aspect of the Kehre. 
 The ‘ethical’ version of the thesis should be distinguished from a very different version of 
the same claim, which I call the ‘ontological’ version. The ontological version says that in Being 
                                                 
8
 If it is only undertaking the pursuit of x as a possible way to be that makes one x, and not, say, a predicate being 
true of one, can one can therefore be anything one pursues? In part, this is the question behind the individual-history 
relation: what, if anything, limits what one can be? Is only merely what one aims to be? 
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and Time and the works of that period, Dasein is a special sort of being, one whose fundamental 
essence is constant and unchanging throughout history; wherever and whenever it is, Dasein is 
always the exact same type of thing, with the exact same nature. In the later work, according to 
this interpretation, man loses his status as a special being with an unchanging nature; instead, he 
is said to have an essence that changes over the course of history. Literally, the Dasein that 
existed in ancient Greece was a different thing, with a different existential-ontological 
constitution, than Dasein today in the West. In short, whereas in Heidegger’s early work man has 
an ahistorical essence, in the later work man’s essence is completely determined historically, and 
changes through history. This second version of the thesis, then, is a claim about man’s nature, 
whereas the first version is about what determines man’s possibilities. The ontological version of 
the thesis, since it is not about authenticity per se, is not discussed here; the focus will be on the 
ethical variant. 
  Although there is variation among interpreters with regard to exactly how one should 
split Heidegger’s work, the ethical claim about the individual-history relation, as with most 
claims about the Kehre, usually has two basic parts, corresponding to Being and Time and the 
later work. (Generally speaking, ‘the later work’ refers to everything written from the mid-1930s 
on. Note that, following the outline below, my investigation will not follow this twofold division. 
Instead, Heidegger’s work will be split into three rough periods. The reason is provided below, 
where I explain the organization of this study in more detail. Regardless, most versions of the 
Kehre, and the ones that I am adopting to in particular, adopt some form of the division between 
“Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II,” as Richardson puts it.9) In the case of the relationship between 
                                                 
9
 See the “Conclusion” to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. As mentioned, not all interpreters 
subscribe to this two-part division; some, such as Schürmann, subscribe to a three-part Kehre by including 
Heidegger’s earliest, pre-Being and Time work as a first part, and others say that there is a more gradual progression 
over time, with different aspects of the Kehre emerging at different moments. Remaining constant in these 
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individuals and history, the supposed issue of contention between the earlier and later Heidegger 
is in what man should be aiming to achieve. How can man realize his true possibilities? What 
does man have to do, where do his goals come from, and what provides the impetus to pursue 
them? According to this part of the strong Kehre reading, Heidegger in Being and Time and in 
the later work offers two directly opposing paths down which man is directed in order to 
discover what possibilities he can and should pursue. There is no obvious name for this particular 
version of the thesis; due to the emphasis on the possibility of choice and on where man ought to 
turn in order to discover his possibilities, I will settle, when a label is used at all, for calling it the 
ethical version. This name is not meant to imply that there is a Heideggerian ethics, nor even that 
there is anything normative in Heidegger’s writings on this topic. (Heidegger, for his part, says 
explicitly that his discussions are not normative, though many interpreters doubt his sincerity at 
such moments: see, for one example of such warnings, Being and Time 211.
10
) 
 To take a second pass, the ethical version of the strong Kehre thesis with regard to the 
individual-history relation says that, whereas Being and Time presents a very individualistic 
portrait of authenticity, pitting authentic individuals with their own unique, independent 
possibilities against a faceless and distorting society, Heidegger’s later work places the content 
of man’s possibilities is under the purview and control of history, and in fact makes acceptance 
of one’s historically determined possibilities the ultimate goal of what, in the later writings, 
corresponds to authenticity. In Being and Time, Heidegger says that authentic Dasein is defined 
as “something of its own;”11 starting from there, supporters of the ethical strong Kehre thesis say 
                                                                                                                                                             
interpretations, however, is the idea of a substantial change some time after the publication of Being and Time, such 
that, by the late 1930s at the very latest, Heidegger’s work is significantly different from what one finds in Being 
and Time. This is all that is meant above by the ‘two parts’ of the Kehre thesis. 
10
 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, Ltd, 1962) (Page numbers refer to English pagination in the Macquarrie and Robinson volume.) 
11
 Being and Time 68. 
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that, in some important way, the possibilities that Dasein pursues are determined by Dasein 
itself, independently of history and of outside circumstances more generally.  Heidegger presents 
authentic Dasein, on this reading, as a lone individual, one capable of transcending socio-
historical influences on what it chooses to pursue, including history, tradition, culture, the media, 
and upbringing, among other things. To be “something of its own” means that authentic Dasein 
is not someone or something else’s. In particular, authentic Dasein is not the slave of societal 
pressures, represented infamously by what Heidegger calls das Man, typically translated as ‘the 
‘they,’’ along with das Man’s distorting way of understanding the world, ‘publicness.’ Authentic 
Dasein is thereby opposed to inauthentic, public Dasein, which is what Dasein is when 
submitting to the control of a not-oneself, the ‘they-self’ or Manselbst. Authentic Dasein chooses 
its own possibilities and acts on them, shutting out the voice of the Manselbst and with it the 
public understanding of the world; thus, this interpretation appears to make natural sense of 
Heidegger’s claim that “Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-
alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being 
rather than upon the possibility of the [Manselbst].”12 This passage, and many others, support the 
view that Being and Time presents an individualistic picture of Dasein; when Dasein is not 
authentic, not choosing its own possibilities, it is because Dasein is lost in the inauthentic social 
world of the Manselbst. 
 Compare the apparent individualism of Being and Time to what appears in Heidegger’s 
later work. In the late 1930s, Heidegger writes that “right from the beginning, the history of man 
and the possibility of machination as the possibility of the groundlessness of the clearing are 
decided in τέχνη [techne].”13 In sum, the ethical thesis tells us, man’s having fallen under the 
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 Being and Time 308. (Italics in quotations are Heidegger’s unless otherwise noted.) 
13
 Heidegger, Martin. Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006) 115. 
12 
 
sway of a calculative, simplifying, dehumanizing way of thinking (machination) that shuts out all 
other possibilities is not the result of individual persons forfeiting their choices to society; rather, 
man’s falling under the sway of this form of thinking was decided millennia ago, with the 
emergence of the ancient Greek concept of τέχνη and its subsequent evolution. As a result of 
historical events, the current age is the age of technology, a step in the history of be-ing
14
, with 
there being no chance for an individual to break free, either of the current age or of the history 
that led to this age. In fact, man is completely left out of the realm of choice and decision-making 
with regards to his possibilities, it seems: “History is the trace left in the clearing of be-ing by the 
decisions on differentiating be-ing from “beings”—decisions that are enowned [erignen] by be-
ing.”15 It is the Ereignis (a term sometimes translated as ‘enowning,’ but which might be 
translated more naturally as ‘event,’ ‘appropriation,’ or ‘event of appropriation’) of be-ing as it, 
be-ing in general, differentiates itself from particular beings in different ways through the course 
of history—as becoming, as thought, and finally as value—that determines what possibilities are 
available in each historical epoch. Using passages like these, many argue that for the later 
Heidegger it is the decisions of be-ing, not of a person, that determine what our age is like and 
therefore what possibilities can be pursued; human history itself is just the history of 
appropriations by or events of be-ing. Given that fact, (the equivalent of) authentic man must 
grasp and accept the historically determined nature of his existence, so that his possibilities can 
be recognized: “Be-ing itself en-owns [er-eignen, appropriates] thinking unto the history of be-
ing, unto this: be-ing is en-owning [Er-eignen].  In this way, thinking becomes be-ing-historical 
                                                 
14
 Se-in. ‘Being’ (Sein) – sometimes capitalized by translators, sometimes not, sometimes used by Heidegger in one 
sense, sometimes in another, sometimes with the word split ( ‘Se-in’) as it is here, sometimes purposely misspelled 
(‘Beyng,’ ‘Seyn’) or crossed out (‘Being,’ Sein). The Herculean task of providing a straightforward translation 
policy for this word, hard enough to deal with in the German, I will avoid in lieu of taking the common route: as a 
rule, when the term is simply Sein I will use ‘Being,’ and I will generally use the translations just provided in the 
other cases. Since the focus of this study is not Being itself, there is little need to delve into all the technicalities that 
translation of the term introduces. 
15
 Mindfulness 146. 
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thinking.”16 Translation: Be-ing is the event of appropriating thinking into history, and it 
appropriates man’s (authentic) thinking into its own (that is, be-ing’s) history (that is, its own 
series of appropriations which constitute history); thus, man’s authentic way of thinking is 
thinking that allows itself to be taken up into the history of be-ing (“be-ing-historical thinking”), 
rather than trying to stand against it. This apparent reversal from individual to history as the 
theatre of decision-making and source of possibilities continues, the ethical thesis holds, through 
the rest of Heidegger’s later work. Thus Heidegger says, in “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” that 
 
The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility 
that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in 
the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this 
danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the 
fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the 
same time kindred to it.
17
 
 
 
People cannot overcome the danger of technology, of what was established in Western history 
with the advent of τέχνη more than two thousand years ago. If there is to be any overcoming at 
all, it must come from a “saving power” that lies hidden in the essence of technology itself, as 
another move in be-ing’s history. Towards the end of his life, in the 1966 interview with Der 
Spiegel, Heidegger straightforwardly answers the question, “You do not number yourself among 
those who could show a way, if people would only listen to them?” with “No.”18 He elaborates: 
“It is not a matter simply of waiting until something occurs to man within the next 300 years, but 
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 Mindfulness 185. 
17
 Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1977) 33-34. 
18
 Heidegger, Martin. “Only a God Can Save Us: The Der Spiegel Interview,” in Philosophical and Political 
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. . . of thinking from the standpoint of the fundamental traits of the present age.”19 Man must 
think through the current age, the current moment in history, and even then man cannot on his 
own take the steps towards being authentic, being shown a way. Rather, unlike Being and Time, 
the aim is now to engage explicitly and fully with history, to prepare for history’s next move 
rather than plot one’s own. 
 The ethical thesis about the individual-history relation and its two interpretive prongs, 
that Being and Time has an ahistorical conception of authenticity and that this conception is 
totally reversed in the later work, has many adopters in the secondary literature, as a thesis about 
the Kehre generally and, via its two prongs, as a free-standing interpretation of either Being and 
Time or the later work. Somewhat complicating an overview of the secondary literature is the 
fact that this view is adopted in both explicit and implicit ways. Explicit, when it is directly 
claimed that Being and Time offers an individualist account of authenticity and that the later 
work rejects the individualism of Being and Time. Implicitly, when the accounts of history in 
general and authentic historicity in Being and Time are left out or disregarded in discussions of 
authenticity, while the subsequent disappearance of ‘authenticity’ as a central term, and 
increasing emphasis on history in the later texts, are taken for granted as indicating a shift from 
authenticity as an individualistic concept. Making matters worse is that the same interpretation 
can include both explicit and implicit elements. Still, a consistent picture emerges through the 
varied interpretations offered in the last few decades, so that a distinct collection of views can be 
singled out. But first, a note: since I agree with every interpreter I know of that Heidegger’s later 
work is indeed centered on history, greater attention will be paid to what is said about Being and 
Time with regards to the relationship between the individual and history. 
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 One of the first to offer variants of the current arguments for Being and Time’s 
individualism, variants still found today, is Michael Zimmerman. Zimmerman says of Being and 
Time that it presents a “voluntaristic-individualistic interpretation of authenticity,”20 where the 
aim of authentic Dasein is to make its own free choices apart from society. Even though 
Zimmerman allows that history is supposed to play some sort of role in Being and Time, it fails 
on account of what he calls subjectivistic assumptions in Being and Time, which ultimately leave 
history under the sway of the choices of Dasein: “The subjectivity of Being and Time can also be 
seen clearly in its failure to show that history is not merely the unfolding of Dasein’s 
possibilities, but is the working out of the history of Being.”21 Why does the discussion of history 
not meet this purpose? Perhaps Heidegger’s arguments were simply insufficient? Zimmerman 
says something much stronger; he explains that, as far as he can tell, the account of history has 
no clear real purpose, no direct connection to the rest of Being and Time: “It seems as if the 
entire analysis of Dasein’s “historicality” was only “tacked on” to the end of Being and Time and 
seems not to have played a vital role in the articulation of the leading idea of the work itself.”22 
The discussion of authentic historicity, he continues, “has failed to show that history is not 
merely the working out of Dasein’s own possibilities, but is the history of Being itself.”23 If one 
assumes that the entire account of historicality, including authentic historicality, has at best the 
status of an add-on to Being and Time, one that contributes nothing to the arguments and 
concepts from earlier in the book, then it’s not surprising that one would arrive at an 
individualistic account of authenticity, particularly when one thinks of the negative language 
used to describe das Man and the public understanding of the world in Being and Time. 
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 An implicit example comes in Frederick Olafson’s account of the Kehre. Olafson thinks 
that there is a tension in Being and Time between the plurality of Dasein’s possibilities, which 
are derived from individual Daseins, and the singularity of Being. This tension arises because the 
world of Dasein’s possibilities is “a space of possibilities and of possibilities that were 
coordinate with the Selbstheit – the “selfness” – of Dasein, and being as such therefore had to be 
understood in the closest possible connection with the projects of individual Dasein.”24 One 
might think that Heidegger’s discussion of history in Being and Time has some bearing on how 
Dasein’s projects are determined, and that that might allow for meanings in the world that are not 
simply dependent on Dasein’s ‘selfness.’ Indeed, Olafson seems to allow for such a possibility 
when he says that “it does not seem to me that this would be an insuperable difficulty for a 
deeply conceived theory of Mitsein [Being-with, in the sense of being with other Daseins],”25 of 
how Dasein relates to others besides itself. Yet that is all Olafson says on the matter. He says that 
“the elements of such a theory” of the Mitsein are in Heidegger’s writings of that period, but that 
they “were not developed in this direction.”26 Heidegger’s discussion of authentic history, as will 
be seen in Chapter 2 of this study, includes ‘co-historizing’ with other Daseins and embracing 
one’s ‘heritage.’. But Olafson gives no indication that the account of historicity in Being and 
Time might be of any relevance here; indeed, the discussion of history does not appear at all in 
his discussion, an odd omission when the topic is the Kehre. 
 Most interpretations similarly tend to place great weight on on the supposed 
individualism of Being and Time, and its great difference from the later work is taken for 
granted. Beyond general discussions of subjectivism and individualism, the locus of the 
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argument is often placed on anxiety as something that totally severs Dasein from the world, 
therefore from socio-historical factors, altogether, leaving nothing but the individual self and its 
correspondingly individual possibilities for Dasein to choose from. Hubert Dreyfus is an 
example. Dreyfus allows, contra interpreters such as Zimmerman, that the role of das Man in 
Dasein’s life is not merely a negative, distorting force, but something that “makes a coherent 
referential whole, shared for-the-sake-of-whichs, and thus, ultimately, significance and 
intelligibility possible.”27 Dreyfus, to his credit, does not take it for granted that, in Being and 
Time, socio-historical factors are merely restraints on the individual. However, granting that, and 
even granting that Heidegger has something to say on the subject of authentic history, he finds 
that “It is hard . . . to reconcile Heidegger's talk of the heritage and choosing superior 
possibilities with his account of anxiety.”28 This difficulty appears because, as Dreyfus reads 
anxiety in Being and Time, for anxious Dasein nothing has any meaning anymore. Dasein 
discovers that the world of meanings and possibilities it had taken for granted “has no essential 
relation to it.”29 Dreyfus strengthens his language in an appendix to Being in the World co-
authored with Jane Rubin: there, he says that “all differentiations are revealed by anxiety to be 
totally indifferent, and so all equally meaningless.”30 That being the case, why should Dasein’s 
culture, tradition, or heritage matter to it, either? It cannot; all becomes equally insignificant. 
Dreyfus thinks that the only possibility for authenticity Heidegger can find for Dasein in such 
extreme circumstances is in what Dreyfus calls ‘marginal practices,’31 out-of-date, basically 
uncool or outmoded practices that, in virtue of their relative insignificance to the broader society, 
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have escaped the society’s levelling effects. But that does not resolve the problem of all 
possibilities of any kind being rendered meaningless by anxiety. Faced with this irresolvable 
tension, Dreyfus says that “Later Heidegger . . . gives up his existential account of anxiety, and 
of falling as a motivated cover-up of Dasein's essential nullity and unsettledness,”32 moving 
instead into the study of the epochs of Occidental history. 
 Michel Haar takes a similar position to that of Dreyfus. In Heidegger and the Essence of 
Man, he allows that “Resolute Dasein [where resoluteness is a necessary part of being authentic] 
does not withdraw from the world to float above it.”33  His discussion of anxiety, unlike that of 
Dreyfus, pushes towards a more complex view; he allows that, in anxiety, “the floating and 
melting of significations described as omnipresent remains entirely relative, limited to the 
everyday familiarity that is shattered.”34 Does that mean that Dasein, even when in the throes of 
anxiety, still has a connection to history? Haar does not give a detailed explanation, except to say 
that anxiety is limited to the everyday because, in Being and Time, “there is no anxiety in respect 
of being.”35 Haar compares the anxiety of Being and Time with what he finds in the 1929 lecture 
“What is Metaphysics?” where “the link between anxiety and the self-manifestation of being is 
substituted for the linking of anxiety with extreme, individual enabling.”36 But how is anxiety in 
Being and Time linked to self-enabling? Given that, according to Haar, not everything is left 
meaningless in anxiety, where does history and all that isn’t left meaningless fit in? How does 
history relate to self-enabling in anxiety, and does it place any limits on self-enabling? Haar 
doesn’t address these questions. 
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 Most recently, Lee Braver argues that Being and Time’s account of authenticity, and in 
particular the individualizing role of anxiety, keeps Heidegger from successfully maintaining the 
anti-realist position that there is no human essence, something Braver thinks Heidegger aims to 
achieve. To this end Braver cites “What is Metaphysics?”37 to argue that anxiety leaves us, as 
Dasein, “Drained of content[. S]ince during these times our roles have no meaning and do not 
involve us, we have nothing but the formal structure of our existence or pure Dasein to cling 
to.”38 That pure, formal, structure, Braver thinks, subsists on its own, independently of historical 
factors, opening Heidegger’s account to inconsistency. The result is that Heidegger’s “ideal of 
authenticity as willed self-coincidence is perhaps the most conventional aspect of Being and 
Time and constitutes a regression”39 from the anti-realism that Braver sees Heidegger as 
attempting to support throughout his career, an anti-realism that is finally reached via dropping 
anxiety as revelatory of a pure, ahistorical subject and, with that out of the way, taking man to be 
totally absorbed in, and structurally defined by, history. Unlike Being and Time, in the later work 
“history now permeates everything, and this removes any possibility of stable, unchanging 
reality, including a true self.”40 Though they differ on what exactly is implied, Dreyfus, Haar, 
and Braver all agree that in authenticity, a way of being that is always anxious, the socio-
historical world loses all relation to Dasein. That being the case, authenticity must be something 
other than a relation to Dasein’s historical world. 
 An additional view that some of these interpreters share is that, for Heidegger, 
authenticity and anxiety are opposed to inauthentic public understanding and to das Man, whose 
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Manselbst is a corruption of Dasein’s possibilities. For these interpreters, das Man’s role, and 
with it socio-historical world more broadly, is as a force of distortion; when considered in 
relation to Heidegger’s views on authentic history, this is then typically presented as a tension for 
Heidegger’s use of history, one resolved in the later work by dropping das Man and the 
authenticity/inauthenticity distinction. For this reason, Braver says that whereas Being and Time 
holds the promise of a conception of the self “as completely defined by societal structures,”41 one 
that gives top billing to socio-historical factors, Heidegger fails to live up to his own promise in 
the book. This is because of authenticity. According to Braver, when Heidegger describes 
authenticity as a form of self-constancy, “The obvious presupposition of Heidegger’s argument 
is that there is a way that we really are, a way that gets covered up and disguised by our fallen 
average everyday understanding.”42 This self, Braver thinks, is the hidden subject left behind 
after all else is stripped away; there is no room for socio-historical factors to have a defining role 
in Dasein’s constitution outside of das Man, a problem that leads to inconsistency when 
Heidegger tries to make a role for authentic history in Being and Time.
43
 
 For Dreyfus, who accepts, as seen above, that history has a positive and important role to 
play in Heidegger’s account of authenticity, this positive role is in tension with the public as a 
force of distortion and untruth. He thinks that Heidegger is caught between the Diltheyan view 
that any understanding of the world can only occur in a backdrop of history and culture, and a 
Kierkegaardian suspicion of hoi polloi. As a result, “Heidegger does not distinguish these two 
issues but jumps back and forth between them, sometimes even in the same paragraph,”44 leading 
to a great deal of confusion in Being and Time’s view of history. This confusion, according to 
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Dreyfus, is resolved in the later work by the eliminating the idea that Dasein flees its anxiety into 
anything like das Man; that is, by basically removing das Man from the account.  
 Haar thinks in largely the same way that the relationship between authenticity and 
inauthenticity becomes less significant after Being and Time.
45
 History is no longer associated 
with das Man and distortion; “the importance of the distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic, originary and derivative, becomes attenuated; Dasein moves towards neutrality.”46 
 Beyond particular claims, there is a consistent general approach to the relationship 
between the individual and history in Heidegger that most of the above interpreters share . They 
place the brunt of their interpretive weight on Being and Time, describing the later work either as 
a reaction against Being and Time or as an attempt to carry out the goals that it failed to achieve. 
Being and Time itself is taken to be individualistic, and the main support for the individualist 
thesis comes from the account of authenticity. It is argued that in Being and Time, anxious, 
authentic Dasein is cut off from the world, whereas in the later work Dasein is immersed in its 
historical epoch; possibilities no longer emerge from Dasein’s own self, but from the particular 
historical epoch itself. As a result, a tension appears in Being and Time between history, 
represented primarily by das Man, and the authentic, anxious individual; the idea of a role for 
history apart from the Manselbst, and for a genuine connection between authenticity and history, 
is either not countenanced, disregarded, or considered an inconsistency on Heidegger’s part, one 
later resolved in favor of history and against the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction. 
 Accordingly, when discussing the individual and history, with regards to Being and Time 
I will give primary attention to: the status of das Man and its relation to socio-historical factors 
more broadly; the way in which Dasein becomes authentic, with special attention to anxiety, 
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resoluteness, and how the process of becoming authentic affects Dasein’s understanding of and 
relation to its possibilities; and the account of authentic historicity late in Being and Time. 
Correspondingly, for later periods the discussion will focus on: how technology relates to man 
and how that compares to the account of das Man and inauthenticity; what happens to the 
elements that were formerly included in the process of authenticity, such as anxiety, decision, 
and resoluteness; and how the account of history compares in content and structure to the role of 
history, in particular authentic historicity, in Being and Time. 
 
1.2 THE EXISTENTIALIST AND THE MYSTIC 
 
 Thus far, the discussion of authenticity has focused on the content of authentic decisions, 
specifically on the source of those possibilities towards which one can take an authentic stance: 
do authentic possibilities come purely from oneself, or is their content determined independently 
of the individual by broader socio-historical factors? Strong Kehre readings of authenticity are 
rarely limited to content, however; they typically also argue for a shift in the form of authenticity, 
which is to say, the way in which authentic choosing occurs and is carried out. Apart from what 
one’s authentic possibilities are and where they come from, what sort of activity (or inactivity) 
does being authentic involve? What does one do when authentic? Step forward and take 
command of one’s destiny, so to speak? Be open and accepting of one’s circumstances, passively 
understanding and accepting rather than fighting for them? These two alternatives offer a first 
pass at defining what will be referred to as ‘activism’ and ‘passivism,’ and they represent another 
central issue in understanding authenticity. In short, does being authentic mean that one is 
actively asserting, taking hold of, and advancing towards one’s possibilities, or is authenticity 
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more of a passive understanding and acknowledgement of one’s possibilities? Or is there 
something in between these two? 
 The active-passive relation is closely related to, but not the same as, the individual-
history relation, so it is important to note how they can diverge. This is importantly partly 
because the two are frequently run together, as when Zimmerman calls Being and Time’s version 
of authenticity a “voluntaristic-individualistic” one, noted above. It seems fairly natural to think 
that, if possibilities come from the individual, it must be up to the individual to actively posit and 
pursue those possibilities; on the other hand, if they come fully from history, then individuals 
must simply accept them as they are, having no power to determine whether or how those 
possibilities will be realized. But such a connection is not necessary. For instance, one can 
believe that one’s possibilities are fully determined by history, but also that the possibility of 
falling away from them must be forcefully resisted, and that these possibilities are resolved upon 
only through one’s own initiative. One must, the thought goes, seize one’s historical destiny, or 
the destiny of one’s people, and realize its potential.47 From the other direction, one may think 
that the possibilities one has are determined solely by oneself as an individual, while also 
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thinking that the way to pursue those choices is to let them unfold naturally, so to speak. From 
this perspective, actively pursuing possibilities may distort them, leading to a mistaken focus on 
pleasure, success, greatness, or accomplishment rather than the actual unfolding of what is most 
true to one; one becomes selfish, lonely, and a caricature of oneself. It is important, therefore, to 
separate the form of authentic action from the content of authentic choice; to accomplish this, the 
discussion of activism and passivism will be treated separately from that of the individual-history 
relation. For similar reasons, one must also be careful to separate the question of activism from 
that of who acts; it could be an individual, a group, a nation, or mankind that is active or passive. 
So when it is asked whether ‘people’ pursue ‘their own’ possibilities actively or passively, this 
must not be read in a way that sneaks individualism in through the backdoor or takes it to show 
that individualism must be part of the picture; referring to ‘people’ in this way is more for 
convenience than anything else. 
 More precisely, the activist version of authenticity can be said to hold that authentic 
individuals or groups pursue their possibilities on their own initiative—regardless of where 
possibilities come from, given that they exist it is up to the people in question to set about 
actualizing those possibilities. If they do not take it on themselves to do so, their possibilities will 
not be realized in any way; possibilities don’t become actual through any other means. This can 
be understood in a few ways. These ways will be explained in more detail when they appear 
again in Chapter 2, but an initial discussion helps to make activism in general clearer. Say that an 
authentic possibility for me is to become a philosopher. On the activist reading, authentically 
becoming a philosopher means asserting and pushing for the realization of my possibility. One 
way in which that would be the case is if it were up to me to determine what my own 
possibilities are. Perhaps those around me tell me that becoming a medical doctor is the way to 
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go, and that a degree in philosophy is at best a qualification for becoming a barista. In that case I 
have to, on my initiative, take being a philosopher as a real possibility for me, as the thing that 
has to be pursued; I have to choose it as my possibility, and in so doing make it mine. This is 
activism with regards to possibility creation. Another somewhat weaker form of activism 
appears if, having recognized that a possibility is my own, it is up to me whether I take it 
seriously. In the above example, say that it is not up to me whether becoming a philosopher is a 
possibility of mine. Perhaps, though, I am tempted to take the easier route and become a well-
paid and respected, but miserable and unfulfilled doctor. Authenticity, on this reading, requires 
admitting to myself that philosophy is the best possibility for me to pursue, against the 
temptation to take on another possibility as my own—granted that I know it is a possibility of 
mine, do I choose to pursue it? This claim is not about possibility creation, but possibility 
acknowledgement. Finally, activism could exist, in a still weaker sense, in the form of persisting 
in the pursuit of one’s possibilities in the face of pressure and resistance. Perhaps, having 
acknowledged that philosophy is what I should pursue, my family threatens to disown me if I 
continue studying it (not an absurd possibility if, say, I am coming from a fundamentalist 
background). Perhaps my professors tell me I’m not writing on a topic that will get me published 
in top journals, and so I should change my field. Becoming a philosopher means overcoming 
these pressures and holding firm in the pursuit of being a philosopher. This claim is about pursuit 
of possibilities. 
 Common in all three readings is the idea that becoming authentic requires taking action to 
overcome something that keeps one from being authentic, be it anxiety, ignorance, temptation, or 
something else; this is where inauthenticity plays its role. Inauthenticity as erring in discovering 
or creating one’s possibilities, as keeping oneself from consciously acknowledging them, or as 
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submitting to outside pressure against pursuing them, must be fought in order to be authentic. 
Being authentic requires taking action, in this view, because there are strong forces (of one or 
more of the sorts in the example above) resisting authenticity. To not take action means lingering 
in inauthenticity, in some way choosing not to pursue one’s possibilities, so action is a 
requirement of authenticity. The activist reading of authenticity, then, holds that becoming 
authentic requires taking some sort of initiative in affirming one’s possibilities, in response to 
something, such as anxiety, ignorance, temptation, or outside pressure, that keeps authenticity 
from being one’s state. In short, authenticity must be pursued. 
 In a passivist version of authenticity, by contrast, authenticity requires openness in some 
manner, and for the active-passive distinction to be a substantive one, that openness must be 
opposed to the assertive stance definitive of the activist reading. One might ask, though, whether 
becoming authentic in a passivist manner makes sense. If authenticity is something that, so to 
speak, just happens to one, with one being the passive recipient of authentic possibilities (or not), 
being authentic (or not) appears to be little more than a fact about one’s state, and as a result not 
particularly interesting. Some people are authentic, some not, and that is simply the way it is. But 
this misses the nature of the distinction. The difference between the activist and passivist 
readings is not whether authenticity requires the person or group to take some sort of stance, 
versus just sitting and waiting for authenticity to happen—both activism and passivism require 
taking a stance, and in this sense require at least some very minimal act. The difference is in 
what kind of stance is involved. Whereas activism requires taking the initiative in pursuing a 
possibility, passivism does not involve asserting possibilities, but rather allowing them to emerge 
of their own accord, so to speak naturally. The easiest way to understand this
48
, and one 
frequently used in the context of Heidegger’s later writings, is in terms of mysticism. Mysticism, 
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in Buddhist, Christian, and other forms, is usually not a total lack of activity. Mystic meditation, 
for example, can take years of training and focused concentration to perfect, the result being a 
carefully cultivated stance towards the world. In a way, it is a sort of sustained action, but the 
action does not involve assertion or pursuing a goal. The action involves the refusal of assertion, 
and in its place allows a situation, a feeling, or a thought (or nothing at all) to manifest itself in 
its own way, naturally and unforced. Passivism is passive insofar as it does not call for assertion 
or actively pursuing possibilities, but rather allows possibilities to emerge on their own. 
 Since the passivist reading ties authenticity to openness as opposed to assertion, assertion 
actually becomes the main ground of inauthenticity. Again, the analogy to mysticism is 
informative. Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths, for instance, locate the source of human suffering 
in attachment to the material world and its pursuits. To achieve the elimination of suffering, one 
must detach oneself from those pursuits (possibilities). Such detachment doesn’t involve the 
assertion of new and different possibilities, but rather pulling away from possibilities previously 
taken for granted, recognizing them as insufficient for human happiness. Such liberation from 
the sources of suffering takes time and practice, but it is not activist in the sense of taking 
command of what one should pursue—rather, it is the process of allowing that struggle to fall 
away and become insignificant. To use the example from before: if my possibility is to become a 
philosopher, the danger to realizing that possibility, according to the passivist reading, is not 
inaction on my part but giving in to the rush of concerns and interests posed by the everyday 
world. The dangers to realizing one’s possibilities can be (though they of course don’t need to 
be) similar to, even the same as, those posed in the activist reading: ideas about what life paths 
are best (“Philosophy isn’t for me—I should try to become a doctor, which is the thing that 
important people in our world do.”), ideas of what professions are appropriate for one 
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(“Philosophy is what I do best and like most, but is that really more important than my financial 
and public success?”), views of what constitutes success in a profession such as philosophy (“I 
care about working on medieval aesthetics, but it’s hard to get published in that area; maybe I 
should work on something more popular.”). What changes is that these factors are opposed to 
authenticity because they lead one to abandon one’s true possibilities in the charge for some 
supposedly better goal. The drive for success, or happiness, or power, or comfort leads to 
absorption in inauthentic life, and inauthenticity promotes assertion because constantly charging 
forward prevents genuine self-awareness. Assertion, thus activism, is the threat to overcome. 
 As with the individual-history relation, the strong Kehre thesis makes two basic claims 
with regard to activism and passivism, one about Being and Time and one about the later work 
taken as a whole. In short, the first is that Being and Time is an activist work, according to which 
authenticity requires that people assert their possibilities against strong resistance. The second is 
that Heidegger’s later work is mystical, where ‘mystical’ means a deeply passivist position. 
 In Being and Time, according to strong Kehre reading, becoming authentic requires a 
process of self-assertion and self-initiated liberation from the temptations of inauthentic 
understanding. (Again, one must recall that despite the language, and despite the fact that the 
secondary literature usually ties the two together, activism and individualism can be separated, as 
can passivity and historicism.) In its normal, everyday way of living in the world, Dasein is 
under the dominion of inauthentic understanding. But this is not simply because Dasein is 
naturally that way; the world itself tempts Dasein away from confronting its own possibilities. 
“If Dasein itself,” Heidegger says, “presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in [das Man] 
and falling into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation 
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towards falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting [versucherich].”49 Instead of 
acknowledging its true possibilities, and so confronting the anxiety that comes with its true 
possibilities, Dasein has a tendency to become absorbed in the concerns and possibilities that the 
world presents to it as valuable; if it didn’t have this tendency, then inauthentic phenomena such 
as idle talk and curiosity would have no hold on it, wouldn’t be tempting. Into this situation 
comes das Man offering an alternative set of possibilities, one that appears to be free of 
unsettledness. Das Man comforts Dasein by hiding the truth from it, an act that Dasein is 
complicit with. As a result, 
 
the particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by [das Man]. Not only that; by thus 
disburdening it of its Being, [das Man] accommodates Dasein [kommt . . . dem Dasein 
entgegen] if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And because 
[das Man] constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being, 
[das Man] retains and enhances its stubborn dominion.
50
 
 
 
Inauthenticity is a “tranquilizing”51 way of existing towards which Dasein is tempted. 
 What of authenticity? How is it, according to the strong reading, activist? “Authentic 
existence . . . [is] a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.”52 Authentic 
existence is a particular way of seizing one’s situation, one that starts with the call of conscience. 
In brief, the call of conscience is what first breaks das Man’s grip on Dasein, by forcing Dasein 
to recognize the anxiety it has about its possibilities. Conscience forces Dasein to recognize its 
guilt, ‘guilt’ being a technical term meaning in part that Dasein “always stands in one possibility 
or another: it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell 
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projection.”53 To say that Dasein is guilty is to say that Dasein has made a choice to pursue some 
possibility rather than others. The call of conscience, then, is the recognition that Dasein has 
made a choice, and is always making a choice; since Dasein’s very nature includes always 
having possibilities, “Dasein as such is guilty, if our formally existential definition of “guilt” as 
“Being-the-basis of a nullity [in the sense of nullifying possibilities]” is indeed correct.”54 
Dasein, then, as a being that constantly pursues possibilities, is always choosing to pursue or not 
to pursue possibilities, always choosing what possibilities it should pursue and so deciding, it 
seems, what its possibilities are (one way in which Being and Time appears activist). Dasein is 
shaken from the inauthentic avoidance of its anxiety by the call of conscience. Where does that 
call come from? Heidegger almost dismisses the question as unnecessary: “But is it at all 
necessary to keep raising explicitly the question of who does the calling . . . ? In conscience 
Dasein calls itself.”55 Dasein must wake itself up via its conscience, must itself admit its anxiety 
(a second way that activism appears). Finally, when Dasein accepts the call of conscience it 
becomes free to recognize the real nature of its possibilities: “It has chosen itself.”56 In so 
choosing itself, it resolves itself upon its true, most essential possibilities: “this reticent self-
projection up on one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call 
“resoluteness”.”57 Dasein, once it has recognized its possibilities, must affirm them as its own, 
accept them, and continue to pursue them (a third way in which activism appears). In several 
ways, then, interpreters can argue that Being and Time has an activist conception of authenticity. 
 While Being and Time is activist, according to the strong Kehre reading, Heidegger’s 
later works completely reverse the relationship between man and Being, and with it activism. In 
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Being and Time, the story goes, whether man achieves the state of authenticity is up to what man 
decides to do; he must make the decision and pursue it. Not so for later Heidegger. For instance, 
in the late 1930s Heidegger says of thinking, which comes to take the place of authenticity in this 
period, “do “we” think being?  Or is it so that be-ing “is” and en-owns [er-eignen] thinking 
(thinking not as an arbitrary representing, but as en-thinking of being) and thereby en-owns 
man’s ownmost?”58 In later Heidegger’s philosophy, you don’t think Being—Being thinks you! 
This is meant quite seriously, at least in a sense. Heidegger’s position at this juncture appears to 
be that, far from man’s assertion of his possibilities setting the ground for an authentic 
relationship to the world, it is the state of be-ing itself, where be-ing is understood as something 
transcending individuals and groups, that determines whether authentic possibilities are 
available, whether man’s ownmost (possibility) will be made manifest. Heidegger continues, in 
an extremely dense passage typical of some of his later works: 
 
It is not we who “bring about” a rupture to be-ing; it is not we who interpret it “as” the 
ground. Rather, within the sway of be-ing as the refusal, there opens up first, along with the 
ab-ground, what is charged with ground as well as the ‘nothing’ that prevails through all 
nihilation and arises together with the prime-leap.
59
 
 
 
Without our getting too far into the weeds, this passage suggests that it is not up to us whether 
we correctly recognize be-ing (hence bringing about a rupture, as anxiety does for our normal 
understanding of the world, which opens up the possibility of authenticity) as that which grounds 
our understanding of the world. Instead, be-ing has a particular nature, that of refusal (refusal to 
show us its true nature as that which makes all beings the beings they are; instead, we are 
presented with particular beings, such as tables, chairs, and the like, not with be-ing) which 
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opens up the nothing. The nothing is the gap between us and a perfectly orderly flow of events, 
what allows us to in a way separate ourselves from the normal flow of life and not be absorbed 
by it; basically, the nothing is what allows for our capacity for awareness of our world as 
historical possibilities, and is what thereby makes authentic decision possible. In the above 
passage, it is be-ing’s refusal and hiding of itself that makes inauthenticity possible, not any 
particular flaw or tendency on our part. At the same time, be-ing is the source of the ab-ground, 
or lack of ground for ultimate significance and meaning of any sort, which leads to the anxiety 
that pierces through our inauthentic understanding and makes authenticity (or here, thinking) 
possible. More straightforwardly, Heidegger says in a later passage that “man can neither steer 
nor force the manner in which, at any given time, be-ing enowns its truth or holds it back in 
order to leave beings entirely to themselves and to their raving in machination,”60 where 
machination here takes the place of inauthenticity. Sometimes be-ing giveth, and sometimes it 
taketh away. It is not up to us whether we are lost in the epoch of technology; the sway of be-ing, 
whether it veils or reveals itself, is up to its own unfolding. Whether we are authentic or not, 
then, appears to be up to be-ing itself, i.e. the impersonal flow of history, not up to us. In this 
way, the history-centered reading of the later work easily pairs with the passivist one, much like 
the individualist interpretation of Being and Time pairs easily with the activist one, which is part 
of why the two so often come together. 
 If everything is up to be-ing, on this reading of Heidegger, is there nothing people can do 
to become authentic (or its equivalents)? In the normal sense, which is to say some sort of 
striving for authenticity, the answer is a flat no. From the 1930s on, Heidegger associates 
assertion and the quest for power, including power over oneself, with the technological 
interpretation of the world that he thinks poses the greatest threat to our relationship to Being:  
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machination expands its sway as coercive force. By securing power, this coercive force 
develops as the immediately eruptible and always transformable capability for subjugation . . 
. . To the extent that in the epoch of machination that is empowered to its unbounded 
coercive force man also grasps himself as animal (living-being), the only thing that remains 
for man himself . . . is the appearance of self-assertion vis a vis beings.”61 
 
 
The modern epoch is obsessed with overcoming, self-willing, and assertion of power over things. 
Man thinks himself powerful, but in fact it is the current age of technology that has power over 
man, determining how he understands the world and what sort of possibilities he pursues, a point 
expanded on later in “The Question Concerning Technology:” “Man can indeed conceive, 
fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over 
unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws.”62 Man can 
try to take control of the world, but how he grasps it is something he is not in control of. There is 
no asserting one’s destiny, as it is fully beyond one’s power. 
 That being said, the question remains: what, if anything, can one do? Here Heidegger’s 
language famously veers towards the poetic. “Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his 
heart, and gives himself over to meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and 
thanking, he finds himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed.”63 The word ‘open’ 
invariably comes up in discussions of the later Heidegger, and with good reason. ‘Open’ or 
‘openness’ is the most effective word to describe what authenticity becomes focused on. Man’s 
proper stance, given that self-assertion is a product of technological thinking, is to slow down, 
take a breath, and observe the world around. Man is always in a world full of meanings that 
come from beyond him, and the most important step to realizing that, the later Heidegger seems 
to think, is by drawing away from the modern rush and allowing the world itself to show itself as 
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it is, without trying to master it. True thinking, which means thinking that grasps the most basic, 
essential relation between man and the world (between Dasein and his possibilities) is about not 
willing at all: “thinking is something other than willing . . . . And that is why, in answer to your 
question as to what I really wanted from our meditation on the nature of thinking, I replied: I 
want non-willing.”64 Freedom from technology means, on the passivist reading, freedom from 
willing altogether, the freedom to grasp one’s world as it reveals itself to be. This appears close 
to the Buddhist idea of nirvana, of release from suffering by releasement from attachments. 
Taking all of this together, one can anticipate what Heidegger would say when asked, in 1966, if 
anyone can do anything to stop the march of technology: “philosophy will not be able to effect 
an immediate transformation of the present condition of the world. This is not only true of 
philosophy, but of all merely human thought and endeavor. Only a god can save us.”65 
 The strong Kehre interpretation of the active-passive dimension just provided appears to 
have a good explanation for the changing nature of Heidegger’s written work after Being and 
Time, and like the individual-history dimension it has several interpreters supporting it in 
somewhat varied ways. As with the individual-history dimension, the interpretive weight here is 
often placed on the interpretation of Being and Time, with the Kehre then understood primarily 
as a response to it. The later work does receive a more developed discussion in the literature 
when it comes to its purported passivism, but as a thesis about Heidegger’s work it is understood 
primarily as a reaction. When given briefly, the story is typically of a conversion from initiator of 
the existentialist movement to a quasi-mystic poet, as when Wrathall opens a chapter on “Death 
and Authenticity” in his introductory book on Heidegger by saying that “Heidegger’s [Being and 
Time-era] philosophy stands squarely in the existential tradition in Western thought,” where 
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existentialists emphasize “human freedom,” among other things.66 Correspondingly, Blattner, in 
his book on what he takes to be Heidegger’s temporal idealism, takes time to mention, though 
not defend, what he takes to be the later Heidegger’s “radical, quasi-mystical position,” a 
position that he makes use of as a contrast to Heidegger’s earlier views.67 
 There are also other, more deeply worked-out versions of the strong Kehre interpretation. 
Again, one of the first and clearest contemporary versions is Zimmerman’s. Zimmerman’s 
explanation of Being and Time, despite his use of the term ‘voluntaristic-individualistic’ to 
describe the work, is more subtle than it appears. In discussing the call of conscience and its role 
in Being and Time, he notes that the call of conscience, which first brings Dasein to recognize its 
guilt and thus be open to becoming authentic, “can be controlled by no man.”68 Thus, Heidegger 
does not think, according to Zimmerman, that we can come on our own to recognize what our 
authentic possibilities are, much less assert our own goals to pursue. However, insofar as Dasein 
 
resolves to anticipate the call of conscience, i.e., insofar as owned existence is possible only 
because Dasein steels itself to face its own finitude, then owned Selfhood remains mired in 
the kind of subjectivity which Heidegger claims characterizes Western thinking. According 
to Heidegger, resolve and will lie on the side of the subject.
69
 
 
 
In Being and Time, on Zimmerman’s reading, Dasein must still will itself to acknowledge that its 
possibilities are its own to take on, and take action in resisting inauthenticity and pressing forth 
into them. This is reversed in the later work, however: “As the later Heidegger might say, Dasein 
must let Being speak through Dasein – but it is Being itself which initiates the disclosing of 
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Being through this speaking.”70 For authentic possibilities to be open in Being and Time, Dasein 
must make the choice to put aside its inauthentic concerns and to acknowledge the source of its 
anxiety; it must choose to let Being speak to it. In Heidegger’s later works, on the other hand, 
Being determines if and when this happens. The later works correct the so-called ‘subjectivity’ 
of the earlier works by abandoning resoluteness and willing as elements of authenticity. 
 Haar similarly locates the crux of activism in how anxiety comes about. In Being and 
Time, according to Haar, anxiety appears “in Dasein alone as the index of its ownmost 
potentiality for being,”71 without there being any role for Being itself, or anything beyond 
Dasein, to initiate the turn to anxiety. The onset of anxious awareness of the limits of one’s 
possibilities, that one either can choose or fail to choose one’s possibilities, is a personal event 
for each Dasein, whose arrival and significance ranges only over that Dasein’s possibilities. 
Being itself more broadly has no role in the process; as noted previously when discussing Haar, 
for him “in Being and Time there is no anxiety in respect of being,”72 but only in respect to 
Dasein’s own possibilities. This formulation remains somewhat ambiguous—does this actually 
require that Dasein itself initiate the transition to anxious recognition of its possibilities?—but is 
made clearer when Haar specifically addresses the Kehre. The activism of Being and Time, Haar 
says, is directly reversed almost immediately after 1927, where “The nonhuman origin of 
nihilation (Nichten), the powerful trace of thrownness, overrides the assumption of self-enabling 
via death.”73 In 1929 nihilation is what initiates anxiety, not Dasein’s self-enabling of itself 
through recognition of its inevitable death (which, in Being and Time, is taken as Dasein’s 
‘ownmost’ possibility). Dasein does not begin the path towards authenticity; nihilation, or “the 
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self manifestation of being is substituted for the linking of anxiety with extreme, individual 
enabling.”74 This transition is perhaps the central aspect of Heidegger’s Kehre, as Haar describes 
it, where Dasein is replaced totally by Being as the locus of activity: “With the [Kehre], indeed, 
it seems that we are witnessing a total inversion of subjectivism, anthropocentrism, and the 
movement of self-possibilization. All freedom is made possible in the first place by being.”75 
 Not all who accept an activist interpretation of Being and Time, or the strong Kehre 
interpretation more broadly, interpret Being and Time’s as activist in this way. While 
Zimmerman’s and Haar’s readings focus primarily on the second sense of activism discussed 
earlier, Olafon’s reading focuses on the first, on who or what is the source of possibilities in the 
first place. In Being and Time, Olafson tells us, Dasein is a projective being—that is to say, it is 
always looking ahead to what it can become, projecting possibilities into the future that it 
chooses to pursue. Because of the “freedom in which such projects are generated, and the 
indefinitely extensive variety of content by which these are characterized,”76 Heidegger was 
presented with the problem that the nature of Being, “as presence a space of possibilities and of 
possibilities that were coordinate with the Selbstheit – the “selfness” – of Dasein,”77 became 
dependent entirely on what Dasein determines to do. It is Dasein, as a free and independent 
being, that decides what possibilities it will pursue. Being, as a result, is just the way the world 
manifests in light of Dasein’s chosen possibilities; I see the world as a Western philosopher or a 
Hindu fundamentalist because of my choice. Everything depends on the initiative of Dasein, 
going as far as what Being itself could be. In his later works, Olafson continues, Heidegger 
“dealt with this difficulty by simply dropping the active and projective character of Dasein” 
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altogether, moving to “the quietism of the later period.”78 This is an instance of the first form of 
activism, where in Being and Time Dasein determines the very nature of its possibilities—of 
what would be the possibility to follow. Authenticity in Being and Time, on this reading, is 
Dasein asserting possibilities of its own choosing, not any that come from outside. In the later 
work, however, the situation is reversed; it is Being, which Olafson interprets as presence, that 
determines the ground of Dasein’s existence, its possibilities, and not the other way around. 
 Braver also focuses on Dasein as a projective being. “The meaning of Being,” says 
Braver, “the goal of the entire book, was the temporality that human Dasein projects which 
makes Being possible.”79 The very aim of Being and Time, Braver says, is to show that it is 
Dasein which creates the space of possibilities in which it moves and acts, “similar to the way 
Kant’s transcendental subject projects time and space (Heidegger, BT 54– 55/31).”80 Interpreting 
Being and Time as a Kantian transcendental project, Braver places the failing of Being and Time, 
and the reason it was left unfinished, in its inability to escape a realist notion of a transcendental 
subject that constitutes the world, and thus constitutes Being, and thus constitutes the 
possibilities that it pursues; Dasein determines what its world will be through its choice. Not so, 
when it comes to the later work, which institutes 
 
a new, revised form of Passive Knower. The clearing or relation to beings is not created or 
instituted by us, as in the Kantian Paradigm; rather, it is “granted” or “sent” to us and we 
receive it. Later Heideggerian man is an exceedingly passive being. This is not the passivity 
of the empiricist soft-wax or blank-slate mind, since interpretation is always at work, but the 
controlling and inaugurating activity of the Kantian active knower is now rejected.
81
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Braver 274. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Braver 275. 
39 
 
In the later work, while “interpretation is always at work” (though apparently not in a substantial 
sense, since the very same interpreter is “an exceedingly passive being”), Dasein no longer 
brings about the world as it is experienced in any way. The projection of possibilities which 
helps to shape a world is no longer the result of Dasein’s activity, as in Being and Time; now it is 
sent to us and we receive it ‘thankfully’ as a ‘gift’ (to use two more of Heidegger’s terms from 
his later work) from something beyond us. 
 As said before, many of these interpreters (virtually all of them, in fact) tend to tie 
activism in Heidegger to individualism, and passivism to historicism. One who offers a more 
complex picture is Dreyfus. The resolute stance that forms the core of Being and Time’s account 
of authenticity, according to Dreyfus, “is the openness that results from the acceptance of the 
breakdown of the ethical illusion of lucid total choice, and the realization that the self is impotent 
and empty. It is therefore misleading to call the change choosing to choose. Dasein does not 
choose at all.”82 This is a drastically different account from the ones given above, where choice 
is central, either at the level of choosing what will be a possibility, or of choosing to 
acknowledge what one’s true possibilities really are. Resoluteness just means, on Dreyfus’ 
account, recognizing that one has no power to decide what one will be (it is worth nothing that 
this discussion appears in an appendix comparing Heidegger and Kierkegaard, in part on the 
powerless of the subject to determine a way to live on her own). However, when one looks at 
why Dreyfus takes resoluteness to be this way, it is because he actually cites in the first place not 
Being and Time, but interpretations of Being and Time that Heidegger gives in Introduction to 
Metaphysics and “The Origin of the Work of Art,” pieces from the mid-1930s, to make the point! 
Which is not to say that Dreyfus is wrong in doing so (in fact, he’s quite right). But the very 
issue in contention is whether such a move is legitimate, whether Heidegger really can be trusted 
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when he claims that he is saying the same thing in Being and Time and after. With so many 
arguing against that thesis, it cannot be taken for granted, but must be defended. 
 As with the individualism-history relation, a common pattern clearly emerges in the 
strong Kehre reading here: Being and Time is an activist work because it has an activist account 
of authenticity, where Dasein in some important way chooses whether or not to become 
authentic. Whatever happens, it is up to Dasein to take action. In the later work, on the other 
hand, action is in a certain sense the enemy; insofar as there is any ‘doing’ at all, it is a ceasing of 
action, of willing, and in its place an opening of oneself to the receiving of Being. It is action, not 
inaction, which creates problems. The result is a complete reversal of the position in Being and 
Time. The way in which I will approach the topic is largely the same as for the individual-history 
relation. In Chapter 2, a detailed interpretation of authenticity in Being and Time will provide 
interpretive grounds for arguing about whether Heidegger was activist or passivist in that work. 
Corresponding to the three possible versions of activism (and corresponding forms of passivism) 
described above, the focus for Being and Time will be on where possibilities come from (a 
question that will be addressed partly in the discussion of history), on how anxiety comes about 
and whether Dasein initiates it, and whether Dasein must hold itself firm in an active sense in its 
pursuit of possibilities. In each of the later chapters, interpretations of major works will proceed 
by way of comparison with regard to the same three elements. The result will be both a clearer 
grasp of whether Heidegger was an activist and passivist, and of what sort of changes his 
understanding of this topic went through over his career. 
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1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 
 
 Since the discussion is about Heidegger’s body of work as a whole and how authenticity 
is understood across that corpus, a wide range of his works will be under consideration. 
However, there is far too much to do anything like an exhaustive study, so much must, of 
necessity, be left out. For instance, I will leave out anything before Being and Time. Not because 
there is nothing of interest there, even when it comes to the discussion of authenticity. (After all, 
it would be strange to assume that authenticity emerged suddenly as Heidegger was writing 
Being and Time, like Athena from the head of Zeus.) However, since the focus is on authenticity 
once it has developed into the distinct form that one finds in Being and Time, it would add little 
to my purpose to discuss it here. 
 The first cross-section of Heidegger’s work to be looked at is, of course, Being and Time 
itself, where authenticity is introduced and expounded on at length. Chapter 2 will focus almost 
exclusively on Being and Time, with a look at “What is Metaphysics?” as well. In the latter, 
anxiety is examined in a way that closely follows the account Being and Time in many respects 
while expanding upon the discussion. There will be no discussion there of works past “What is 
Metaphysics?” as they reach more uncertain interpretive territory. Thus, Chapter 2 can be 
thought of as covering authenticity pre-Kehre. 
 Chapter 3 will jump to the late 1930s. The early to mid-1930s is very important for 
grasping the actual historical progression of Heidegger’s work itself, but this study does not aim 
to look at each individual development and introduction or modification of a term—the aim here 
is to examine several snapshots as they appear in significant works at a given time period, and to 
see how they relate to each other. And while the status of the 1930s remains murky—there is 
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much debate, noted above, as to when changes emblematic of the Kehre can be found in certain 
works—there is universal agreement that such changes have come about by the late 1930s, in 
particular with the be-ing-historical treatises. As such, Chapter 3 will focus primarily on 
Mindfulness, the second of those treatises, which is more developed and more legible than the 
earlier Contributions. There will also be some discussion of the 1935 lecture “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” which covers some similar themes in a very different form. Together, these cover 
a sort of transition period between Being and Time and what is typically considered the late 
Heidegger, who purportedly comes onto the scene in the 1940s. 
 Chapter 4 then moves on to that late Heidegger, covering a wide range of works from the 
early 1940s to the mid-1960s. Heidegger’s writings of that time are diverse, and are mostly in the 
form of lectures or lecture courses, not long treatises such as Being and Time or Mindfulness. 
Thus, a single representative work cannot be chosen to lead the discussion, and this has some 
benefits, since a much wider range of years is being covered. Works under close consideration 
include the two Addenda to “What is Metaphysics?” and the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” all written 
in the 1940s, “The Question Concerning Technology,” written in the late 1940s but revised in the 
1950s, and the Der Spiegel interview, “Only a God Can Save Us,” given in 1966. The discussion 
there will not be limited to those works; several others will appear when they have something 
distinct to contribute, such as 1962’s “Time and Being.” While a much wider range of years is 
being considered, and a much wider variety of works, there is little scholarly debate about the 
degree of difference between works of this period, and indeed they tend to be similar, tonally and 
otherwise, so that there is not much issue in treating them mostly together (though, of course, 
any significant differences, whether apparent or otherwise, will be discussed as they come up). 
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 Finally, Chapter 5 will look back at the overall argument developed over the previous 
chapters, and take a speculative look at what possibilities for further study might be opened up as 
a result. I argue that any changes in Heidegger’s conception of authenticity are not changes of 
content. But then how does one explain why things look so different? What is the Kehre, if not a 
new view? I conclude by offering a quick sketch of where the answer may lie.  
 In an ideal world, far more of Heidegger’s works would be examined for this study. But 
an exhaustive study of Heidegger’s body of work would be nearly as exhaustive as Heidegger’s 
collected works themselves, and likely take decades rather than years to write; as a result, one 
can only take what are important works, either taken on their own or in virtue of their place in 
the secondary literature, and try to form as complete a picture from them as the circumstances 
allow. My hope is to have covered the major twists and turns in Heidegger’s works in a way that 
can be judged at least satisfactory. Whether I have succeeded, only what follows can determine. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTHENTICITY AND INAUTHENTICITY IN BEING AND TIME 
 
 Heidegger, of course, wrote many works before Being and Time, especially in the early 
and mid-1920s, and there is little doubt among commentators that there was a great deal of 
change over that period. However, when Heidegger appears to refer to a Kehre, most take the 
Kehre to have occurred between Being and Time and the works that came in the following 
decades. It is with Being and Time that we get the most complete statement of several aspects 
involved in the Kehre, and against which any discussion of the later work is compared. In 
particular, it is in Being and Time that authenticity (and, with it, inauthenticity) receives the 
extended, detailed analysis around which any discussion of authenticity in Heidegger revolves. 
As such, Being and Time itself, along with the well-known 1929 lecture “What is Metaphysics?” 
(which is in many ways complementary to Being and Time) will provide the starting point for 
discussing authenticity. 
 The examination of authenticity in Being and Time will consist of four parts. First will be 
an initial discussion of authenticity and inauthenticity, moving in the order that Heidegger sets it 
out in (from inauthenticity as a starting point, to authenticity). This discussion will attempt to 
paint a relatively neutral picture of authenticity and inauthenticity, and of what the relation 
between the two, along with how one transitions to the other, looks like. It will lay out the major 
terms, when they appear in the course of the text, and what role they seem to play, while 
attempting to avoid controversial interpretive leaps. From the basic picture I will take a brief 
look look at how the common view of authenticity as an individualistic (which for commentators 
typically means ahistorical, as opposed to historical) and activist (which is typically opposed to a 
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form of passivism) view emerges from this account. Having set out those two interpretations, I 
will address the first by turning to the discussion of authenticity in the later chapters of Being 
and Time, where a more nuanced picture emerges, one that attempts (without complete success, I 
will argue) to develop an account of authentic historicity. The account of authentic historicity, 
often ignored or discounted as in conflict with the initial account of authenticity, becomes 
comprehensible and even follows naturally when considered in light of certain concepts 
developed earlier in Being and Time, particularly Being-in-the-world with its central role in the 
account of Dasein. This picture will help to demonstrate that Being and Time’s account of 
authenticity is far more historical than often assumed—in fact, history has an essential role in the 
account of authenticity. This will be clear even though, I will argue, Heidegger’s picture of 
authentic historicity is at certain points murky and incomplete. Finally, the discussion of 
authentic historicity in Being and Time will help to inform a less activist account of Being and 
Time than is generally supposed. Given the role of history in Dasein’s existence, there cannot 
(contra Olafson) be a voluntaristic positing of one’s life goals, as a strong activist reading of 
Being and Time supposes. Nor is it up to Dasein whether or not to acknowledge his fundamental 
anxiety; the call of conscience comes unbidden, and not as a result of Dasein’s willing. Rather, 
Heidegger wants to strike a balance between an acceptance and acknowledgement of the 
irreducible role of history in Dasein’s life, and the need for Dasein to actively grasp that history, 
along with the possibilities it opens, as being genuinely one’s own, as opposed to the possibilities 
thrust upon Dasein by others. As a result, there is indeed an activism, but only one of persisting 
in the pursuit of one’s authentic possibilities. Although the incomplete account of authentic 
historicity prevents a full story from being seen, that fact does not stop a clear picture from 
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emerging, one that is a far cry from authenticity as an existentialist-style taking charge of and 
creating one’s fate. 
 
2.1 THE BASICS: AN ACCOUNT OF INAUTHENTICITY, DAS MAN, AND ANXIETY 
 
 Before describing authenticity or inauthenticity, I will start with a brief discussion of the 
term ‘authenticity’ itself, and how the concept relates to Dasein. ‘Authenticity’ is a translation of 
the German term Eigentlichkeit, but the German term is more precisely translated as something 
like ‘ownedness,’ in the sense of possessing what is truly one’s own, what truly belongs to one. 
If Dasein is authentic, it possesses what is truly its own, and for Heidegger what is truly Dasein’s 
own is its self. In Heidegger’s words, “only in so far as [Dasein] is essentially something which 
can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself.”83 
The self which can be lost (how exactly that happens will be explained below), and which must 
be found if Dasein is to be authentic, consists of Dasein’s possibilities. “[P]ossibility as an 
existentiale [that is, as a constitutive element of Dasein’s ontological constitution, as part of what 
Dasein is as long as it exists] is the primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is 
characterized ontologically.”84 What Dasein is, what makes it Dasein, and thus what defines the 
content of the self that it can lose or gain, is the possibilities that it has and can pursue. Dasein is 
possibilities, meaning Dasein is the pursuing of given possible ways to be; Dasein is, in a sense, 
a form of activity, the pursuing of possibilities. By comparison, something like a rock lacks 
possibilities; though things can happen to a rock, such as it being broken, breaking is not a 
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possibility that the rock itself can actively pursue or fail to pursue. Dasein, however, so long as it 
exists, has possibilities that it can choose to pursue or not. 
 It is important to note that for Dasein, having possibilities does not mean that it is totally 
free to do anything at any time, that it lives in “the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas 
indifferentiae).”85 Rather, whenever Dasein exists, it has a definite set of possibilities that are its 
own particular possibilities (much more about which will be said later). An individual Dasein, 
such as you or I, can pursue the possibilities that are its own, or not. Which of these it does 
determines whether it is authentic or inauthentic. On a first gloss, then, authenticity is a matter of 
Dasein recovering its own [eigen] specific possibilities, and authentic [eigentlich] Dasein is 
Dasein that has recovered its own possibilities. 
 As Heidegger frequently repeats in Being and Time, however, “proximally and for the 
most part” Dasein is not pursuing its own possibilities, and so is not authentic. As opposed to 
authentic Dasein, inauthentic [uneigentlich] Dasein is Dasein when it has lost its possibilities. 
What does this mean? In what sense can something lose its own possibilities? Heidegger 
describes inauthenticity as consisting of two parts: “fleeing in the face of [Dasein, i.e., Dasein’s 
own possibilities] and forgetfulness thereof.”86 First I will look at forgetfulness, and then fleeing. 
 Dasein’s forgetting of its possibilities is assisted by what Heidegger calls ‘das Man.’. 
Strictly translated, “das Man” means “the one,”87 and Man “one,” in the sense of, “One does not 
do that,” or in German, “Man tut das nicht.” (For instance: “One does not simply walk into 
Mordor.”) To say that “one does not do that” is not referring to any particular Dasein’s 
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circumstances, but to Dasein qua part of a general, undifferentiated multitude: As a member of 
the group, the club, the class, the country, one simply does not do certain things; they are 
frowned upon, discouraged, nonsensical, a faux pas in decent society. But das Man’s roleis not 
solely prohibitive for Heidegger, and in fact its prohibitive role is not even the most important 
role it has; it also provides positive possibilities as to what each Dasein should do with its life, 
what it should pursue and how it should pursue it. For example: To become a great philosopher 
today, it is generally taken for granted that one must perform well at a good undergrad program, 
move on to a Leiter Top 10 grad school for a Ph.D (if one doesn’t make it in, one must get a 
terminal Master’s Degree at a good program and try again), publish at least one or two articles in 
high-ranked journals such as Nous or The Journal of Philosophy while working on the degree, 
and then get a tenure-track job at one of those same Top 10 schools. This understanding of what 
one must do to become a great philosopher does not account for, nor intends to account for, each 
Dasein’s particular circumstances, its history or present situation; it only regards Dasein as a 
member of a group, namely the group of potential philosophers, and prescribes possibilities 
based upon that generality. Yet this common knowledge, so to speak, is taken as obvious and 
necessary to anyone who aims to succeed in the profession. 
 Further, das Man provides an explanation not only for how to achieve one’s possibilities, 
but also for what possibilities are worth achieving in the first place (such as whether becoming a 
philosopher is the right path for people at all, and what sort of people it is right for). The term 
‘das Man,’ it must be kept in mind, is not meant to point to some particular being or entity that 
tells Dasein what to do, nor does it refer to the collected totality of persons; rather, it refers to the 
common, undifferentiated, impersonal (one might say superpersonal) understanding of what 
one’s possibilities are, an understanding that comes about through shared social norms and is 
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experienced via the general public, the media, friends and family, one’s upbringing, and so on. It 
is this understanding on which Dasein relies for virtually all of its decisions.   As a result of its 
pervasiveness, this common understanding of each Dasein’s possibilities, called ‘publicness’ by 
Heidegger, is said to 
 
proximally [control] every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is 
always right . . . because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and 
thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’ [“auf die Sachen”]. By publicness everything gets 
obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and 
accessible to everyone.
88
 
 
 
Das Man, i.e., the common, public way of understanding the world, controls Dasein’s 
possibilities because it offers what we call conventional wisdom about decisions, and presents 
that wisdom as obvious and necessary. (To use the example from before: to hear someone say 
that he or she intends to become a philosopher by meditating under a tree for seven years strikes 
us as absurd; that is not what someone should do, we tend to think, in order to become a 
philosopher.
89) By offering its own set of obvious, “familiar and accessible to everyone” 
possibilities, Das Man can thus control how the each Dasein’s possibilities are interpreted. It can 
maintain a wide degree of control not because it knows each Dasein’s particular possibilities and 
calibrates its claims accordingly, but because it completely ignores those particularities, instead 
prescribing the same universally applicable possibilities to everyone, with the pressures of social 
norms and expectations doing the rest of the work.  Thus, although each Dasein may have its 
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own particular possibilities, the influence of das Man obscures those, and as Dasein becomes 
absorbed in the subsequent tasks and goals provided for it, the universally applicable set of 
possibilities is taken to be obvious and beyond question. To live in this way, attempting to forget 
one’s own possibilities under what Heidegger calls the “dictatorship of [das Man],”90 is 
inauthenticity. 
 But why does Dasein accept das Man’s possibilities? Why be inauthentic? This is 
because of Dasein’s tendency to flee its possibilities, a tendency that comes from the nature of 
possibilities. Because Dasein always has possibilities, Heidegger says, it always has some 
awareness of being responsible for what it does, which is just to say that Dasein is always 
choosing some possibility and by so doing excludes others—it chose A rather than B, thus it is 
responsible for choosing A. This awareness Heidegger refers to with the term “guilt” (Schuld); 
Dasein is guilty, whatever it does, because it has chosen something to the exclusion of something 
else.
91
 Another implication of always having possibilities is that, since possibilities qua 
possibilities are not actualized or realized, the aim and direction of Dasein’s life is always 
unsettled, subject to some sort of change. This can happen in two ways: Dasein can, at any time, 
pursue some other possibility (I could, at any and every moment, cease writing, leave the 
university, and try to join the circus), and Dasein’s possibilities can change due to factors beyond 
its control (If, en route to a philosophy conference, my plane crashes on a desert island and I am 
never rescued, I will no longer be able to be a member of the professional philosophical 
community, no matter how many papers I present to rapt audiences of coconuts). Recognizing 
this responsibility and unsettledness, which comes from the fact that one is always choosing 
despite a lack of finality and even of control, is the core of what Heidegger calls anxiety (Angst), 
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which “makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, 
its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”92 In other words, 
anxiety is Dasein’s awareness of the unsettled nature of its own possibilities, awareness that it 
can at any time choose to pursue its own possibilities, whatever they may be and regardless of 
the possibilities das Man offers; anxiety recognizes that public possibilities are not its own and 
that they do not offer any final resolution to the question of what to do in one’s life. Dasein, 
being always unsettled in this way since by definition it always has possibilities (hence, always 
in fact being anxious in some way), is always able to take charge of its own possibilities, even 
though doing so offers no certainty, no finality, and no settledness in its existence. That being the 
case, the certitude, reassurance, and simplicity of das Man’s possibilities provide a tempting way 
of avoiding one’s anxiety. 
 As a recognition of the limits of Dasein’s possibilities, anxiety includes recognition of 
one possibility in particular that Dasein always has so long as it is, “its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being” that it can never avoid: death. Heidegger’s summarizes death as something that is “one’s 
ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.”93 That is to say, Dasein’s death qua 
possibility (1) belongs to each individual Dasein as an individual Dasein, (2) it cannot be passed 
from oneself to another Dasein, and (3) it cannot be escaped by Dasein—it, along with taxes, is 
guaranteed, though never at any specific, certain moment. Besides being inevitable, death is 
indefinite—it could come at any time, without warning—and death functions as the outer bound 
of all of Dasein’s possibilities, the point past which Dasein can have no more possibilities, and as 
the end of all of Dasein’s current possibilities. In order to avoid confronting death and its role in 
each Dasein’s life, das Man presents death as an uninteresting, universal, and ultimately trivial 
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fact: “death is understood [through das Man] as an indefinite something which, above all, must 
duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present-at-hand for 
oneself, and is therefore no threat.”94 Hundreds of people are reported dead on the news every 
day, thousands die from disease, war, and famine, but it is of no interest to most of us most of the 
time; it’s just another day in the news. Death happens, and it happens so often as to be 
insignificant; one day I will die, too, but how is that any different? To face one’s inevitable but 
uncertain (as to the exact time) death is uncomfortable, to say the least. There are times, 
nonetheless, when death takes on a more personal significance: for example, when someone we 
know dies, or when we ourselves have a close brush with death. At such times, the trivial fact of 
death may strike us in a new, personal, and disturbing way, as though we are becoming aware of 
it for the first time. But for the most part, by dismissing the personal aspect of death, as well as 
the unsettledness of life, das Man allows Dasein to avoid the acknowledgement of its own death, 
and so the true range of its possibilities, by fleeing to das Man’s understanding of the world. 
 In sum, inauthentic Dasein is characterized by fleeing its own possibilities, especially 
death, and trying to forget them by taking on das Man’s publicly available possibilities as its 
own. That in mind, authentic Dasein can now be described as the rejection of inauthenticity; in 
brief, authentic Dasein rejects the public possibilities of das Man, instead acknowledging and 
accepting its own possibilities, and with those the anxiety and guilt that it previously fled. In 
such a state Dasein is no longer absorbed in das Man’s understanding of the world. Being 
unsettled with regard to its former, inauthentic web of involvements and interests, Dasein is, 
Heidegger says in no uncertain terms, individualized: “Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus 
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discloses it as ‘solus ipse’,”95 free of das Man’s grip. The stance of authentic Dasein in this 
situation towards its possibilities, wherein it acknowledges the certainty of its own death and 
resists the temptation (Heidegger’s term) of das Man’s public possibilities, is called ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness.’ Heidegger summarizes anticipatory resoluteness as bringing 
 
Dasein back to its ownmost [possibility]-for-Being-its-Self. When one has an understanding 
Being-towards-death—towards death as one's ownmost possibility—one’s potentiality-for-
Being becomes authentic and wholly transparent. 
The call of conscience passes over in its appeal all Dasein’s ‘worldly’ prestige and 
potentialities. Relentlessly it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty, 
and exacts of it that it should be this potentiality authentically.
96
 
 
  
 The term ‘conscience’ refers to Dasein’s implicit, constant awareness of having 
possibilities (after all, Dasein exists only so long as it has possibilities—possibilities end only 
with death), and hence of its unsettledness and guilt. Dasein, recall, never fully forgets its 
possibilities, though they can get covered up to some degree in inauthenticity. The ‘call of 
conscience’ refers to Dasein’s call to itself to acknowledge its own possibilities, rather than those 
offered to it by das Man, and to base its choices on the former. Rather than saying anything in 
particular, the call is just the awareness, constituted by anxiety, that the world is unsettled (or as 
Heidegger calls it, unheimlich, ‘uncanny’ in the M&R translation but more precisely translated 
as ‘not at home,’ out of place). In short, what is calling is Dasein’s anxious self, reminding itself 
that things are not settled and not final: “the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its 
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Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being.”97 Resoluteness means bypassing, 
via anxiety, of das Man’s possibilities and accepting one’s own possibilities, including death, 
instead. It is accepting one’s self. 
 Since responding to the call of conscience requires that Dasein acknowledge its ownmost 
possibility, death, Heidegger also refer to authentic Dasein’s state as ‘Being-towards-death,’ as 
opposed to das Man’s generic, dismissive understanding of death. In acknowledging death as its 
most personal possibility that cannot be abandoned or diluted, authentic Dasein is freed of das 
Man’s impersonal possibilities; it grasps its own possibilities as the particular Dasein that it is. 
 
2.2 HEIDEGGER AS EXISTENTIALIST 
 
 Given the account of authenticity provided thus far, an account which hews closely to 
Heidegger’s text and terminology and has not made any unusual interpretive leaps, one can make 
several arguments for reading authenticity as an individualistic, activist concept. 
 The first observes that the role of socio-historical factors in Heidegger’s account appears 
to be entirely encompassed by das Man, which itself appears to exercise an exclusively distorting 
influence on Dasein. Das Man, Heidegger says, always covers up Dasein’s own possibilities. 
This is true of das Man not because it is evil but because, by definition, das Man is simply the 
totality of social norms that tells Dasein qua generalized subject what possibilities it should or 
shouldn’t pursue. It is exactly because of its universality and non-specificity, because it does not 
account for Dasein’s true self, that das Man’s possibilities can apply to everyone: it can do so 
only when it completely ignores any individualizing factors in individual Daseins. 
Terminologically, calling the das Man’s way of understanding ‘publicness’ (‘publicness’ is a 
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fairly accurate translation of the term die Offenetlichkeit) closely ties das Man (and with it, 
inauthenticity) with the public sphere in general. Nor does Heidegger ever appear to distinguish 
das Man and socio-historical factors. On the side of authenticity, breaking free of Dasein appears 
to be a break from socio-historical influences more broadly; to break from inauthenticity is to 
break from publicness, from das Man. 
 From the identity of das Man and socio-historical factors an argument can be made that, 
if das Man is always a distorting influence on Dasein, which it appears to be, then so are socio-
historical factors generally, since the two are the same; in that case, it is the aim of authenticity to 
reject such factors. There is still much that will be said on the subject of history in Being and 
Time, and most (though not all) commentators do recognize that history has an important role, as 
will be seen shortly. However, the argument just given can account for that; insofar as outside 
factors such as tradition and history might have any role, this is only because they come into 
tension, many commentators say, with the account of authenticity.  Of Being and Time, then, 
Zimmerman thus says that “It seems as if the entire analysis of Dasein’s “historicality” was only 
“tacked on” to the end of Being and Time and seems not to have played a vital role in the 
articulation of the leading idea of the work itself.”98 Over thirty years later, Braver says that 
although Heidegger takes great strides towards an “interpretation of the self as completely 
defined by societal structures,” ultimately “Heidegger does not maintain this position in his early 
work,”99 falling back towards an emphasis on the subject via the account of authenticity. 
Whether such a falling back occurs will be seen once we look more closely at the role of history. 
 Secondly, anxiety, which is an essential element of authenticity, appears to be explicitly 
individualizing. Anxiety, Heidegger says, causes a break between Dasein and das Man’s 
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influence; at the same time, it appears to rob Dasein of its projects and concerns, its connections 
to a world shaped by history and society. This interpretation is reinforced, as Braver notes, by the 
1929 lecture “What is Metaphysics?” in which Heidegger says of anxiety that “In the altogether 
unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold on to, pure Da-sein is all 
that is still there.”100 At such times, Heidegger seems to be suggesting, the world itself and 
everything outside of Dasein’s innermost self disappears from Dasein’s experience. Anxiety, on 
this reading, causes an impassable rift between Dasein and the world, leaving the one without the 
other. If so, given that authenticity is always an anxious state, then it appears that authentic 
Dasein is always in an important way severed from the influence of the world, including history, 
society, and everything else that falls under das Man. In this light Harr, recall, opposes the works 
from 1929 on (including “What is Metaphysics,” interestingly) to Being and Time’s “linking of 
anxiety with extreme, individual enabling.”101 According to Dreyfus, anxiety reveals that “the 
public world makes no intrinsic sense for it and would go on whether that particular Dasein 
existed or not,”102 robbing the public world of any importance. 
 The individualistic reading of authenticity, in turn, frequently ties into the activist 
reading. Dasein, Heidegger says, typically tends to avoid confronting its own possibilities. Das 
Man provides possibilities that are comforting, allowing Dasein to avoid acknowledging its real 
possibilities. “The supposition of [das Man] that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 
‘life’, brings Dasein a tranquillity.”103 Das Man’s interpretation of the world is “tempting,”104 
presumably tempting from the difficulties of authenticity, resolve, and anxiety. Most 
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importantly, Dasein is inauthentic most of the time. To avoid inauthenticity requires a resistance 
to Dasein’s own tendencies; Dasein must refuse to accept the possibilities offered to it. Instead, it 
must be resolute towards its own possibilities: “In the light of the “for-the-sake-of-which” of 
one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world.”105 Dasein 
must take action, must free itself, and in this sense becoming authentic is a matter of voluntary 
choice; authenticity only comes about through Dasein’s willing it so. This “extreme enabling,” as 
it is described by Haar in the passage cited above, is then typically opposed to the later 
Heidegger, according to whom Dasein is, as Braver says, “an exceedingly passive being.”106 
Being acts in the later Heidegger, whereas in the earlier Heidegger it is up to Dasein to assert 
itself. As Zimmerman summarizes his version of the activist reading,  
 
to the extent that it resolves to anticipate the call of conscience, i.e., insofar as owned 
existence is possible only because Dasein steels itself to face its own finitude, then owned 
Selfhood remains mired in the kind of subjectivity which Heidegger claims characterizes 
Western thinking. According to Heidegger, resolve and will lie on the side of the subject.
107
 
 
 
 Finally, both of these interpretations are supported by the terminology Heidegger uses to 
describe authenticity and inauthenticity in general. Heidegger’s language comes across as 
heavily normative, describing the role of socio-historical factors with negative, passive terms and 
describing authenticity with positive, active terms. Societal norms are the voice of ’das Man,’ the 
impersonal ’one,’ through which ’fallen‘ Dasein ’flees‘ and ’forgets‘ its own possibilities. In 
order to recover authenticity, which means being freed from the “dictatorship of [das Man],” 
’conscience‘ must ’call‘ Dasein to recognize “its own” possibilities, and Dasein should respond 
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by acknowledging its ’guilt.’ ’Authenticity,’ or ‘ownedness,’ is Dasein taking hold of its guilt in 
’resoluteness.’ The very terminology itself appears to make plain that authentic Dasein should 
break free of socio-historical factors on the quest to become a true, individual self. It is easy to 
see how the existentialism found an early voice in Being and Time. And while Heidegger himself 
says more than once that his interpretation of authenticity and inauthenticity “is far removed 
from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein,”108 Braver can say with seeming justification 
that “Although Heidegger denies that his analysis of Dasein contains any ethical prescriptions, it 
is obvious that authenticity is some kind of ideal.”109 Even Charles Guignon, who strongly 
opposes what he calls Zimmerman’s activist reading of Being and Time, says that “Despite 
Heidegger's insistence that his ontological findings have no evaluative import, the exhortative 
tone of the account of authenticity is unmistakable.”110 Heidegger appears to be promoting a 
view, one strongly opposed to any sort of conformism or acceptance of society as the source of 
meanings. Even putting any moralizing aside, Heidegger was quoted above as saying explicitly 
that anxiety and the call of conscience individualize Dasein. It is hard to see how authenticity 
could be anything but individualistic, and an activist story of Dasein’s recovery from 
inauthenticity appears to closely follow. But how well does that story hold under scrutiny? 
 
2.3 RESOLUTENESS, THE SITUATION, AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY 
 
 The explanation of authenticity thus far is in many ways the standard account of what 
authenticity amounts to; however, Heidegger’s discussion does not end with Being-towards-
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death and anticipatory resoluteness. Following the “hermeneutical spiral” method of Being and 
Time,
111
 Heidegger’s initial account of authenticity receives additional clarification and revision 
over the course of the book. And it is only in the final chapters, those frequently given less heed 
by interpreters, that Heidegger begins to develop his conception of Dasein’s historicity and its 
relation to authenticity. Further, that development is not ex nihilo; there is much in the earlier 
parts of Being and Time that points to the development of history later on. Accordingly, this 
section will look first at Being-in-the-world and its role in the account of Dasein, a role that some 
take to be in conflict or tension with the account of authenticity. Then I will offer an 
interpretation that brings Being-in-the-world into step with authenticity, showing that the 
discussion of Dasein’s authentic relation to history is not an afterthought, but Heidegger’s 
fleshing out of authenticity in light of Dasein’s constitution as Being-in-the-world. The supposed 
tension between history and authenticity only arises if one does not take proper measure of 
Being-in-the-world’s central place in the account of Dasein. 
 I start by continuing the discussion of authenticity where it left off—resoluteness. 
Resoluteness, says Heidegger, isn’t just a general attitude way to be, but always requires 
resolving upon some particular possibility that Dasein has.
112
 The possibility that Dasein resolves 
upon is not one given to it by das Man. Das Man’s universalized possibilities, as has been said, 
cannot simultaneously apply to everyone while also accounting for all of the circumstances of 
each individual, and so they are never capable of being truly one’s own. Authentic Dasein can 
therefore only resolve upon its own possibilities, which are, judging by what has been said, its 
own and no one else’s. This is made clear to Dasein via the awareness of death, which forms the 
outermost limit of all of its possibilities (not to be outstripped), is always its own (ownmost), and 
                                                 
111
 Being and Time §63. 
112
 Being and Time 345. 
60 
 
cannot be passed off (non-relational). The resolute anticipation of death thus cuts Dasein off 
from das Man, forcing it to face its now freely chosen possibilities (with the caveat that all 
possibilities cease with death). 
 This story, however, is incomplete. For Heidegger also says, in seeming tension with 
everything else, that “Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from 
its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”.” 113 To explain why this 
should be obvious, even though in “What is Metaphysics?” he says that “pure Da-sein is all that 
is there,” Heidegger continues: “And how should it [detach or isolate Dasein], when resoluteness 
as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world?” To understand 
resoluteness, and so authenticity, more fully requires looking at an element of Dasein’s 
existential constitution that arises much earlier in Being and Time, initially separated from talk of 
authenticity: Being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that a key part of Dasein’s existential 
constitution is that of having a circumspective involvement in a relational web of concerns, 
interests, and projects, one not of its own making. Recall that Dasein is not just defined as a 
being with possibilities. It is a being with a definite set of possibilities, such that having 
possibilities doesn’t amount to a “liberty of indifference;” Dasein is faced with possibilities that 
are not arbitrary, and it is between those possibilities that it must choose. This involvement that 
provides the ground for a Dasein’s particular set of definite possibilities is what Heidegger refers 
to as “Being-in-the-world,” with the world as such roughly being the web of concerns, relations, 
and projects. Being-in-the-world is so essential to understanding Dasein that, besides having 
possibility be its most fundamental characterization, Dasein is at the same time “an entity whose 
Being is defined as Being-in-the-world.”114 
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 An example helps illustrate how Dasein as possibility is connected to Dasein as Being-in-
the-world. I, like any other Dasein, have possibilities. But I don’t have the same possibilities as 
every other Dasein out there. A Dasein growing up impoverished in Sudan has a very restricted 
set of possibilities compared to myself, a graduate student at a large US university. Becoming a 
professional philosopher is possible for me, in no small part because my life circumstances allow 
me to study philosophy, work with philosophers, and so on. A Dasein growing up in Sudan must 
contend with war and famine; it may not be able to escape its circumstances at all, due to danger 
and lack of money and transportation. Such facts represent, for Heidegger, very real limiting 
factors on Dasein’s possibilities, to the point that those factors define the Dasein that it is; the 
fact that each Dasein is in the world in some way is what makes its possibilities unique and 
definite as compared with other Daseins that have other possibilities. In brief, for Dasein to have 
possibilities, it must have a world in which certain possibilities can be pursued while others 
cannot, that being possible in virtue of the circumstances of that Dasein’s place in the world; it is 
the limits, in a very strong sense, that define what is possible. Were there no world, no “Da” in 
German, Dasein
115
 would not exist, on account of there being no possibilities. Thus, Dasein must 
in some sense always have a world that is limiting in some way. 
 Recall, at this point, that anxiety is explicitly said to individualize Dasein. How exactly 
does that claim fit with the picture of Being-in-the-world just sketched? Are there any 
possibilities left for anxious Dasein? It appears not, the result being, as Dreyfus and Jane Rubin 
argue, that “anxiety has wiped out all intrinsic meaning and so all reasons for doing things.”116 
Because of this, Dasein is left empty and without a world; , for this reason, according to Braver, 
“anxiety and anticipation of death revealed structural aspects of Dasein that couldn’t be defined 
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wholly in terms of the world.”117 Dasein is Being-in-the-world, but anxiety strips Dasein of the 
grounds for possibilities, and so of its world. How does one reconcile Being-in-the-world with 
authenticity, then, if authenticity is anxious and anxiety severs Dasein from the world? 
 Recall the sources of anxiety—namely, the fact that Dasein can at any time pursue a 
different possibility, and the fact that those possibilities can change due to factors beyond 
Dasein’s control. In the latter case in particular, it is the world that is impinging on Dasein’s 
possibilities; if a large-scale war were to break out and the international order collapsed, my 
possibility of becoming a professor would become severely limited or disappear altogether. I 
have little or no power over such factors, and the awareness that something like this (or 
something more mundane, such as sudden financial hardship or an accident) could happen at any 
time and dramatically shift my possibilities is one of the sources of Dasein’s anxiety. One is 
anxious because the world is unheimlich, uncanny or unsettled, meaning it does not provide 
certainty about what one’s possibilities are and whether they will stay as they are. This point is 
essential, for it is tempting to read anxiety as implying that the world itself drops out altogether, 
that there is a full severing from the world itself, which indeed would conflict with the account of 
Being-in-the-world. 
 However, a close look at the text reveals that anxiety is not the dropping out of the world, 
but more precisely the recognition that nothing is totally determined or under one’s control, that 
the world can change; in fact, nothing drops out in anxiety, neither the world nor the things in it. 
Though there appears to be much in Braver’s claim that Heideggerian anxiety leaves us “drained 
of content,”118 Heidegger’s actual account is subtly different, in an important way. In “What is 
Metaphysics?” for example, Heidegger says that, “in their very receding [in anxiety], things turn 
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toward us”119 and oppress us with their contingency, their uncertainty: “The receding of beings 
as a whole, closing in on us in anxiety, oppresses us. We can get no hold on things.”120 In Being 
and Time, though Heidegger says that for anxious Dasein “the world has the character of 
completely lacking significance,”121 he explains that 
 
The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere”, does not 
signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little 
importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, 
the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.
122
 
 
 
Obtrusion, oppression, turning towards; these are not terms for the world dropping out, but for it 
appearing in a very distinct, overwhelming manner. The individualism of anxiety, in short, is not 
that of an individual who is left worldless, but one who is in the world in the specific way of not 
having a firm grasp on it, of lacking control over it, being in thrall to its contingency. Anxious 
Dasein’s world is one where possibilities provide no final anchor or feeling of certainty. 
 While it is true, then, that anxiety “induces the slipping away of beings as a whole,” 
Heidegger adds in the next sentence, in a way that maintains consistency with his account of 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world: “This implies that we ourselves—we humans who are in being 
[that is, human beings as always pursuing possibilities]—in the midst of beings slip away from 
ourselves,” ourselves in terms of firm, established identities: “it is not as though “you” or “I” feel 
uncanny; rather, it is this way for some “one.”” 123 If one goes, the other goes; this just follows 
from being Being-in-the-world. But neither truly disappears, though they both give the 
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appearance of doing so. In anxiety particular features of one’s identity, formerly thought firm 
and permanent, fall away; our sense of ourselves as definite, established ego cogitos 
disintegrates. But neither the self nor the world actually disappears; rather, the world appears in 
the mode of not providing the permanent identity one formerly thought it did (via das Man), as 
being insufficient to ultimately define what one’s possibilities are, and this insufficiency is what 
makes Dasein anxious. But being thus insufficient is not the same as ceasing to have any 
significance at all; things have the character of lacking significance, which is to say they are 
significant towards us in the sense of not appearing significant, not being what we need or are 
looking for—like Heidegger’s famous example of the broken hammer, we see them, but 
specifically as being not what they are supposed to be. To refer only to passages that speak of 
Dasein as being “solus ipse” or as being separated from beings without such clarification leaves 
out the true nature of anxiety; anxiety is a way of Being-in-the-world, a way that things have 
significances, which requires that things still be there.
124
 
 It has been argued that keeping Being-in-the-world in mind is important to grasping 
several elements of the account of authenticity, the above examples showing its role in 
understanding possibility in general and anxiety. Despite this importance, the full connection 
between Being-in-the-world and authenticity itself is not made explicit by Heidegger until late in 
Being and Time, long after the initial accounts of das Man and authenticity. It is only then, with a 
turn in the hermeneutic spiral, that the non-individualistic story properly emerges. 
 The key comes where the discussion of resoluteness left off, as Heidegger explains that 
resoluteness must resolve upon the particular possibilities established in Dasein’s Being-in-the-
world, the latter being a world of possibilities that are not merely determined from out of the 
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individual. In fact, “The resolution,” Heidegger writes, “is precisely the disclosive projection and 
determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefiniteness 
characteristic of every potentiality-for-Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is 
something that necessarily belongs.”125 Resolution, according to the passage just quoted, 
determines “what is factically possible,” the situation into which Dasein has been “factically 
thrown.” The term ‘facticity’ in Being and Time refers to the concreteness of Dasein’s existing in 
a given set of circumstances; it is the fact (forgive the term) that Dasein exists in a world of 
already determined features and meanings, of a situation that already is one way rather than 
another. Factically, Heidegger says elsewhere, Dasein always exists as thrown into a particular 
situation, a world: “it has in each case already been thrown into a world.”126 In other words, as 
was just discussed, the fact that Dasein has possibilities at all is only true in virtue of there being 
a world, and the world is not something that Dasein creates or controls; rather, Dasein is thrown 
(the German term, geworfen, has exactly the same connotations as the English ‘thrown’) into it. 
Thus the world, something beyond Dasein’s control, determines what possibilities Dasein can 
resolve upon. And the world that establishes Dasein’s possibilities does not limit itself to the 
physical earth, the environment, or the like; Heidegger’s own examples of the sorts of 
involvements constitutive of a world are a workshop and a farmstead, places whose meaning is 
determined by human social and historical facts and relations.
127
 Since resolution resolves upon 
some definite possibility, and such possibilities come from the world, and the world it is 
anything but free of socio-historical factors, in fact is largely constituted by it (after all, my world 
of dissertations and philosophy conferences did not spring from the earth fully formed), 
resoluteness itself can only mean the resolute grasping one’s particular world, including socio-
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historical circumstances. This total set of circumstances Heidegger calls “the Situation,”128 the 
way in which Dasein’s world is disclosed to its understanding, Dasein’s particular web of 
meanings at a given time and place. Think once more of my situation (in the non-technical sense 
of the term; when used in Heidegger’s specific sense, it will be captialized) versus that of the 
Dasein in Sudan; resoluteness must resolve upon definite possibilities, and those that belong to 
myself and the other Dasein are not determined solely by what each of us chooses, as though 
anxiety made our circumstances perfectly equal—the world does not, cannot disappear in that 
way. This is no Sartrean freedom. My Situation, and the other Dasein’s, are not things that come 
from within, but largely from without, and ‘without’ largely means society, culture, and history. 
 How does all of this relate to das Man and the role of the public in inauthenticity? Das 
Man, after all, is part of the world, part of one’s Situation just like anything else. If Dasein must 
reject das Man’s possibilities in order to be authentic, what else is there to return to authenically, 
when it comes to tradition, history, and culture? In fact, resoluteness is itself a return to das Man 
as a constitutive part of the Situation: “Resolution . . . discovers first what is factically possible; 
and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being in [das Man].”129 Guignon, in his critique of Zimmerman, correctly explains that Dasein’s 
Being being Being-in-the-world means that the meanings Dasein comes across are meanings that 
have been generated not from timeless nature, God’s hand, or rugged individuals, but from the 
society and tradition that exists around Dasein: “Only because we have been initiated into a 
shared “we-world” can we handle ourselves in coherent, normalized ways. But this means that 
all of the possible roles and self-interpretations we can take over have been laid out in advance 
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by [das Man].”130 The very same socio-historical understandings and interpretations that are 
necessary for there to be such things as the university system, a set of tools, the First World War, 
etc. at all, are the very same that can exercise pressure and control as das Man. 
 While it is true, then, that das Man and socio-historical factors more broadly cannot be 
separated such that Dasein could accept one without the other, socio-historical factors only 
exercise a distorting influence as das Man in a specific case, namely when das Man’s 
universalized possibilities are taken on specifically as a Dasein’s own, to the detriment of any 
other factors; one can accept that the socio-historical world creates meanings without thinking 
that those meanings apply to everyone in the same way all the time. To think that I must follow 
one certain path to become a philosopher, even if other paths would work as well or better, is das 
Man in the distorting sense. But that there are such things as philosophy and philosophers at all is 
due to the very same socio-historical factors which give rise to das Man. The socio-historical 
world is what allows there to be possibilities at all, but it also has a tendency to pressure us as to 
what possibilities we should pursue and how we should pursue them, even if there are other 
possibilities just as good or better. There is a field known as philosophy that is a product of 
history and society, but that does not mean that there is only one way to enter into it. Thus, in 
breaking free of das Man’s grip, Dasein does not ignore socio-historical influences or even das 
Man (as a part of those influences), nor need any of Dasein’s concrete circumstances, life 
choices, or anything even change. Instead, it is the nature of Dasein’s involvement with das Man 
that changes: “The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, 
nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one's Being towards the 
ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one's solicitous Being with Others, are now 
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given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves,”131 as 
opposed to being accepted simply because it is what common sense and das Man say to do. 
Dasein grasps authentically and as its own what das Man generates and then attempts to foist 
upon it in a universal, generalized, and inauthentic way; it grasps its possibilities not because one 
does x, but because x is what that Dasein’s Situation makes possible for it. In sum: it’s not what 
you pursue, it’s how you pursue it. 
 If authentic Dasein is Dasein that resolutely accepts its Situation, and Dasein’s Situation 
is shaped not just occasionally and slightly, but invariably by socio-historical factors (which, to 
emphasize, are always part of what constitutes Dasein’s world: “[T]he world is always the one 
that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt].”132), it follows that to 
become authentic requires that Dasein reckon in some way with its history, insofar as that history 
plays a part in the make-up of its world. For a given Dasein, that means reckoning not just with 
history in the broad sense of world history, but reckoning with its own history, where that means 
all of the traditions, inheritances, and so on that help shape its Being-in-the-world and so its 
Situation. It is with this in mind that Chapter 5 of Division Two of Being and Time turns to 
history. Heidegger begins with an admission that should be noted carefully: the discussion of 
authenticity thus far, in which anticipatory resoluteness of Being-towards-death discloses 
Dasein’s Situation, has been “one-sided”133 in its emphasis on the future: 
 
As long as Dasein factically exists, both the ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are, and they are in 
the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care. Thrownness and that 
Being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this 
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unity birth and death are ‘connected’ in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is 
the ‘between’.134 
 
 
To say that Dasein has possibilities is not only a reference to the future; as seen earlier, in order 
for there to be possibilities at all there must be something that allows them to exist as specific 
possibilities to be pursued. Possibilities exist because the world is a certain way; to use a very 
brute example, breathing is a possibility for me only because the Earth’s atmosphere has oxygen. 
To say that Dasein has possibilities is also to say, then, that Dasein has a past, since the past 
shapes and determines those possibilities are, just as my past and that of the Dasein from Sudan 
have different possibilities shaped not only by what is currently available for us to make use of, 
but also by what my Situation growing up in America has made possible compared to that of 
someone living in a war-torn part of Africa. It must always be remembered that, in virtue of 
being a being with possibilities, Dasein is connected both to its future and to its past, its 
oncoming death and its history (birth). Since Dasein’s historical circumstances form part of its 
Being-in-the-world, authentic Dasein, in reckoning with death, must reckon also with those 
circumstances: “One’s anticipatory projection of oneself on that possibility of existence which is 
not to be outstripped—on death—guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one's 
resoluteness. But those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to 
be gathered from death.”135 Resolution is nothing more than a formal exercise unless it resolves 
upon something; what it resolves upon comes from history. What should be clear at this point is 
that the introduction of history into the study of authentic Dasein, whatever it amounts to, is not 
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just “tacked on,” as Zimmerman rather dismissively claims. Given that Dasein is Being-in-the-
world and given what Being-in-the-world is, a necessary role for history follows naturally from a 
full account of authenticity. With Dasein’s way of relating to its history, its ‘historizing,’ as 
Heidegger calls it, the investigation returns once more to Dasein’s authenticity, and so once more 
to how Dasein becomes its own: “we come back in our investigation to . . . the constancy of the 
Self,”136 meaning a self in history. 
 How does authentic Dasein relate to its history? The discussion is extremely brief, taking 
up a mere five pages in the English edition of Being and Time,; and, unfortunately, this brevity is 
not due to conciseness. Heidegger begins by saying that authentic historizing requires a “handing 
down” of Dasein’s possibilities to itself.137 This does not mean that Dasein decides what 
possibilities it will give to itself, but rather that Dasein takes over its thrownness, accepts that it 
exists factically in circumstances that are not entirely, or even much at all, of its own choosing. 
This act of handing down Heidegger calls ‘fate,’ “Dasein’s primordial historizing,” “in which 
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet 
has chosen.”138 Again, this is not a proposing of possibilities, but a grasping of what possibilities 
Dasein already has, based on its (historical) Situation. What is actually passed down is referred 
to as Dasein’s ‘heritage.’ Since the heritage is what is taken over, it is clear that it is related to 
Dasein’s possibilities as what are handed down to it, and possibly refers to Dasein’s facticity 
understood in a historical sense. Presumably, my heritage would include my growing up in a 
particular part of the world, with a family of a certain income level, a certain place on the 
American socio-cultural ladder, and so on; that of the Sudanese Dasein would include that 
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Dasein’s political situation, tribe, family history, and so on. However, Heidegger does little to 
clarify the concept of heritage further, a point that will become important shortly. 
 Second, since Dasein’s Being-in-the-world includes existing as Being-with Others, 
authentic historicizing is not something done by each Dasein on its own, just as anticipatory 
resoluteness doesn’t meant that the world drops out of view. Authentic Dasein, as seen above, 
doesn’t remove its relation to others, but rather comes to that relation in a new way; likewise, 
authentic Dasein comes to relate to fellow members of its heritage in a new way. For my heritage 
is not just mine, presumably, but includes that part of my Being-in-the-world that I share with 
others who grew up with me
139
, one that can be clearly distinguished from the heritage of the 
Daseins of Sudan; this broader, non-personal fate, which “is not something that puts itself 
together out of individual fates,”140 is Dasein’s destiny. For Dasein’s “historizing is a co-
historizing,”141 and so one’s grasping of heritage as fate must also be a grasping of destiny. 
 Several important questions about heritage, fate, and destiny are left lingering at this 
point. For instance: Dasein’s heritage is that which is taken over in resoluteness. How, exactly? 
The passage where Heidegger discusses heritage is as follows, in its entirety: 
 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities 
of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as 
thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a 
handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily 
as having thus come down. If everything ‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of ‘goodness’ 
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lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes 
itself in resoluteness.
142
 
 
 
Is heritage something like a set of limiting factors on Dasein’s possibilities? As noted above, that 
makes heritage out to be a filling in of the concept of facticity, where insofar as Dasein must 
grasp its thrownness, it must also of course grasp its facticity, thus its heritage. Further, 
Heidegger speaks of heritage specifically in terms of possibilities, and its own possibilities (what 
‘its own possibilities’ refers to, something that has seemed reasonably straightforward thus far, 
will become more complicated shortly) are what Dasein must take over. Is the term ‘heritage,’ 
then, meant specifically to describe the historical aspect of Dasein’s possibilities, as opposed to 
the anticipatory aspect? Again, here one finds reason to think that heritage is meant to be a sort 
of clarification of facticity, but it’s not clear how exactly it is serving that purpose. What work is 
the concept of heritage doing that facticity did not, such that it requires a new term? Further, 
what exactly does it mean to say that a heritage is handed down, but not as having been handed 
down? And how does one do this to oneself? Is it just an acceptance of what is already there? 
The third sentence in the quotation, which appears to be an attempt to bring heritage back to 
resoluteness, only makes things worse. While one can say with some justification that much in 
Heidegger’s work is unclear, the explanation of heritage is unclear in a very un-Heideggerian 
sense: Heidegger, who usually goes to great lengths to define his technical terms and their 
relationships to related terms, spends almost no time clarifying the exact role of ‘heritage’ in the 
broader context of his terminology. 
 More problems arise when one asks about the relationship between fate and destiny. If 
destiny is not just a grouping together of individual fates, what is it, exactly? What is the 
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difference between fate and destiny, if Dasein’s Being-in-the-world always is in some respect 
Being-with Others? Likewise, if historizing is always co-historizing, if authenticity always 
includes one’s relation to other Daseins, how can there be a grasping fate separate from destiny? 
What is the purpose of the separate concepts? Perhaps fate is heritage insofar as Dasein takes it 
on itself, whereas destiny is Dasein’s grasp of history as part of its people, as part of a larger 
group. This reading receives support when Heidegger says that “Resoluteness implies handing 
oneself down . . . , and this handing down we call “fate”. This is also the ground for destiny, by 
which we understand Dasein's historizing in Being-with Others.”143 But does this imply that 
Dasein can accept its fate, but not its destiny, if Dasein’s people fails to pursue its heritage? 
What of the reverse? Can Dasein be towards others in a way that grasps its destiny, while the 
others fail to do so? The passage just quoted seems to imply this. On the other hand, Heidegger 
says that Dasein’s historizing is a co-historizing, and that co-historizing is destiny. Is fate not 
separable from destiny, then? Are they the same? If fate were no different from destiny, how 
could a Dasein have a fate of its own outside of the fate of its community? In that case, why use 
different terms? In the discussion that ensues, Heidegger uses first one term, ‘fate’ or ‘destiny,’ 
then the other, and sometimes speaks of “fateful destiny,”144 and it’s not always clear what the 
reasoning for choosing one or the other at a given time is. And all that aside, where exactly does 
heritage fall in this discussion?  The most likely story, I believe, is that fate is Dasein handing 
itself its heritage, where heritage appears to be facticity qua the history of that Dasein’s people, 
and that authentic historizing will at the same time involve Being-with other Daseins as part of 
one’s history, and that Being-with others qua historizing is destiny. Therefore, fate is a grasping 
of one’s heritage as a subset of one’s facticity, and grasping fate always implies grasping destiny, 
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for it includes Being-with Others in the relevant way. But the discussion is deeply muddled, in 
particular when it comes to the relation between Dasein and the people it is a member of when it 
comes to historizing. So long as the relationship between these terms remains unclear, the 
relationship between Dasein’s historizing as an individual and its historizing as part of a 
community or people remains unclear as well. 
 Heidegger leaves these issues behind, however, and continues on to the third element of 
authentic historicity, repetition. “Repeating,” says Heidegger, “is handing down explicitly—that 
is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there.”145 Yet, following 
Kierkegaard, this repetition is not meant to be a mere repeating of a previous possibility exactly 
as it was; instead, repetition for Heidegger appears to be more of a response to the past, or a 
response to Dasein’s heritage, the “Dasein that has-been-there.” It is thus a “reciprocative 
rejoinder,”146 a taking hold in some manner of what has been for the purposes of Dasein’s 
forward-looking possibilities. For this reason, Heidegger says with some justification that 
authentic historizing arises from the future, since such historizing is undertaken for the sake of 
current Dasein’s possible ways to be, which extend into the future. Authentic history is not 
simply recognizing past events, but a response to one’s heritage that takes them properly into 
account for the sake of current action. 
 This aspect of the account of historicity has its own problems, for repetition is not 
explained very well at all in the single paragraph Heidegger devotes to an essential aspect of 
authentic historicity. While Heidegger says that repetition is not simply a repeating of past events 
as they happened, for example, it’s not clear just what its relation to past events is. One “follows 
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in the footsteps of that which can be repeated,”147 and Heidegger says directly that this is not a 
simple recurrence of past events. Fair enough; it seems that the past must be kept in mind in 
some special and explicit way in grasping one’s possibilities. But how? What is this 
‘reciprocative rejoinder’ that Dasein undertakes? With repetition and the rejoinder, Heidegger 
seems to be bringing into the picture not just one’s general history, traditions, culture, and the 
like, but to be referring to something both more specific (in the sense that something is repeated, 
it is a rejoinder “to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there”148) and yet grand in 
scope (for repetition seems to bring to completion the connection between authenticity and 
Dasein’s own particular history; repetition of a possibility is essentially the authentic choice of 
Dasein’s possibilities – “the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero”149). How that all comes 
together, though, as with much of this section, isn’t fully clear, and Heidegger moves on in the 
next section to discuss historizing and history in the more commonly understood and inauthentic 
sense, as the recording of the past. 
 These questions about authentic historicity remain unanswered in Being and Time, and 
because they remain unanswered, the connection between authenticity and history is, at the end 
of the day, somewhat undeveloped. Which is not to say that nothing has been learned; quite the 
opposite. Authentic existence obviously involves Dasein taking over its history in some 
important way, to the point that there is some sort of clear and intentional rejoinder to Dasein’s 
past history. At the same time, this taking over of history is not isolated to a lone Dasein, since, 
to repeat, Dasein’s “historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny 
[Geschick].” This much can certainly be said: authenticity in Being and Time is irreducibly 
historical in character, because Dasein’s own Being is such that it is always in a world that is 
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constituted in large part historically. Its possibilities are shaped by socio-historical factors 
outside of its control, including those that also go to make up das Man. Even in anxiety, Dasein 
is still confronted by a social, historical world, though one that does not offer it settled, final 
meanings for anything. And authenticity, insofar as it must grasp possibilities, must grasp 
possibilities that emerge from a very non-individualistic milieu. Being and Time is thus not 
individualist; it is not even close. It is historical through and through. 
 Why, despite the central role for history, have so many read Being and Time in an 
individualistic way? There are several likely reasons. First, Heidegger reserves all talk of history 
for the final chapters of the book; the initial discussions of authenticity include no discussion of 
the positive role of history. Second, the introduction of socio-historical factors is via das Man 
and inauthenticity; in this way, history and socio-historical factors appear in a negative light. 
Third, though he more than once denies it, Heidegger’s language often appears to imply that das 
Man is an evil that must be cast away. Fourth, Heidegger specifically talks of individualization 
with anxiety, which is only true in a highly qualified sense – in anxiety, Dasein is thrown back 
from das Man’s grip and from engagement in the world to its own possibilities, but it cannot and 
does not leave the world, and what is left is not a worldless subject. Fifth, something I did not 
touch on directly, is that the description of death as ‘ownmost, nonrelational, and not to be 
outstripped’ appears to indicate that each Dasein is unique in a way that society cannot touch. 
But as with anxiety, though a Dasein can and is individualized in a sense in this way, that does 
not mean that authentic recognition of death takes one outside of history; rather, it simply means 
that part of grasping Dasein’s facticity is grasping one more element, death, which always bears 
to some degree on all of other possibilities.
150
 Sixth, when Heidegger does get to authentic 
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history, the discussion is brief and obscure, to the point that it is perhaps little wonder now that 
Zimmerman thought so little of it.  Finally, as was said during the broader discussion of the 
individualist and activist interpretations, Heidegger’s language taken as a whole appears to be 
broadly pushing an individualist view—the public, epitomized by das Man, is bad, and authentic, 
existential self-realization is good. Heidegger explicitly denies any such intent. Whether he is a 
moralizer or not, a thorough look at the text itself shows that authenticity in Being and Time truly 
is grounded in Dasein’s history. 
 
2.4 RESOLVE, THE MOMENT OF VISION, AND TAKING ACTION 
 
 Next I turn to the activist interpretations of authenticity in Being and Time. This view is 
best understood by its opposite, the presumed passivism that most find in Heidegger’s later 
works, and which is thought to be a reversal of Heidegger’s earlier position. Haar, in pushing the 
activist reading, opposes it to the passivism he finds in works from “What is Metaphysics?” 
on,
151
 in which work he says that “the thoughts and acts of negation, as well as the transcendence 
of Dasein beyond entities as a whole, come to be rooted in the force of nihilation and no longer 
in the tension of resoluteness.”152 In other words, the break between Dasein and the world (the 
negation of the world, to use the term from “What is Metaphysics?”) is not something that comes 
from Dasein’s choosing to be resolute, but from an outside force, that of nihilation, which comes 
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from Being. The passivist reading holds that, for the later Heidegger, it is Being (or the History 
of Being) that determines the course of history as well as of individuals within that history. 
Individuals cannot, on their own, have any impact on whether history is better or worse 
understood, or on whether they relate authentically to their history. In Being and Time, on the 
other hand, it is purportedly up to Dasein to become resolute and to accept its history. Being does 
not do this for it—resoluteness involves a self-initiated, self-sustained course of action against 
which any form of passivity leads straight back to inauthenticity. 
 Along these lines, Olafson argues in his account of the Kehre that Heidegger resolved 
problems in determining the relationship between Dasein and Being “by simply dropping the 
active and projective character of Dasein from his theory . . . from the mid-thirties onward.”153 
This, of course, assumes that Dasein has an active and projective character (which is to say, a 
type of character that identifies and takes over the pursuit of possibilities on its own) in Being 
and Time, a point that does not generally invite much further discussion in the literature. 
 What is it, exactly, that is supposed to make Dasein activist in Being and Time? One 
element is what Olafson references above, what he calls Dasein’s “projective character.” Part of 
Dasein’s existential constitution, something that Dasein is not Dasein without, is projection 
(Entwurf, which has connotations of throwing—recall that ‘thrownness’ is geworfen—but 
typically means ‘design’ or ‘plan’). Dasein always projects itself forward upon its possibilities, 
which is another way of saying that Dasein is at all times relating to, moving towards, its future, 
trying to realize possibilities. Thus Dasein is always in some way beyond itself, beyond just what 
it is (meaning its facticity, its past circumstances), and part of its existence consists in the fact 
that it is always moving in some way beyond that background, it is always more than the list of 
known facts about it: “Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the existentiale of 
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projection, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is.”154 If Dasein is always more than its 
facticity, then facticity (which includes its history and the socio-historical influence in it in 
general) is not exhaustive of Dasein; how Dasein relates to its future is not merely determined by 
the circumstances around it, and Dasein has some sort of choice as to what it will be. Sartre 
famously develops a radically voluntarist version of this point when he claims that consciousness 
“is not what it is:” this is the case, Sartre says, because “making sustains being; consciousness 
has to be its own being, it is never sustained by being.”155 There is nothing but consciousness 
that sustains itself, keeps it going, in its projects; consciousness, for Sartre, is radically free as a 
result, always choosing what it will or will not be. 
 But Sartre is not Heidegger, and Sartre’s radical freedom is far different from what 
Heidegger, in his discussion of authentic historicity, calls the “power of [Dasein’s] finite 
freedom,” such that this freedom, “which ‘is’ only in its having chosen to make such a choice . . . 
, can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to 
have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.”156 That Dasein is a 
projecting being, always pursuing futural, unrealized possibilities, does not mean that Dasein 
freely chooses those possibilities willy nilly; at best, it does so in a peculiar, and very limited, 
sense. What Dasein projects are possibilities, but possibilities, as previously discussed, do not 
come from just anywhere. They come from the world, which just is the very facticity, the world 
of delimited possibilities, that Dasein is more than. The claim that Dasein is more than what it is, 
then, must be parsed carefully, for Heidegger heavily qualifies his statement in the very next 
sentence: “Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is . . . . But Dasein is never more than it 
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factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially.”157 He explains: 
“Projection always pertains to the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world; as potentiality-for-
Being, understanding has itself possibilities, which are sketched out beforehand within the range 
of what is essentially disclosable in it.”158 This should be fairly intuitive after the extended 
discussion of history’s role for Dasein. Dasein is defined by the pursuit of possibilities (hence 
more than what it factically is), but such pursuit is impossible without some way of defining 
possibilities. Possibilities are defined in virtue of facticity—the amount of freedom one does or 
doesn’t have is not up to one, but depends upon the particulars of one’s Situation, and is always 
subject to that Situation. Whereas Sartre would say that the Dasein in Sudan is free to accept his 
fate or rebel against it, Heidegger would not accept such a claim. Even in projection, one is 
projecting the possibilities that are already there, and cannot create new ones. History determines 
what one projects upon; projection, then, provides no activism besides taking over one’s 
‘powerlessness,’ to use Heidegger’s term; one projects upon the possibilities one already has. 
Nor does Dasein choose whether or not to project in the first place: “any Dasein has, as Dasein, 
already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting.”159 Dasein is already in a history, and 
already has possibilities based on that history upon which it is projecting. It can choose to accept 
its history, or not, but those possibilities do not change through its choice (nor, of course, is it 
guaranteed that those possibilities will not change due to circumstances beyond its control—such 
is the anxiety of being Dasein). 
 So much for projection, and with it what we typically think of as free choice, as 
undergirding a form of activism. Though that is the strongest form of activism that might be 
imputed to Being and Time, it is not the only one. The discussion of projection, and in particular 
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its relation to history, informs another way in which activism appears to arise; namely, in the 
discussion of das Man and our tendency to accept the possibilities it offers. Das Man, Heidegger 
says, is tempting. It is tempting because it offers an escape from the anxiety of an unsettled 
world, something Dasein wants to avoid. If Dasein’s tendency is to accept das Man’s inauthentic 
understanding of the world, and resoluteness requires resisting this temptation, then another sort 
of activism appears. This new possibility holds that Being and Time is activist insofar as Dasein 
must itself choose to see past das Man’s control and recognize that it could become authentic. 
Regardless of whether becoming authentic then requires a relation to society and history, it is up 
to Dasein, and Dasein alone, to see past the temptation of inauthenticity, to call to itself via the 
call of conscience, and to resolve to acknowledge its possibilities authentically. This weaker 
form of activism aligns better with Zimmerman’s account, and fits with some readings of 
Heidegger as an existentialist, such as Wrathall’s. For Wrathall, “Heidegger’s philosophy stands 
squarely in the existential tradition in Western thought,” where “Existentialists emphasize 
passion over rational detachment [and] human freedom over the mechanistic workings of the 
physical universe, and the groundlessness and arbitrariness of our way of Life, as opposed to 
trusting in the ultimate rationality of the world.”160 Perhaps it isn’t quite right to say that 
possibilities are arbitrarily chosen on Heidegger’s view, given the importance of history, but the 
first two pieces of Wrathall’s description seem like they could fit, and the second would qualify 
as activism. Similarly with Haar’s description of individual enabling. In brief, the claim 
being investigated is that breaking free of das Man’s grip and becoming authentic requires 
Dasein itself to make a choice to become authentic, which would mean that it of its own 
initiative chooses to reject the public understanding, to accept its anxiety, to grasp its true 
possibilities (i.e., its Situation), and to resolve upon its own possibilities. Though it cannot 
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choose what its possibilities are, it can decide whether to pursue them or not; nothing prevents it, 
and importantly, nothing initiates the process but Dasein. This latter part is important because, 
recall, the activist thesis about Being and Time is typically set up in opposition to the passivist 
reading of Heidegger’s later work, where Being initiates any such change. For Braver, the later 
Heidegger offers “new, revised form of . . . Passive Knower. The clearing or relation to beings is 
not created or instituted by us, as in the Kantian Paradigm; rather, it is “granted” or “sent” to us 
and we receive it.”161 For Haar, it is “link between anxiety and the self-manifestation of being”162 
that takes the place of individual enabling. As will be discussed in later chapters, it is purportedly 
Being that initiates, sends, offers, gifts Dasein its own possibilities; Dasein must be open to 
Being’s gift, rather than asserting its possibilities, a line of thought epitomized in the title of the 
1966 Der Spiegel interview, “Only a God Can Save Us.” In this light, to call Being and Time 
‘activist’ means that Dasein initiates the process of recognizing its true possibilities. 
 What is this process? It starts, of course, with Dasein being lost in the inauthentic 
possibilities prescribed by das Man. The description of the transition itself begins with 
introduction the call of conscience, briefly discussed before, and so it is to that that return. 
 The call of conscience, recall, is a call to Dasein to recognize its own possibilities; it is, as 
anxiety, also the awareness that Dasein’s true possibilities are unsettled, that all is not perfectly 
determined for it, not even with the assurances of das Man. When the call of conscience appears 
is when the temptations of das Man fall away for the first time, revealing themselves to be 
hollow and insufficient for grounding Dasein’s possibilities: “because only the Self of the 
[Manselbst] gets appealed to and brought to hear, [das Man] collapses.”163 The call does not 
have anything to say in particular, and in fact the peculiarity about it is that it remains utterly 
                                                 
161
 Braver 275. 
162
 Haar 51.  
163
 Being and Time 317. 
83 
 
silent; the message, if anything, is rather the feeling of uncanniness, the awareness that the world 
is unsettled; “it does not call him into the public idle talk of [das Man], but calls him back from 
this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being.”164 This call is what leads Dasein 
onto the path of recognizing its anxiety, and with it its historical Situation. But where, exactly, 
does the call come from? Does Dasein initiate it, or does it arise from some other source? If the 
former, that seems to imply that Dasein is the one initiating its turn towards authenticity; if the 
latter, then it appears not to be up to Dasein when it starts to recognize its authentic possibilities. 
 The answer is a complicated one. On the one hand, Heidegger frames it as though it were 
obvious: “But is it at all necessary to keep raising explicitly the question of who does the calling? 
. . . In conscience Dasein calls itself.”165 Dasein itself is the caller of Dasein; Dasein as anxious is 
the one who, without words, makes itself aware and forces itself to recognize the unsettledness 
of the world. This is how the call is capable of being experienced as uncanniness—rather than 
being a message that actually goes from one party to another, it is an experience of Dasein, an 
experience of one’s own conscience (which makes a kind of intuitive sense—if you’re going to 
call it the call of conscience, it would be a bit strange if one’s conscience belonged to someone 
else). Thus the question appears to be answered: Dasein wakes itself up to awareness, calls itself 
to action. No outside force does the calling, a point that Heidegger emphasizes: “we need not 
resort to powers with a character other than that of Dasein; indeed, recourse to these is so far 
from clarifying the uncanniness of the call that instead it annihilates it.”166 This comes across in 
some ways like Sartre’s description of the phenomenon bad faith, where a person is in a way 
both aware and unaware of her own situation, pretending that she is free when she is also unfree, 
and unfree when she is free. Though a person in bad faith tries to deceive herself, the deception 
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will always fail, Sartre says, because to deceive oneself requires knowing what one is hiding: “I 
must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the 
one deceived.”167 Likewise, it appears, in anxiety Dasein tries to deceive itself, but it is always 
open to no longer doing so. 
 That Dasein is the source of the call which initiates the move towards authenticity is 
indisputable. However, things become suddenly more complicated, and again Heidegger’s 
picture and that of Sartre diverge—for though Dasein initiates the call of conscience, Dasein 
does not actually choose to do so. On this point Heidegger is equally emphatic: 
 
Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared 
for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations 
and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from 
someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond 
me.
168
 
 
 
To use an analogy: When I sneeze, it is not because I do so freely, even though it is I who 
sneeze, and no one else makes me. The sneeze merely comes from me, as a result of facts about 
what I am, and I have no control over when and where it occurs. Likewise, the call of conscience 
is basically, so to speak, anxiety’s knocking on the door. Since Dasein’s constitution is such that 
it is always unsettled, it is always in a state of uncanniness, and thus of anxiety. That that doesn’t 
seem to be the case is just due to the fact that we spend most of our time trying to avoid it. As 
Heidegger says in “What is Metaphysics?” rather ominously, “Anxiety is there. It is only 
sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein.”169 And given that the call itself exactly 
is the feeling of uncanniness (“The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-
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in-the-world as the “not-at-home””170), the call is not something that Dasein chooses to initiate at 
a given time or place; it is something that emerges seemingly like its own accord, like a sneeze 
or, truer to the concept, like a sudden moment of anxiety about the meaning and direction of 
one’s life, a moment unasked for and unannounced: “Originary anxiety can awaken in Dasein at 
any moment. It needs no unusual event to arouse it.”171 It is true, that conscience comes from 
Dasein, but one cannot draw the conclusion that Dasein is therefore activist, if ‘activist’ here is 
used in the sense of Dasein choosing to initiate something. There is no choice to become 
anxious, because Dasein is already anxious, and Dasein does not decide when anxiety will 
bubble up from below. The call of conscience is the constant sense, suppressed to greater or 
lesser degrees (usually greater) at different times, that one is anxious about one’s possibilities. 
Being and Time, therefore, is not activist in this second sense, because Dasein does not at all 
choose when to acknowledge the call and admit its unsettledness, the steps necessary to initiate 
the move to authenticity. 
 However, this is also not the end of the story. For there is yet another way in which one 
might find activism in Being and Time, weaker than the first two variants but not yet excluded. 
Granted that Dasein cannot choose what its possibilities are; granted that Dasein does not 
determine when it will be forced to see beyond das Man and towards its own possibilities; might 
there still be room for activism in the sense that Dasein must itself actively hold itself to, and 
maintain itself in, resoluteness? If Dasein has a tendency to fall into inauthenticity, the 
recognition of anxiety alone does not dissolve that tendency; perhaps, then, Dasein must itself 
take on the task of not just recognizing its anxiety, but of turning its awareness into a sustained 
resolution. Here another sort of activism does appears. 
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 The call of conscience can be summarized as Dasein’s being shaken out of its complete 
absorption in the world and das Man by the unannounced appearance of its anxiety, an anxiety 
that was always there but that, at this particular moment for reasons unknown, has suddenly 
surged forward. Anxiety, breaking Dasein from of its absorption, confronts it with a world free 
of illusions. In calling Dasein to anxiety, the call of conscience calls it to the possibility of 
grasping its possibilities as they really are, that is, grounded in its history and moving towards an 
unsettled future. In this way anxiety, via the call, first opens up the real possibility of becoming 
authentic, of grasping one’s possibilities, because it “calls Dasein forth to the possibility of 
taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is.”172 The call comes from Dasein not 
simply insofar as it is anxious, but from Dasein as a possessor of possibilities. To acknowledge 
that the call is a call from oneself and in particular from one’s unsettledness, is to acknowledge 
that one’s possibilities are a certain way, to have a certain understanding of one’s Situation 
(though that term doesn’t yet come up in Heidegger’s discussion). Because of this, “Hearing the 
appeal correctly is thus tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being.”173 The link between hearing the appeal and having a particular 
understanding is essential, for Heidegger continues: 
 
When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its 
becoming free for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In 
understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall to [hörig] its ownmost possibility of existence. It 
has chosen itself.
174
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 Here again comes the language of choice. At this point, one might be tempted to to write 
off any discussion of choice or will as deceptive, as has often seemed to be the case thus far. But 
here there is a specific relation between knowing and acting at work. To understand the appeal 
that conscience makes is not just to intellectually understand something, to be able to formulate 
true statements about the world, but for Dasein to “let itself” be called forth into a possibility, to 
open itself up to it—Dasein becomes free for its ownmost possibility, readies itself for it. 
Conscience is an experience, after all, not something articulated in words. Further down, 
Heidegger will repeat that “In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost Self take action in 
itself [in sich handeln] in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which it has chosen.”175 Recall that 
Dasein has a tendency to fall into inauthentic understanding. (This, one now sees, is because 
authentic experience is unsettling, anxious; it recognizes that the very possibilities that define 
Dasein’s existence are contingent.) Inauthenticity is thus tempting: “In the face of its thrownness 
Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of the [Manselbst].”176 In this 
context, for Dasein to let itself be open or take action, then, is not the same as submitting to 
something. To let itself take action requires refusing to accept the possibilities of das Man. But 
Dasein’s constitution does not incline it towards this; Dasein is inclined towards the opposite. As 
Heidegger says later on, while resolute “Dasein is already in irresoluteness [Unentschlossenheit], 
and soon, perhaps, will be in it again.”177 Thus, it’s proper to say some sort of activity on 
Dasein’s part is involved in being open, because being open requires resistance against an 
existential tendency of Dasein. Nor is there some other power behind such being open; it is, 
Heidegger says, Dasein that brings this about. Nor does this openness come about in the way that 
the call of conscience comes about, without warning or alternative; Dasein at this point is aware 
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of its anxiety, and the temptation it feels, the so to speak ‘natural’ position, is to misunderstand 
or ignore the call, to fall back into inauthenticity. Opposing such a temptation requires an act of 
resistance, and doing so for any length of time requires sustained resistance. Understanding the 
call correctly is thus an admittance of what one’s possibilities are, a “readiness for the 
potentiality of getting appealed to” in terms of its possibilities. For this reason, Heidegger says 
that ““Understanding the appeal” means “wanting to have a conscience”,”178 where Dasein is 
now choosing to accept the call. 
 Proper understanding of the call of conscience is thus a form of action, because it requires 
Dasein to keep aware of, and fight the tendency to avoid, its real possibilities. And it is a form of 
action that does not come from anything but Dasein’, Dasein aware of what is at stake and 
choosing to persist in that awareness rather than let it slip away. Thus Heidegger can fairly call it 
a choice (if one keeps in mind the very limited idea of freedom Heidegger has in mind), and it is 
one that is self-initiated by Dasein. Dasein did not choose to have the truth of its anxiety 
presented to it in the first place, but it does choose whether or not it accepts it or falls back into 
inauthenticity. Rather than fleeing, authentic Dasein opens itself to its true possibilities, 
something that, given Dasein’s constitution, takes genuine action. And the understanding that 
arises in wanting to have a conscience amounts to a disclosing of the world to Dasein, an 
acknowledgement of the way the world is. “This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which 
is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost 
Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call “resoluteness”.”179 
 Resoluteness, then, is activist. It is activist in a narrow, very specific sense—not in the 
sense that Dasein can actively determine what its authentic resolution will be, or even whether 
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becoming authentic is a possibility that it will consider, but in the sense of actively maintaining 
the particular Situation that resoluteness discloses to it as being its ownmost possibility. It is the 
finite freedom of Dasein to choose its history, to “choose its hero,” which is not a reference to 
picking whatever hero it wants, but deciding whether to choose the only real hero that is there 
(its heritage), or to reject it (i.e., be inauthentic). At around this point in the text one finds one of 
the few direct references to, and the only substantial (if one paragraph can qualify as 
‘substantive’) discussion of, action. “As resolute,” Heidegger says, “Dasein is already taking 
action.”180 But, he warns, he is reticent to use the word ‘action,’ for two reasons, both of which 
are now comprehensible. First, “this term must be taken so broadly that “activity” [Aktivitat] will 
also embrace the passivity of resistance.”181 Indeed, this may be the most important form of 
activity, as activity appears primarily to involve resisting the pull to conform to das Man, and 
standing firm not in some novel possibility that one has invented, but in the possibilities that are 
already there. Second, building on the first point, one must not understand resoluteness “as if 
resoluteness were a special way of behaviour belonging to the practical faculty as contrasted with 
one that is theoretical.”182 There is no need for anything like literal action in resoluteness; as was 
seen in the earlier discussion of resoluteness, the world may very well stay exactly the same, 
with what changes being the way in which Dasein understands and relates to that world. 
Resoluteness is both an act of understanding and the action that conforms to that understanding. 
Resoluteness, then, is a sort of active, sustained openness to one’s Situation, which is to say an 
active openness to the possibilities that exist in virtue of one’s history. It is open to its world, but 
actively resists distorting that world. It accepts das Man as part of the world, but must actively 
refuse to be sucked into das Man’s generalizations and half-truths. Being and Time is active, 
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then, but only active in the special sense of an active acceptance of or openness to one’s socio-
historical Situation, and a resistance to distortions of that Situation. Not the usual form of 
activism by any stretch of the imagination. 
 
 Is Being and Time the pivotal proto-existentialist work, as many think? Or is 
existentialism, insofar as it is grounded in Heidegger (and especially Sartre’s interpretation of 
Heidegger), grounded in a misconception? Mostly the latter. On first reading Being and Time, 
one can easily see how readers come away with a very assertive, anti-conformist interpretation of 
Heidegger’s thought. If the discussion in this chapter appears to make that point look rhetorically 
weak, it should be recalled that the focus throughout was on directly refuting common 
conceptions of individualism and activism in Heidegger; when reading Being and Time itself, it 
is hard not to be overwhelmed by the accounts of das Man, inauthenticity, conscience, guilt, 
resoluteness, and more, with the prominence of das Man’s deceptiveness, of resoluteness’ 
asserting the truth in contrast. The fact that Heidegger left his work unfinished, and that the final 
chapters were those discussing authenticity’s relation to history, did nothing to help, as can be 
seen in the problems surrounding the section on authentic historicity. 
 Despite those problems, I believe, and have argued, that the text, when taken in full, 
largely speaks for itself. A full, coherent account of authenticity can be developed that gives 
proper due to history, and develops an activism, insofar as it is an activism at all, far from that of 
the existentialists. Not only is such a picture consistent, I argue, but it is the only picture that 
makes full sense of the text. To argue for individualism ultimately requires ignoring or 
dismissing chapters’ worth of discussion of history, finding inconsistencies between anxiety and 
other parts of the work, and deemphasizing the role of Being-in-the-world, which is no less than 
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Dasein’s own Being.183 To argue for a strong, free sense of activism leaves aside the limits on 
Dasein’s possibility and freedom, and fails to comprehend the explanation of how authenticity 
arises. How my account squares with Heidegger’s position in later works has not yet been seen, 
but at this point, at least, it can be said that the common view of Heidegger as existentialist must 
fall to the wayside. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURNING TO THE 30S 
 
 Having developed in the previous chapter a detailed picture of authenticity, and with it 
inauthenticity, as it appears in Being and Time, the next question is: how is the concept of 
authenticity, which if it is present at all is no longer called such, developed in Heidegger’s works 
written during and after the Kehre? As discussed in the first chapter, there is some dispute as to 
when exactly the Kehre starts, or if it even has a clear beginning; some, such as Haar, place 
elements of it as early as “What is Metaphysics?” in 1929, though that is a fairly extreme view. 
In any case, it is not disputed that, whenever exactly the Kehre first starts, it is definitely pesent 
by the mid to late 1930s, certainly in Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), started in 1936. 
There, the structure and vocabulary of Heidegger’s writings goes through a dramatic change, and 
it’s beyond dispute that by the early 1940s that there has been a significant shift in how 
Heidegger conducts philosophy. 
 Perhaps the most direct exposition of the changes as they are in process is the 1938-9 
treatise Mindfulness, the second of the be-ing-historical treatises. Contributions and Mindfulness 
are notable among Heidegger’s works both for their frankness of content and obscurity of style; 
in them Heidegger directly addresses his evolving ideas and how he understands his previous 
work in a way that rarely appears in his lectures and courses, yet the writing style in these works 
ranges from incredibly challenging to indecipherable. Of the two treatises, Mindfulness is 
significantly clearer and more structurally coherent than its predecessor, Contributions; at the 
least, most of Mindfulness is written in complete sentences. Since both treatises cover basically 
the same set of topics in the same way, Mindfulness will be the central text in my examination of 
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authenticity in the mid to late 1930s. Yet since Mindfulness remains difficult, due in large part to 
the profusion of new terminology present in it, a companion text would be helpful. “The Origin 
of the Work of Art,” a lecture first delivered in 1935, is among Heidegger’s best-known lectures, 
and delves in particular into the active-passive dimension of authenticity. These two texts will 
form the basis of the discussion. 
 The discussion will move in roughly the same order as the previous chapter. I begin with 
a general description of technology and technological thinking as set against mindfulness, these 
concepts taking up the thematic space previously occupied by authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The discussion will thus simultaneously show Heidegger’s account of history and its relation to 
authenticity at this point in time: How does man, no longer referred to as Dasein, typically relate 
to his socio-historical circumstances, and how can that relation become authentic? The account 
outlined there will then be used to help fill in the question of activism: what must mindful 
humankind do to enter into a better relation to its world? Is the process purely passive, as strong 
Kehre readers argue, or is there a qualified sort of activism similar to that found in Being and 
Time? Here, “On the Origin of the Work of Art” will help support my reading of Mindfulness. 
 While the basic sequence is similar to before, the flow of the discussion will be somewhat 
different, as the aim is not just interpretive but comparative: how does the account of 
authenticity, history, and action in Mindfulness, and to a lesser degree in “On the Origin of the 
Work of Art,” square with the account given in Being and Time, point by point? If, as argued in 
the previous chapter, Being and Time’s account of authenticity has history playing a central role, 
one can assume that the change must not be as dramatic as strong Kehre readers suppose; 
however, knowing that does not answer the question of just what exactly, if anything, has 
changed. What, for example, happens to the role played by anxiety in Being and Time? What 
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about resoluteness? Perhaps there are still important content changes insofar as key elements of 
Being and Time’s account are removed or fundamentally altered later on. It is noteworthy, for 
instance, that terms such as ‘anxiety’ and ‘resoluteness’ are for the most part no longer used by 
Heidegger, except when explicitly referring back to Being and Time; are the corresponding 
concepts gone as well? To answer these questions, as concepts and terms from Mindfulness are 
examined, they will frequently be set against concepts from Being and Time. 
 It turns out, I argue, that not only is the basic view of authenticity, as historically 
informed and activist in a limited sense, similar to what is found in Being and Time; one can, in 
fact, go point by point through the major concepts introduced in Being and Time’s discussion of 
authenticity and find equivalents in Mindfulness. One point where there is a shift, however, is in 
the discussion of authentic historicity. The account of authentic historicity is not so much 
changed, however, as refined and fleshed out; it seems that it is still being developed at this time. 
It is, I suspect, this attempt to work out a more nuanced and complete account of authentic 
historicity, an essential but unfinished task in Being and Time, that gives works such as 
Mindfulness and those that come after their more historically oriented appearance. 
 
3.1 WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH ΤΕΧΝΗ? 
 
 In reckoning with authenticity in post-Being and Time works, the first and one of the 
most important difficulties one encounters is terminological. One of the biggest changes in 
Heidegger’s later works is the near total disappearance of the terms ‘authenticity’ and 
‘inauthenticity,’ along with the related body of terms such as ‘das Man,’ ‘guilt,’ ‘anxiety,’ 
‘resoluteness,’ and so on, from the discussion. If one thinks solely in terms of terminology, 
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authenticity disappears altogether by the mid-1930s; when old terms do appear, they almost 
always (almost always, but not always) refer back specifically to Being and Time’s account. For 
example, in Mindfulness, instead of discussing inauthenticity and das Man as the distorting 
influences on man’s (Mensch, who is now rarely referred to as Dasein) possibilities, Heidegger 
shifts focus to what he calls ‘the epoch of technology.’ Technology, referred to as ‘technicity’ in 
the current English translation of Mindfulness (a translation I will mostly avoid outside of 
quotations), appears to take on the role of obscuring man’s true possibilities and replacing them 
with ones that are not man’s own. What is technology, and what is its role in Mindfulness?184 
 Heidegger says that our current age (referring in a broad sense to Western civilization 
from Descartes on, but focused especially on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe) is 
the epoch of technology. One might initially think of the industrial revolution or The Terminator 
here, and both of those are related, but ‘the epoch of technology’ is far more than the control or 
enslaving of man by technology. At its most basic level, technology is an understanding of 
reality, of what it means for something to be real, to exist. The epoch of technology, therefore, 
manifests a specific way of understanding and interpreting the world, machination, just as das 
Man manifested what Heidegger called the public understanding of the world. Machination, as 
technology’s mode of understanding, is thus what Heidegger calls a “swaying of being,” which is 
just to say a way in which the Being of beings is grasped, a way of understanding the basic 
nature of reality.
185
 In the epoch of technology, the dominant understanding of reality is largely 
encompassed by the term ‘calculability,’ meaning that everything that is real is understood in 
terms of discrete, calculable, orderable units, of what can be produced or used for production: 
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“machination fosters in advance the completely surveyable calculability of the subjugating 
empowering of beings to an accessible arrangement.”186 Leaving subjugation and power aside 
for a moment, machination fosters in advance a particular understanding of beings such that they 
are accessible because calculable. Access to beings is defined by calculability; to grasp what a 
being is, one must be able to understand it in a calculable manner. Reality is organized, ordered, 
something counted and assembled from parts. 
 To make ‘calculability’ and thus the nature of technology clearer, one might compare it 
to a non-technological, non-calculable understanding of reality. Take, for instance, Plato’s 
understanding of reality. Plato held that the particular physical entities we sense are in some 
some sense instantiations of Forms, which are non-physical universal entities, and that sensible 
particulars derive their existence as well as their nature from their relationship to those Forms. 
The particulars of Platonic metaphysics are not important here. What is important is that what 
any particular thing in the world is, and so the key to understanding what a thing is, is in 
understanding how that thing is related to a higher universal accessible not through the senses, 
but through the mind alone; the mind knows the true Form, and there is no true sensory 
knowledge, properly speaking. A beautiful flower, for instance, is not beautiful because of 
physical facts about its smell, its colors, or the arrangement of its atoms (Democritean or 
otherwise). The flower is beautiful because it is somehow an instance or derivative of a perfect, 
intellectually grasped Form of Beauty. The intellectual realm is not just what makes the flower 
look pretty; it is what gives the flower the reality it has qua beautiful thing. The intellectually 
grasped Forms are what give things the existence as well as the features that they have. The 
Platonic understanding of the world is, in brief, of a physical, sensible reality that is derivative 
and an intellectual reality in virtue of which the physical reality has its existence and meaning. 
                                                 
186
 Mindfulness 12. 
97 
 
 Compare the Platonic view to the modern view, exemplified for Heidegger in modern 
science and especially (mid-twentieth century) physics. For the average scientist, there is no 
higher intellectual reality that makes a flower appear beautiful, no Beauty from which a flower 
derives its beautiful appearance. But neither does the world as experienced quite explain the 
flower’s beauty. The flower’s pleasant appearance, for example, is understood at one level as the 
result of a complicated reaction between particular wavelengths of light in a particular pattern 
and receptors in our eyes (biology), which itself is understood in terms of more fundamental 
chemical reactions between atomic elements (chemistry), which in turn is understood at more 
and more fundamental levels until one arrives at something like interacting fields of electrical or 
other force (theoretical physics). The fields of force themselves have no color, much less beauty; 
rather, taking something as beautiful is describing the calculable relationships between the light 
and receptors, which is between particles, which is between fields of force. These relationships 
are then ultimately describable mathematically, through the methods of modern physics. What a 
flower’s beauty is, and no less what a flower is, is fields (or perhaps something even more 
fundamental and abstract, as visible to our eyes as Plato’s Forms) that stand in mathematically 
describable relationships. Biology, as the saying goes, is applied chemistry, chemistry applied 
physics, and physics applied mathematics (and to finish the saying, mathematics applied logic; 
Heidegger, not coincidentally, sees the epoch of technology as one in which logic has supremacy 
over the sciences, a view expressed in “What is Metaphysics?” and elsewhere). Thus, a flower’s 
beauty is fundamentally something ordered in accord with specific, describable, calculable 
relations. Calculability is taking reality to be, at its most basic level, the precise (here, 
mathematical) relationships that describe the world. 
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 For Heidegger, an understanding of the way the world is comes with a view to how one 
should act in it (an understanding of what one’s possibilities are, to reach back to Being and 
Time), and so with the different understandings come different ways of interacting with the 
world. For the Platonist, the physical world is less important than the world of the intellect, and 
we should treat it accordingly: “He will do this [“grasp . . . the reality of all other things, that 
which each of them essentially is”] most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone 
. . . , freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole body.” 
(Pl. Phaedo 65d-66a)
187
 The physical world of sense is the derivative, and thus impure, world, so 
“those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying.” (Pl. Phaedo 67e) 
Compare this to what the current state of science tells us about the world. There, the world is 
composed of calculable resources, resources that can be harnessed in accord with their 
properties; thus, “Machination means the accordance of everything with producibility,” where 
the calculable is understood in terms of products, of the power that can be harnessed and the 
things that can be produced from it. Chemists extract fuel from crude oil, nuclear scientists 
extract power (whether for energy or destruction) from the atom, and so on. A river does not 
embody a Beauty that should be contemplated, but is a reaction that can be harnessed as a source 
of power for specific purposes. For Plato, people are essentially intellectual beings tethered to 
physical bodies, which in turn influences how we relate to the world; today, we see ourselves as 
integrated collectives of chemicals that act in accord with mathematical relationships. In the 
modern epoch, reality is understood as that which is wholly describable by ordered, calculable 
relationships, relationships which can be exploited for the practical ends one is pursuing, ends 
which are in turn calculable in terms of maximum efficiency. Everything else that appears to 
exist is derivative of the calculable, just as everything physical for Plato is derivative of Forms. 
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 The implications of calculability as an understanding of the world are far-reaching. 
Heidegger’s claim about calculability isn’t just about physical objects; it is a basic claim about 
our experience of reality itself, one that extends far beyond atoms and string theory. For this 
reason, the epoch of technology should not be understood as a product or result of modern 
physics; rather, modern physics (and with it the mathematical description of reality) is one, and 
not the only, result of the technological worldview, a worldview that equates reality, and with 
that meaning and value, with calculability. Under technology as an epoch and calculability as a 
form of understanding, all phenomena are interpreted in terms of how the phenomena in question 
can be ordered, organized, and made use of. Take art as an example. For Plato, works of art are 
visible entities that point to the higher intellectual Forms; anything, recall, that is beautiful is so 
only because it somehow instantiates the Form of Beauty. At its best, a specific work of art can 
act as a stepping stone, the first stage of the lover in Symposium who starts with a particular 
beautiful body and moves on to the love of all beautiful bodies, and from there by steps to “the 
Beautiful itself, absolute, pure, unmixed, not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great 
nonsense of mortality.” (Pl. Symposium 211d-e) Forms are thus an ontology that also explains 
what art can, and should, accomplish. 
 Calculability plays the same role as the Forms, but to very different effect. From the 
perspective of calculability, 
 
What art brings forth are “installations” (forms of organizing beings) . . . . Word, sound, and 
image are means for structuring, stirring, rousing and assembling of masses, in short, they are 
means of organizing . . . . “Motion picture” is the public installation of the “new” societal 
comportments, fashions, gestures, and “live-experience” of “actual” “lived-experiences.”188 
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In the modern age, Heidegger thinks, art is not understood as being revelatory of anything 
beyond itself, whether that be the Form of Beauty or otherwise. Rather, art as it is understood 
today is about the organization of tastes, interests, and fashions, of the tangible effects it has on 
people; art is defined by its usefulness in pleasing the public, in appealing to particular tastes. Art 
is currently pop culture: it is not that people have forgotten how to paint or make music, but that 
paintings and songs are made as consumer goods, organized products for public consumption in 
accord with ordered categories of aesthetic experience; mainstream or subculture, popular or 
underground, local or cosmopolitan. The summer blockbuster, the profusion of kitsch and niche 
interests, and exhibitions of indigenous art in Western museums basically as novelties are all 
examples.  “It is not films that are trashy,” Heidegger says, “but what they offer as the 
consequence of machination of lived-experience and what they disseminate as worthy of live-
experience.”189 (‘Lived-experience’ will be explained shortly.) The aim of art, in brief, is the 
“organizing the public life of the masses” according to calculable categories for the purpose of 
usefulness.
190
 Art as calculability, then, is not (or not merely) art in terms of mathematical 
physics. Art as calculability is art understood fundamentally in terms of delimited categories that 
are themselves grasped in a calculable way; ordered calculation of discrete entities for use and 
production is the common thread that physics and art share in the epoch of technology. 
 Given, as noted above, that the purpose of art in the epoch of technology is to organize 
the life of the masses and their interests, one can guess that human life itself, how we understand 
our lives and how we think those lives should be lived, is not free of calculability. In the epoch 
of technology man is defined as subject. As Heidegger understands it, subjectivism is man’s 
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understanding of himself as “that being from, and in view of which, all beings are “explained” in 
their beingness.”191 As subject, man is the being that identifies what other beings are, and in so 
doing makes available for production what is of use in them; man identifies the true nature of 
atoms and so can harness their power, identifies the true nature of a river and so can harness its 
power, identifies what is beautiful and how it can be used to sell more expensive clothes. Man as 
calculating being thus has power over objects, which are the things that are perceived by the 
subject. But at the same time man, as one being among others, is also part of the universe of 
calculable objects, and understood as such: “Man, the forgotten subject, belongs to the ‘whole’ 
of the “objective” beings and is within this ‘whole’ merely a fleeting speck of dust.”192 An 
epochal understanding of reality, such as that of technology, does not interpret objects in 
isolation from the subject, for Heidegger. What it is to exist, according to the epoch of 
technology, is to be calculable; the world is understood as calculable, goals and purposes are 
understood in terms of calculability and producibility, i.e., as discrete entities consisting of 
potential forces that can be harnessed for ends; one can almost see a Marxist notion of value in 
terms of labor-hours here. Just as Plato’s Forms lead to a particular way of comporting towards 
the world, the epoch of technology will lead to a particular way of regarding human experience. 
Since calculability grasps the world as consisting things to be harnessed for ordered, calculated 
use, human life in the world becomes understood as something that is ordered and calculated in 
the same way; the aim of human life becomes the maximization of output. 
 The upshot is that human life becomes a collecting of “lived experience” as what gives to 
man “the appearance of self-assertion vis-à-vis beings,”193 the illusion of having power and 
control over one’s life. To understand what is meant by ‘lived experience,’ think of the modern 
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family vacation. Rather than being a time of rest and relaxation, a modern vacation is usually 
centered on a trip somewhere, the goal of which is to have as many good experiences as possible. 
One goes to Disney World and experiences as many rides as one can, or one tries to visit all of 
the great national monuments. One goes sky diving or rock climbing simply for the experience of 
having done so. The idea of a vacation is, Heidegger would say, cheapened and simplified to a 
collection of experiences (epitomized by vacation photographs, which are representational stand-
ins for experience; Heidegger would likely have a lot to say about our growing tendency to 
constantly photograph our experiences and put them on social media for public display). 
Experience becomes something acquired, collected, amassed; amount and variety of experiences 
becomes a stand-in for any other form of value. For this reason, technology is also referred to as 
“man’s massive way of being,”194 emphasizing the scale and quantitative perspective, and ‘live-
experience’ as “the heightening of expanse and quickness, of affordability and publicness,”195 
emphasizing convenience and reach, on making everything possible. Technology, through 
calculation as a way of understanding the world, thus overpowers man, defining him and telling 
him what his life means, how life should be lived, without regard for the curves and fine details 
of human life; rather, life becomes what one has accomplished, what one can do, what power one 
has; it becomes a calculable, discrete list of things one has done. 
 The understanding of the world engendered by the epoch of technology has further 
consequences. As previously hinted at, the possession of power is an essential aspect of the 
technological epoch. Man is set against beings as their master and possessor, controlling 
resources for his own use; machination is thus a form of “coercive force.”196 Coercion, assertion, 
and power are central to Heidegger’s view of technology, and are influenced by Heidegger’s 
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reading of Nietzsche, a thorough exposition of which is beyond the scope of this study. In brief, 
Heidegger adopts Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, taking it to be a final step in 
revealing the modern era as one of power and control, of harnessing nature and oneself in the 
service of greater power and control. The technological worldview is described consistently as 
destructive, coercive, and forceful, such that “its own overpowering of itself necessarily includes 
commanding everything to subjugation that finds itself in the sphere of disposal of power.”197  
 But because technology asserts control over man’s view of himself as well as his view of 
objects, man is swept up into the process of control, stripped of genuine power to question 
technology itself. The result is blindness towards anything but accumulating more, “the 
undermining of every possibility of a beginning on the basis of a completely bedazzled self-
seeking that lacks all measures and has become absolute.”198 Man is too busy chasing lived 
experiences and being bedazzled by how much more he can do to ask about the worldview that 
places absolute priority on such things. In this way, the epoch of technology leads man away 
from inquiring into the origin of the epoch, of avoiding questions about the nature of the modern 
understanding of the world and its foundations. Technology thus leads to a forgetting of the 
historical sources that led to technology as the only possible way of understanding the world, 
something Heidegger calls a ‘decision’: 
 
such a grasping [“of the sway of power . . . as a form of self-mastery”] can take place only in 
a deciding, through which one side of machination as such and, along with it, machination in 
its unconcealed sway in general, first comes to a halt. However, every sway of power and 
every power-possessing being is in itself an evasion of such decisions.
199
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The epoch of technology includes a failure to even question whether it itself is anything but 
correct, and so man is rendered incapable of seeing the epoch of technology and what comes 
with it as problematic. The epoch of technology avoids confronting its own foundations, 
confronting the sway of be-ing that allowed technology to take precedence in the first place. The 
end result is that technology “blocks and finally undermines all decision”200 about man’s 
historical situation (where ‘situation’ is being used in a general sense here), on what to make of 
the epoch itself and whether to challenge it. 
 While the terminology is much more rhetorically aggressive than that in Being and Time, 
and is generally keyed into one specific epoch in history, (1) the tendency of technology to take 
its own form of explanation as absolute, (2) its orderly, universalized, and uninquisitive manner 
of explanation of the world, (3) the illusion it provides of control and the substitution of genuine 
experience for, in Being and Time’s words, “the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is 
genuinely ‘lively’,”201 (4) the resulting avoidance of questioning the historical foundations of 
man’s situation and thus (5) the inability to come to any decisions that would arise therefrom 
draw consistent analogies to Being and Time’s discussion of das Man and what about das Man 
led Dasein in Being and Time towards inauthenticity. Das Man, recall, provided simple answers 
that were to be taken as obvious and beyond question (satisfying point 1). It explained the world 
and one’s possibilities simply, in terms of ‘what one does’ in the established way of living, 
thereby promoting inauthenticity rather than pursuing to the utmost one’s true possibilities (point 
2). Das Man thus allowed Dasein to think it had control over what it wanted, to think it was 
doing the right thing, when in truth Dasein’s possibilities are always unsettled and never fully 
within its control (3). Because Dasein’s true possibilities must come from its historical situation, 
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Das Man’s form of understanding failed to acknowledge Dasein’s true historical possibilities (4); 
thus, when resolute, Dasein “has chosen itself;”202 it has prepared itself to acknowledge and 
move forward in its genuine historical possibilities, unlike the Manselbst (5). The epoch of 
technology plays not just a similar role in Mindfulness to the role das Man plays in Being and 
Time when it comes to promoting inauthenticity; the two operate identically. 
 Despite the strong similarities that manifest on a close reading, there appears to be at least 
one very important difference between the concepts of das Man and technology:  technology, as 
Heidegger understands it, is not a timeless phenomenon that always has the same structure. 
Rather, it is the epoch of technology; Heidegger appears to be unambiguous talking about the 
modern era alone: “Modern technicity,” Heidegger says, “arises out of [a] foundational but at the 
same time concealed fostering.”203 Notice not only that it is modern technology that is the point 
of interest, but also that it arises out of a “foundational” fostering, which appears to imply that 
there was some previous historical occurrence or set of occurrences that led to what is today the 
epoch of technology. Technology, according to this passage and in line with the constant use of 
the term ‘epoch,’ appears to be a historical phenomenon in a way that inauthenticity does not—
while in Being and Time inauthenticity was certainly Dasein’s state at particular times and places 
in history, technology appears to be a form of human understanding that arises specifically in the 
modern era, from specific historical events. Inauthenticity and das Man, by and large, seem to 
fade away as basic, persistent parts of Dasein’s existence, replaced by a specific historical 
phenomenon; one might then infer, accordingly, that the concept of authenticity has somehow 
changed in a similar way. Zimmerman, following this view, says of Being and Time that “At this 
stage in his thinking, Heidegger was not yet aware of the fact that the possibility of owned 
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existence lies not on the site of Dasein, but within a certain phase of the history of Being.”204 For 
Being and Time-era Heidegger, on Zimmerman’s reading, whether Dasein is authentic or not 
depends on what Dasein does.For the later Heidegger it depends on what sort of character the 
contemporary epoch has: is it one of technology, or a more authentic epoch? “Certainly,” Haar 
says of the later Heidegger, “the fundamental choices in terms of which an epoch orders itself are 
simple and few. But are they still choices, decisions (Entscheidungen) freely made by man . . . ? 
Errancy is not a fault of man,”205 because the epoch decides whether man will be in errancy or 
not: man, on Haar’s reading of the later Heidegger, “can escape neither errancy, nor forgetting, 
which is itself forgotten.” 206 
 Heidegger certainly refers to the modern era specifically when he discusses technology 
and calculation in works such as Mindfulness. But if authenticity and inauthenticity depend 
entirely on the character of the epoch, if they are entirely historical circumstances that either 
obtain or don’t, then if there were an authentic epoch it would be impossible to be inauthentic in 
it, just as it appears (according to Haar and Zimmerman) that the possibility of authenticity 
depends on the era. Is that Heidegger’s view in Mindfulness? 
 Look back to Being and Time. Inauthenticity appears to be described in a way that 
doesn’t limit it to just one epoch, but exactly how? In what sense, given Heidegger’s conceptual 
framework, is inauthenticity not specifically a historical phenomenon? In Being and Time 
Heidegger says that Dasein is inauthentic, or “everyday” Dasein, “proximally and for the most 
part.” That seems to imply that there are general features of inauthenticity which operate in the 
same way throughout history. However, Heidegger never draws out that implication explicitly 
even once in Being and Time, and the only seemingly clear evidence is the use of these two 
                                                 
204
 Zimmerman 105. 
205
 Haar 126. 
206
 Ibid. 
107 
 
expressions. Throughout Being and Time, Heidegger describes inauthenticity without actually 
saying anything about its historicality or lack thereof; perhaps such an omission is unhelpful, but 
it is the state of the text. That in mind, one can read the two expressions ‘everyday’ and 
‘proximally and for the most part’ in at least two ways: ahistorically, as referring to ‘everyday’ 
Dasein throughout ‘the most part’ of its history, or as referring to what everyday Dasein is like in 
a particular circumstance, what is ‘everyday’ for a specific place and time. “For the most part, 
Dasein is inauthentic” is understandable in either sense, so the use of such expressions without 
further elaboration does not on its own make a case. 
 In fact, one can find some evidence, albeit inconclusive evidence, for the view that 
inauthenticity is tied to a specific historical period in Being and Time. In particular, one can cite 
the instances in Being and Time where Heidegger describes specific examples of inauthenticity 
and of misinterpretations in philosophy. His examples of inauthenticity in particular trend 
towards the contemporary, and certainly are historical in the sense of being comprehensible only 
in terms of specific historical circumstances. For example, Heidegger says in his initial 
discussion of das Man that 
 
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the 
newspaper, every Other is like the next . . . . We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they 
[man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; 
likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what 
they find shocking.”207 
 
 
Public transportation and newspapers are anything but timeless features of human life. In this 
instance, at least, inauthenticity is expressed in a particular historical moment, which turns out to 
be the same moment that becomes known as the epoch of technology in Mindfulness. One 
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example does not constitute a proof, of course, but it is far from the only example. The general 
sense of excessive speed in the same discussion of idle talk, of the drifting about of idle curiosity 
from one interest to the next
208
 and the rush to make trends out of date through ambiguity
209
 
appear in a way that suggests particularly contemporary concerns. 
 One might say in response that contemporary examples make for livelier examples, and 
that using such examples is just a way to connect with the readership, not making an implicit 
point. This could be true, but one should look to the broader interpretive concerns that animate 
Being and Time itself. Heidegger’s concerns about the understanding of Being are not merely 
about inauthenticity as such, but about a specific type of misinterpretation that, he thinks, has a 
specific history. For instance, the guiding concern that opens the treatise itself, the neglect of the 
question of Being, is described as an issue of contemporary concern with historical origins: “a 
dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to 
be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect.”210 This neglect seems not to be presented as 
an atemporal fact. When Heidegger speaks of method, his discussion of the sciences, both 
broadly speaking and on their relation to the project of fundamental ontology, is far from 
unhistorical, including Heidegger’s persistent concern over the confusion of the analysis of 
Dasein for contemporary anthropology.
211
 The following passage, in the section titled “The Task 
of Destroying the History of Ontology,” brings what seems to be an ambiguity of Heidegger’s 
view into relief: 
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When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made 
so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed . . . . 
Dasein has had its historicality so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it confines its interest 
to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in 
the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact that it 
has no ground of its own to stand on.
212
 
 
 
On the one hand, ‘tradition’ is identified as what obscures Dasein’s understanding. Heidegger 
does not seem to be referring to a specific tradition, but to tradition itself. However, the next 
passage refers to specific problems with what Heidegger takes to be the current historical 
situation. It is not simply that tradition does something wrong and must be overcome in general 
(that would make no sense, given that authenticity is tied to tradition), but that a specific tradition 
has manifested the neglect of Being; there is nothing inevitable about confining one’s “interest to 
the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the 
most exotic and alien of cultures.” What, then, is the sense of ‘tradition’ at work here? Tradition 
itself, as a steady influence in Dasein’s existence, or one specific tradition and what it has done? 
 The answer is, “Yes.” The ambiguity in this passage is only apparent, and is explained a 
few paragraphs before. “The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being 
as an historical inquiry, gives us the assignment [Anweisung] of inquiring into the history of that 
inquiry itself, that is, of becoming historiological.”213 Any inquiry into Being is historical, 
because Dasein is fundamentally a historical being. Thus, any discussion of Dasein cannot only 
be a discussion of Dasein in the abstract, but must be understood to apply to Dasein as having an 
actual, lived history. Dasein is historical, so any relation to tradition it has is a relation to a 
particular tradition. The discussion of inauthenticity in Being and Time may not be ahistorical, 
which would mean that the account has no reliance on history, but rather transhistorical; that is, 
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inauthenticity may have general features that transcend historical periods, but those features only 
have any substance when they are given specific historical content. In other words, inauthenticity 
is not nothing, but it is an empty concept without historical manifestation, and of course those 
historical manifestations will not always be the exact same. Ahistoricality assumes that das Man, 
for instance, is some existing structure that is exactly the same whenever it manifests; 
transhistoricality assumes only that it can manifest across multiple time periods, but allows for 
difference in how that manifestation occurs. On a transhistoricality reading, there may be some 
very broad features that inauthenticity shares across epochs, but those features are only 
comprehensible, and only have any sort of existence, when manifested in some particular form 
(it’s like the difference between a Platonic Form and an Aristotelian form; more is said on this 
point in the Conclusion); those features don’t belong to a free-standing structure,214 and so one 
cannot talk about inauthenticity an sich, so to speak. 
 But, one may object, das Man is still being understood in Being and Time as some sort of 
structure that exists across historical periods, and that is enough to show a significant difference 
from Heidegger’s position in Mindfulness. Two further points can be made, one from the 
direction of Being and Time and one from the direction of Heidegger in the 1930s, which press 
firmly against this objection. First, a brief paragraph in Being and Time’s initial discussion of das 
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Man provides a more direct, though unelaborated, view into the relationship between das Man 
and history. Heidegger opens the paragraph by saying that das Man is not just something out and 
apart from Dasein, but is in fact part of Dasein’s existential constitution, a part of Dasein’s very 
structure whenever it exists. So far, this is compatible with das Man being read as either 
ahistorical or transhistorical. However, Heidegger adds in a key passage that das Man “has, in 
turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein [seiner 
daseinsmassigen Konkretion]. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit 
may change in the course of history.”215 Notice that here in Being and Time itself, Heidegger is 
saying that, given das Man is part of Dasein’s constitution, das Man can become part of Dasein’s 
worldv in different ways through history, possessing different levels of control over Dasein’s 
understanding. Heidegger does not go on to say what determines the extent of das Man’s control 
in a given historical period, but what is important is that the way in which das Man manifests is 
not always the same, and that das Man is not simply experienced in the same way by all Daseins 
throughout history. The role of das Man changes with history itself; das Man’s control, and so 
inauthenticity, is not and cannot be ahistorical; it must be transhistorical. 
 As a note, if one grants that Being and Time’s account of inauthenticity (and much more, 
presumably, that goes beyond the scope of this study) transhistorical, a different interpretation of 
the change from Being and Time to the later works opens up. If inauthenticity can only exist as 
something that manifests concretely in history, then perhaps the change after Being and Time is 
not the replacing of inauthenticity by a particular historical phenomenon. It may instead be the 
result of a different sort of shift, a shift in emphasis or focus from a conceptual discussion of 
structural features, putting aside their manifestations in historical circumstances (talking of 
tradition, inauthenticity, and das Man in general, for instance, without using any historical 
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qualifiers) to specific historical descriptions, to talk of a particular manifestation of these 
structures. Speaking in neutral terms about inauthenticity and the like does indeed make them 
sound ahistorical, and seems to push against Heidegger’s own view (or so I have argued) that 
these concepts only have meaning when manifested in concrete historical situations; perhaps, 
then, one solution for Heidegger would be to drop the neutral, conceptual language and speak 
directly of concrete historical situations. Thus, Heidegger may have decided that, instead of 
describing inauthenticity as a general phenomenon, he will focus specifically on its current 
manifestation in the epoch of technology. I will argue in the Conclusion that this is exactly what 
is going on, though the evidence thus far presented does not provide a full case for it, and a truly 
complete discussion of that question would consume a dissertation all its own.   
 Returning to the narrower question, whether there was a shift of content from 
inauthenticity’s being constituted by transhistorical structures to it being constituted by historical 
phenomena, the ultimate answer to this question appears in Chapter 4 of this study. At the 
moment, however, I can offer, as the second point, a passage from the 1930s which presages that 
later solution. In 1935’s “On the Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger considers the different 
interpretations of what a thing in general is that have appeared throughout history. Perhaps a 
thing, such as a jug, is a combination substance and accident? Perhaps form and matter? When 
Heidegger gets to the medieval notion of thing as something created, a product of an uncreated 
God, he notes that “The philosophy of [“the biblical,” meaning Christian] faith can of course 
assure us that all of God's creative work is to be thought of as different from the action of a 
craftsman. “Nevertheless,” he cautions, 
 
if at the same time or even beforehand, in accordance with a presumed predetermination of 
Thomistic philosophy for interpreting the Bible, the ens creatum is conceived as a unity of 
113 
 
materia and forma, then faith is expounded by way of a philosophy whose truth lies in an 
unconcealedness of beings which differs in kind from the world believed in by faith. 
The idea of creation, grounded in faith, can lose its guiding power of knowledge of beings as 
a whole. But the theological interpretation of all beings, the view of the world in terms of 
matter and form borrowed from an alien philosophy, having once been instituted, can still 
remain a force. This happens in the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times.
216
 
 
 
The interpretation of createdness that defined the medieval era, Heidegger says in this lecture 
composed and edited shortly before Mindfulness, allowed man in that time to understand the 
physical world as having a unique status as the creation of God, an understanding that would 
have given the world a particular value and medieval Dasein a particular set of possibilities, a 
destiny. That understanding, however, was then distorted in a particular way, through the 
metaphysics of form and matter, which had repercussions later in history. A foreign notion of 
reality entered into the medieval worldview, leading it astray and dragging vestiges of it into the 
modern era. But that doesn’t mean that the medieval understanding of the world was inherently 
corrupt and inauthentic; if it were, what sort of “guiding power of knowledge of beings,” in 
Heidegger’s words, would the notion of reality as God’s creation have? An epoch, in this case 
the medieval epoch, appears to be not simply inauthentic or authentic; rather, there was an 
understanding of the world that could be illuminating (providing a guiding power) if grasped 
properly, but could also be distorting if brought under the sway of concepts foreign to it. In other 
words, there appears to be an authentic and inauthentic medieval worldview. If the different 
ways of grasping an epoch’s understanding of Being can be distinguished along the lines of 
authenticity and inauthenticity, as appears reasonable here, then the conceptual machinery is 
available for a transhistorical reading of Heidegger’s later works. In such a reading, 
inauthenticity may appear across historical epochs; however, the degree and style of that 
                                                 
216
 Heidegger, Martin. “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry Language Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971) 29. 
114 
 
inauthenticity could vary greatly, just as the passage in Being and Time argues. Being and Time 
and the later work would thus be brought together in this key respect. While this route looks 
promising, the case for it is still somewhat embryonic, and more direct confirmation is desirable. 
A similar passage from “The Question Concerning Technology” will provide the needed 
confirmation much more clearly, but for now I want to emphasize that this reading is one to be 
taken seriously; a knockdown proof that there is no content change has not yet been adduced, but 
the grounds for one are present, and open up a genuine alternative view. 
 In conclusion, recall the strong Kehre thesis. One of its central claims is ‘man is replaced 
by history.’ One way in which that might be the case is if authenticity and inauthenticity as 
phenomena are no longer specific to the nature of people as such, but to historical periods as 
such—in Being and Time, this story would go, people  are authentic or inauthentic based on 
whether their particular actions and understandings of the world are; in the later work, on the 
other hand, it is a historical epoch itself that is authentic or inauthentic, and people are basically 
along for the ride. The replacment of general talk of inauthenticity with talk of the epoch of 
technology appears, on the surface, to confirm this view. But, as I have argued, Being and Time’s 
account of inauthenticity is not an ahistorical phenomenon. Further, there is good reason to think 
that Mindfulness does not hold to a purely historical view of inauthenticity. Thus, there is reason 
to think that the two accounts are not so different, and that man is not simply replaced by history. 
Finishing this argument will require two more steps, however: One, finding stronger textual 
support for the idea that the later work is transhistorical, and two, showing how that textual 
support is in line with the evidence provided above from Mindfulness. That will appear in the 
next chapter, but for now I move forward to authenticity in Mindfulness. 
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3.2 BEING HISTORICALLY MINDED 
 
 Based on what was just said in the previous section, inauthenticity appears to have a 
place in Mindfulness similar to, perhaps identical to, its place in Being and Time. But that is only 
one half of the story. On the other side, when it comes to potentially overcoming the epoch of 
technology, Heidegger says that what is required is what he calls ‘mindfulness.’ What is 
mindfulness, and how does it relate to authenticity? There is little dispute that, on its surface, it 
focuses more on history than authenticity. But is its actual relation to historical possibilities the 
same as the relation I argued authenticity has to history in Being and Time? And is there a sort of 
activism in being mindful, similar to that in Being and Time, or has it gone totally passive, as 
some argue? As in the last chapter, I will start with a general discussion of mindfulness that will 
pave the way towards answering the question of history’s role; the section after that will shift 
focus to activism and passivism. 
 First, what is mindfulness? As opposed to technology’s forgetting of its own ground, 
“mindfulness means preparing the preparedness” for “taking over the distress of the grounding of 
the truth of be-ing – it is the beginning of a history that has no ‘history’.”217 Mindfulness is a 
form of preparation, but in the sense of preparing a preparedness, or preparing a readiness for 
action; it is a priming or bracing oneself to act. Specifically, it is a preparing to take over “the 
distress of the grounding of the truth of be-ing.” Heidegger frequently refers in Mindfulness to 
the epoch of technology as signified by a lack of distress—specifically, by a lack of concern for 
man’s lostness in the epoch of technology. This lack of concern is what allows technology to 
spread its control, by becoming the only voice that offers an understanding of the world, one that 
shuts out all others—recall from the previous section that technology results in a “a completely 
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bedazzled self-seeking” in the search for lived-experience, where all possibilities of decision are 
undermined because not recognized. Mindfulness, as preparing the preparedness to do something 
(to make a decision in some way, presumably), must acknowledge the distressing nature of an 
era where no one recognizes that there is even a problem. Accordingly, mindfulness is a distress 
at the lack of distress over the epoch of technology; it becomes the “distress of the lack of 
distress wherein being’s abandonment of beings becomes manifest.”218 
 In the epoch of technology, recall, everything is interpreted through the lens of 
calculability, including human life and experience. Any other understanding of the being of 
beings is forgotten, left out, ignored. Heidegger refers to this in Mindfulness as the abandonment 
of beings by being, which reaches its nadir in the epoch of technology: “this groundless and 
ungraspable obtrusiveness of the undecided question of being that avoids every decision on 
distress itself originates from being’s abandonment of beings and from the unbroken 
predominance of what is always simply “actual”,”219 where actuality is another marker of 
calculability and so technology. That is to say, any awareness of being in general, as apart from 
particular manifested beings, is lost in the epoch technology, and furthermore, the situation is 
such that this very fact is invisible to people most of the time; everyone thinks that all is well and 
nothing is missing. Therefore, the first task of becoming mindful is to become aware of the 
overpowering and deceptive nature of technology, of the lostness of the question of Being that 
motivates Being and Time from the very first page: “it is fitting that we should raise anew the 
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question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to 
understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all.”220 
 How does such awareness come about? In a passage characteristic of the terminological 
rollercoaster that is the be-ing-historical treatises, Heidegger says that “be-ing can enown 
(ereignet, appropriate) its openness”—that is, a space of possibilities (openness) can be revealed 
beyond that found in the epoch of technology, one that is receptive to the appropriating event 
(Ereignis) of be-ing rather than being consumed with calculating and ordering beings—“only 
when, via a grounding-attunement that is attuned by be-ing, the post-metaphysical man who 
undertakes the groundership for this openness is sundered from all ensnarement by mere beings.  
This grounding-attunement is the attunement of the dismay that sets-free.”221 The operative term 
in this passage is ‘grounding-attunement.’ A grounding-attunement is a fundamental way of 
comporting towards the world, not in the sense of a feeling or behavior; it is “the “ground” of all 
comportments that thoroughly attunes them,”222 it allows particular feelings and moods to take 
place at all, by opening up a sphere of involvement in which they can occur. Grounding-
attunements thus shape and direct our attitudes towards the world, and in so doing opening up 
possibilities; they have, Heidegger says in Mindfulness, the character of ereignet, of 
appropriating man into the world—in short, a grounding-attunement is a particular manner of 
Being-in-the-world. 
 A grounding-attunement is a way in which the world is grasped, an understanding of the 
world in Being and Time’s sense of that term. The account of grounding-attunements closely 
follows that of mood in Being and Time. Mood, Heidegger says there, is not another word for 
feeling; it “implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter 
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something that matters to us;”223 it is finding the world to be in some particular way, which 
allows things to have meaningful significances in terms of Dasein’s possibilities. Dismay as a 
grounding-attunement, which is the state that distress at the lack of distress places us in, draws 
obvious analogies to anxiety as a mood, and with good reason. In Being and Time, anxious 
Dasein experienced the world as not being settled and in its control, as oppressive and obtrusive 
insofar that it fails to offer straightforward, settled, unquestionable possibilities that Dasein can 
then pursue without worry. In Mindfulness, the grounding-attunement that frees man from 
technology’s sway is dismay, which is a distress at the lack of distress over the lack of concern 
about being. The epoch of technology takes everything to be ordered and calculable, and so 
subject to man’s control. But it is possible to question the epoch of technology, to ask whether 
the world can only be understood in that way. Dismay is what comes from recognizing that man 
has been taking his understanding of the world entirely from technology, an understanding that 
can be questioned as to its origins and its absoluteness, and challenged; perhaps, man realizes in 
dismay, the world is not simply this way, perhaps man is not in control. Dismayed man also 
recognizes that any possibilities outside of the simple orderability of technology are no longer 
even seen, that man is not even aware of, much less in control of, his own destiny. Dismay, 
Heidegger says in the passage quoted above, “sunders” modern man from beings as such (since 
beings are currently being understood via calculability and nothing else, any other awareness 
sunders man from the world he currently lives in), but at the same time it is a “dismay that sets-
free,” meaning that it sets us free from our enthrallment to particular beings: “the shared 
knowing-awareness must be inaugurated in those who mold their style out of the attunement that 
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thoroughly attunes a dismay that sets-free from beings and bears and steers the displacement 
unto the inquiry into the most question-worthy,”224 i.e., unto be-ing. 
 While the term ‘anxiety’ never emerges in this discussion, the similarities are striking. It 
is the task of mindfulness to see through the dominating technological understanding of the 
world, a task that leads to distress. This distress pulls man out of his obsession with particular 
beings and their supposedly set nature, as anxiety broke Dasein away from the straightforward 
projects and goals given to it by das Man. Heidegger, in a passage in Mindfulness where he 
reflects upon Being and Time, connects authenticity and distress directly: “un-ownedness [a 
translation of Un-eigentlichkeit, the same term as Being and Time’s ‘inauthenticity’] . . . thought 
“existentially” unto and out of the question of being, means lostness to beings, that is, means the 
predominance of beings themselves and their overshadowing of being to such an extent that the 
distress of the question concerning the truth of being has to stay away.”225 One might be inclined 
to read this passage as Heidegger reading later concepts, in this case distress and the truth of 
being, back into Being and Time, a charge Heidegger is frequently accused of.
226
 Yet recall that, 
in Being and Time, the question of Being “has today been forgotten,”227 that Dasein spends much 
of its time fallen from “Dasein itself as factical Being-in-the-world,”228 that inauthentic Dasein is 
described as being in a state of ““absorption in . . .””229 the world of its concerns, an absorption 
where an authentic understanding of the world is replaced “by what is present-at-hand within-
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the-world, namely, Things;”230 further, that this absorption “has mostly the character of Being-
lost in the publicness of [das Man],”231 because such publicness “brings Dasein a tranquility, for 
which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open,”232 and that “In this falling 
Being-alongside” that is represented by tranquilizing inauthenticity, “fleeing from uncanniness 
[i.e., from anxiety] announces itself.”233 The terms are not the same between Being and Time and 
Mindfulness, but the content of the account is hardly new, and what emerges is a far cry from the 
revisionist self-interpretation that some claim to find sprinkled throughout Heidegger’s works. 
 Technology is an all-consuming understanding of the world in terms of calculability, the 
overcoming of which starts with recognition of the lack of distress over technology’s domination 
and over the failure to look towards be-ing. If distress at the lack of distress takes the place of 
anxiety, in what does the positive account of mindfulness consist? What is mindfulness like? 
 
The decision prepares itself as mindfulness of what is ownmost to the epoch that consists of 
the completion of modernity [i.e., the modern epoch] . . . . Necessitated and held within 
decision itself, mindfulness, as the originary onefold of that historical knowing-awareness 
and this inquiry, only prepares the decision . . . . But “metaphysics” [that is, the history of be-
ing that resulted in the epoch of technology] . . . can be overcome only by a more inceptual 
questioning of metaphysics’ ownmost question and by relegating metaphysics to its ownmost 
necessity . . . . Questioning more inceptually means, on the one hand, to raise to what is most 
question-worthy that which remained fundamentally unquestioned . . . on the other hand,  to 
leap into the hitherto hidden history of be-ing and thereby to grasp history itself in the whole 
more foundationally than any kind of ‘history’.234 
 
 
Given the emphasis by interpreters on a supposed shift to history in Heidegger’s later work, it is 
not surprising to see that history plays a major role in the form of mindfulness of the current 
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epoch and of leaping into a hidden history. The question, however, is not whether history is 
emphasized more or spoken of more directly here than in Being and Time, but exactly what role 
history is playing in this passage and in Heidegger’s thought more generally at this juncture, and 
how that differs from the (somewhat unclear, as discussed in the previous chapter) account of 
authentic historicity in Being and Time. 
 Mindfulness is presented in the passage above as preparing for a decision
235
 concerning 
what is ownmost—not ownmost to an individual or group, says Heidegger, but to a particular 
historical epoch. In other words, mindfulness prepares to confront and determine what the central 
characteristic of the current epoch is, of what defines it and drives it forward. In practice, this 
preparation amounts to an awareness of the nature of technology that at the same time opens the 
possibility of deciding in favor of another beginning. This other beginning is not clearly defined, 
but is in contrast with the first beginning, that being the history of the West which begins with 
Greek philosophy
236
 and leads to the current epoch of technology, the course of which Heidegger 
frequently refers to as ‘the history of metaphysics’ because, he thinks, the history of 
understandings of the world can be traced through the different metaphysical interpretations of 
be-ing. Mindfulness thus prepares for the advent of a way of thinking open to something other 
than technology (it can’t, Heidegger says, initiate this way of thinking itself, a fact that will 
become important in the next section), for the possibility of a different foundation to history.  
 Mindfulness prepares for the decision by way of questioning. In particular, mindfulness is 
inceptual questioning, questioning after the inception of the current historical epoch, which 
means that mindfulness involves questioning about the history of be-ing itself, and specifically of 
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how technology became the dominant understanding of be-ing in the West. Such questioning 
requires looking back into the sequence of decisions, which is to say the sequence of 
understandings of be-ing, which founded the current epoch in which man lives, i.e., looking back 
into history of metaphysics and what he calls the ‘first beginning’ that got it going. Such 
questioning is itself the acting out of distress at the current era’s lack of distress about being; it 
is, in more ordinary terms, modern man asking about how the modern world became dominated 
by technology and technological thinking, and marks the move towards a break from 
technological dominion. This, Heidegger says, is all that mindfulness can do: prepare the way for 
a new beginning by questioning the history that led to man’s current situation, prepare for a 
decision by recognizing why the present is as it is, recognizing that the current understanding of 
the world is not the only possible one, and not the perfect one. From there, man is prepared “to 
raise to what is most question-worthy that which remained fundamentally unquestioned.” 
 Look back once more to the very first page of Being and Time. “[I]t is fitting that we 
should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being . . . . [F]irst of all we must reawaken an 
understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out 
the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely.”237 Heidegger says that the aim of 
Being and Time is not to say what the meaning of Being is, but to raise the question of the 
meaning of Being; that is, to present what we mean by the word ‘being’ as something to be 
questioned. This is necessary, Heidegger says, because the question has been forgotten, since “a 
dogma has been developed”238 which either declares the most fundamental ontological question 
to be pointless, or ignores it entirely. Being and Time aims to overcome that dogma, first, 
through an analysis of that being that can ask about Being: Dasein. And what is discovered in the 
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course of that analysis? That Dasein grasps itself as a whole, which is to say it grasps itself in 
terms of its Being rather than some particular thing, concept, or feature of it, in authenticity, 
which was described above as Dasein’s reckoning with its historically-shaped world. Recall that 
because Dasein’s Situation includes not only its death, but its birth as well, authentic Dasein 
must pass down to itself its heritage, where this is something like (remembering that this part of 
Being and Time left much unexplained) its facticity. This results in a repetition of one’s heritage 
in some way, but not in a way that suggests we all become professional re-enactors: “The 
repeating of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is ‘past’, 
nor does it bind the ‘Present’ back to that which has already been ‘outstripped’.”239 Rather than 
simply binding itself to the past, authentic Dasein makes some sort of rejoinder or response to its 
heritage. Of course, Dasein is historical and has a tradition as long as it exists, so this rejoinder 
isn’t going to be a breaking free of history. Nonetheless, authenticity requires a response to the 
past that has shaped the present. 
 Turn back now to the introductory chapters to Being and Time, where the plan for the 
whole work is set out. The initial analysis of Dasein, which reveals that “the inquiry into Being . 
. . is itself characterized by historicality,”240 was meant onto to be the first half of the work. The 
second half of the work was to be constituted by the never-completed destruction of the history 
of ontology. Why is this necessary? Because, given the results of the first half of Being and Time 
(which were to include the third, unfinished division, “Time and Being”), the role of history in 
understanding the meaning of Being becomes undeniable. Dasein is that being which has an 
understanding of Being. But Dasein is also necessarily historical. Given this fact, 
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if by such inquiry [Dasein’s] eyes have been opened to its own essential historicality, then 
one cannot fail to see that the inquiry into Being (the ontico-ontological necessity of which 
we have already indicated) is itself characterized by historicality. The ownmost meaning of 
Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an historical inquiry, gives us the 
assignment [Anweisung] of inquiring into the history of that inquiry itself, that is, of 
becoming historiological. In working out the question of Being, we must heed this 
assignment, so that by positively making the past our own, we may bring ourselves into full 
possession of the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry.
 241
 
 
 
Asking about the meaning of Being, which is the stated aim of Being and Time, is not simply a 
formal philosophical exercise. Given what Dasein is by definition, such questioning can only 
take place as an inquiry into the history of the understanding of Being, i.e., an inquiry into the 
history of metaphysics. The second half of Being and Time, where Heidegger intended to discuss 
in reverse historical order Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle, was not meant to be merely an exercise 
in the history of philosophy, or a way to drive in the nail after he had made his substantive 
arguments in the first half; it was, Heidegger says here, the primary directive of the first half of 
the work. With the engagement with history, he concludes, “by positively making the past our 
own, we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry.” 
 A direct comparison of mindfulness with authentic historicity is difficult in virtue of the 
fact that Heidegger’s account of authentic historicity in Being and Time remains somewhat 
inchoate. But if we recall that authentic Dasein reckons with its tradition by making a rejoinder 
that grasps and at the same time moves beyond it, and we put that next to Heidegger’s comments 
in the Introduction to Being and Time about the relationship between ontology and the history of 
metaphysics, a purpose emerges. Being and Time itself appears to be meant by Heidegger as a 
move towards an authentic engagement with the heritage of the West, which means, the 
Introduction to Being and Time tells us, the history of metaphysics, i.e., the history of the 
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understandings of Being that have emerged in the West. The aim of the second half of Being and 
Time was to be a critical engagement with the history of metaphysics as what has shaped how 
Being, and with it beings, are understood in the modern world. In other words, the aim of Being 
and Time is exactly to execute the critique of technology as the end result of the history of 
Western metaphysics that is being carried out in Mindfulness. In Mindfulness, mindfulness itself 
is described as a critical, aware engagement with the history of Western history through its 
understandings of be-ing. Insofar as Being and Time has as clear picture of authentic historicity 
at all, it is what mindfulness is meant to be in practice. Not only are both authenticity and 
mindfulness oriented towards history; they relate to history in the very same way. 
 Of course, as any reader of Being and Time and Mindfulness could say, Heidegger is not 
saying these things in the same way in both works. Though technology and mindfulness take the 
place and the content of inauthenticity and authenticity, the former terms are used by Heidegger 
in very different ways than the latter. The frame of discussion is now undisputedly presented as 
that of the modern period, and the description of authenticity is put exclusively in terms of the 
tasks contemporary man faces. Man’s problems are presented unambiguously as historical 
problems, their solution involving a specific engagement with history. On the other hand, what in 
that account actually marks a break from the interpretation of Being and Time offered in the 
previous chapter, one that was argued for independently of anything from Heidegger’s post-1930 
works? Technology and calculability, when applied to human experience and social life, amounts 
to a recapitulation of das Man, publicness, and inauthenticity in terms of the current historical 
epoch. The role of anxiety and the authentic response to history reappear in the account of 
mindfulness. And again, recall that when Heidegger used concrete examples for das Man’s 
influence in Being and Time, he used newspapers, public transportation, and the rapid, 
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ambiguous nature of trends and gossip as his leading examples. Even though it’s not made 
explicit, there is good reason to think that Heidegger was already taking at a particularly 
contemporary perspective while describing authenticity and inauthenticity in Being and Time, a 
perspective matches both broadly and in its details with the account given in Mindfulness. 
 Think once again of the strong Kehre reading. According to those most who hold it, 
whereas in Being and Time authenticity is about stepping away from socio-historical forces and 
finding one’s true, independent self, in the later work the equivalent to authenticity is reversed, 
becoming a turn towards history rather than away from it, from the individual rather than 
towards it. Based on what has been said thus far, the progression from calculability to 
mindfulness in Mindfulness is virtually identical to what occurs in Being and Time, and, keeping 
in mind points of obscurity in Being and Time’s account of authentic historicity, there is no 
evidence of a major shift in the account of mindfulness itself, either. If the question at hand is 
whether Heidegger’s understanding of inauthenticity, authenticity, or the shift from one to other 
changes, the answer thus far, I have argued, is no. The frame of the discussion may have 
changed, but the account itself has not. 
 
3.3 UNDERGOING A GOING-UNDER 
 
 Mindful man’s relation to history, it has been said, is not different from authentic 
Dasein’s relation to history. But what of activity and passivity? The discussion so far has 
presented many hints that a deeply passive view pervades Mindfulness. I will start by elaborating 
in more detail those hints, and from there provide a general picture of the apparent passivity of 
mindfulness. The question, as before, is how that view squares with what was uncovered in 
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Being and Time, particular in light of the three different types of activism (and, more to our 
interest here, the corresponding forms of passivism) discussed in Chapter 1. It will turn out that, 
while on the surface things may appear very differently, a closer examination shows that, again, 
the content stays the same. 
 Technology, as discussed earlier, is closely associated with power in the form of control. 
Recall that calculation, as technology’s form of understanding, is a way of asserting control over 
beings by manipulating their discretely ordered elements for human use, an activity that extends 
to human life itself in the form of ‘lived-experience.’ Through grasping reality as calculable, 
modern man takes himself to be master of it, though modern man is himself mastered by 
technology as a form of understanding: “machination expands its sway as coercive force. By 
securing power, this coercive force develops as the immediately eruptible and always 
transformable capability for subjugation that knows no discretion, and supersedes itself as it 
spreads.”242 In opposition to calculation, mindfulness can be fairly presumed to be opposed to 
control and assertion, a presumption that is easily confirmed. Heidegger discusses control and 
power, and how they relate to mindfulness, repeatedly and at length in Mindfulness. Mindfulness 
must be “exempt from all the power of the effective,”243 where an emphasis on being effective is 
the mark of technological assertiveness. The aim of mindfulness, as opposed to calculation, is 
not to enact anything at all, “neither to communicate a knowledge, nor to set up a doctrine.”244 
Be-ing, the object of mindful thought, has no connection whatsoever to power relationships: 
“power-character is basically foreign to the sway of be-ing,”245 which isn’t to say that be-ing is 
itself powerless, but that it has a different sort of character altogether. Relations of dominance 
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and submission, master and slave, control and assertion, are totally foreign to mindfulness as a 
way of understanding and be-ing as what determines the nature of reality. From this, one might 
infer with some justification that mindfulness, in opposition to technology’s constant 
assertiveness and struggle, is a fundamentally passive phenomenon. Mindful man does not take 
charge of his possibilities, because taking charge would be just the sort of concept associated 
with technology. Man doesn’t assert what he will do with his life, but rather embraces be-ing in 
an open and unassertive manner. 
 Perhaps more significant, and subject to more explicit discussion in the literature, is a 
seeming reversal between the role of man and the role of be-ing as compared to Being and Time. 
Whatever might be said of Being and Time, in later works, including Mindfulness, it is now 
unambiguously be-ing that is the source of man’s choices. For while be-ing is beyond power and 
powerless, that does not seem to mean that it does nothing at all. Quite the opposite: 
 
However, the experience to be mindful of is this: only on the basis of allotedness unto the 
truth of be-ing can man determine ‘beings in the whole’ and himself as the being that he is.  
Considering man’s ownmost ground, be-ing itself has to have ‘owned’ man ‘over’ unto the 
truth of being.  This en-owning alone yields that clearing wherein ‘beings in the whole’ and 
man can encounter each other in order to assess their remoteness.
246
 
 
 
Man has to be ereignen, owned over or appropriated by be-ing. A clearing is an open space, 
meaning a space of possibilities. Man cannot determine his nearness or remoteness to be-ing, 
which is to say the overall quality of his relationship to beings generally, i.e., his degree of 
authenticity or inauthenticity, without such an en-owning on the part of be-ing. It is be-ing, in 
other words, which opens the space wherein man can encounter a world of possibilities in a 
particular way, and thus fall short or not fall short of it.  Man does not assert his possibilities in 
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the sense of generating them: his basic understanding of the world, his ‘grounding-experience’ in 
the language of Mindfulness, is “not “enacted” in the sense that the “individuals” would invent it, 
concoct it or assemble it from isolated pieces. Rather, grounding-experience en-owns.”247 It is 
the en-owning of be-ing that provides a particular understanding of the world in a given epoch. 
 If it is granted that be-ing is the source of the various forms of understanding throughout 
history, one expects that this would be the case in any epoch, whether that epoch is marked by 
authenticity or inauthenticity. The times in which man has a fundamentally appropriate or flawed 
understanding of the world and of be-ing, then, would be determined by be-ing itself, not by 
man. In short, be-ing decides whether an age will be authentic or inauthentic. Heidegger appears 
to be unhesitant in granting that conclusion: “is there behind that preeminence of beings (of 
“actuality”, of “deed”, of “life”) already a decision made about being?  But perhaps this 
“decision” is also only a lack of decision that from time to time be-ing allows to occur in order to 
entrust beings to groundlessness.”248 History, Heidegger has said, is a history of decisions of be-
ing, which boils down to a series of understandings of what be-ing is. The current decision is one 
for technology and calculability as key to understanding be-ing, a view that is fundamentally 
flawed. But such decisions on the course of history are not man’s provenance; they belong to be-
ing. Be-ing, the conclusion appears to run, decides whether man will be authentic or inauthentic. 
Man cannot change the understanding of be-ing he has, so there is no room for any sort of 
activism with regard to mindfulness. Man is what be-ing makes him, and nothing more. 
 This route is that typically taken by those such as Braver, who, when claiming that “Later 
Heideggerian man is an exceedingly passive being,”249 defends his claim by arguing that, in his 
later work, “Heidegger claims that it is not man who establishes or forms our relation to beings, 
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but Being.”250 The fact that it is be-ing that establishes the nature of an epoch, and not man, 
means that man cannot act to take on an understanding of be-ing, authentic or not: “The clearing 
or relation to beings is not created or instituted by us, as in the Kantian Paradigm; rather, it is 
“granted” or “sent” to us and we receive it.”251 Olafson argues in a similar direction; for Olafson, 
when Heidegger in his later work drops the ‘active’ character of a Dasein who freely creates 
projects, philosophically that amounts to “making being as presence independent of the kind of 
entity – Dasein – in whose mode of being – existence – it had been grounded.”252 In Being and 
Time it is Dasein’s freedom to create and pursue projects that threaten the unique status of Being; 
Heidegger’s response, Olafson says, is to make Being itself free and independent. For both of 
these interpreters, it was Dasein who established Being in Being and Time; in the later work, 
passivism or the elimination of activism is associated with the independence of be-ing. 
 Neither Braver nor Olafson is wrong here, as far as it goes. Given how the active-passive 
dimension was originally introduced in Chapter 1, however, the question exactly is how far it 
goes. In other words, if there is a passivism in Mindfulness, what sort of passivity is it? Is it 
enough to mark a transition from the account in Being and Time? Or is does it only appear 
passivist relative to the supposed activism of Being and Time, which Braver and Olafson both 
accept in strong forms? Recall the distinction between three forms of the relation between 
activism and passivism. One is understood with regard to the creation of possibilities: do 
possibilities come from (in the language of Mindfulness) be-ing or man? Second is with regard to 
acknowledgment: is it be-ing or man who brings about the recognition, via anxiety or dismay, of 
Dasein’s true possibilities? Third is with regard to pursuit of possibilities: given that Dasein’s 
true possibilities are recognized as such, is it be-ing or man that brings about the sustained 
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pursuit of those possibilities? Braver’s and Olafson’s accounts lean towards activism and 
passivism with regard to the creation of possibilities. As seen in Chapter 2, that account cannot 
be right, since Being and Time is not activist in the sense they describe. But that does not put the 
issue to rest, as one can further ask what to make of the second half of their story, that referring 
to the later work. Braver and Olafson are associating the emergence of passivism and the 
disappearance of activism with the creation aspect of activity and passivity; they consider no 
other way in which activism and passivism might be understood. But recall that I argued in the 
previous chapter that Being and Time was passivist in the first two senses, yet actually activist in 
the third, weakest senes. If the account in Mindfulness is fully passive, i.e., passive in all three 
senses, that still marks a significant content change. The question remains, then: is the account in 
Mindfulness passive in its totality, i.e., in all three senses outlined above? 
 With regards to the first sense, that of the creation of possibilities, it is already clear from 
what has been said that Mindfulness is passive. Heidegger is far more direct than he was in Being 
and Time: the clearing, and man’s grounding-attunement, are not determined by man, but by the 
en-owning of be-ing, by the particular way in which be-ing is manifested in a given stage of 
history. If the modern age features the preeminence of beings in a certain way, it is because be-
ing has allowed it. This is no different from Being and Time, where Dasein as Being-in-the-
world always already has a history that determines what its possibilities are. Being authentic is in 
part recognizing one’s historically determined possibilities (one’s Situation), which just are the 
possibilities of one’s epoch in Mindfulness. Being determined Dasein’s possibilities there, and it 
does so here. Little more needs to be said there. 
 With regards to the second sense, and whether it is man or be-ing that brings about 
dismay, it is important to begin by recalling that dismay is a grounding-attunement. A 
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grounding-attunement is not simply something that someone stumbles upon, or something that 
someone invents; it is a basic aspect of the way in which the world is understood, one 
corresponding to Being and Time’s anxiety. As anxiety is a particular kind of mood, dismay is a 
particular grounding-attunement, one that “is attuned by be-ing” and through which “post-
metaphysical man who undertakes this groundership for openness is sundered from all 
ensnarement by mere beings.”253 Leaving aside for the moment what it means to ‘undertake this 
groundership for openness,’ man in this situation is sundered by a grounding-attunement 
instantiated by be-ing, dismay. This grounding-attunement is not something that comes from 
nowhere or without precendent: “And nevertheless already a hinting comes to pass; nevertheless 
the dismay that sets free strikes into the machination of beings.”254 In language reminiscent of 
“What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger thinks that the modern age has hints of anxiety, that it is 
there but sleeping and needs to be recognized. The openness that reveals what man’s decisions 
are is not something that man uncovers on his own: “Attunement throws from out of itself the 
‘time-space’ of fundamental decisions and throws the attuned one into this ‘time-space’.”255 
 The language at this point often actually appears to lean towards activism, as in the 
passage above that mentions man undertaking a groundership. However, with regard to the type 
of passivism currently under discussion, it is important to remember that the question is where 
the possibility of undertaking a groundership comes from. It comes from an attunement, and 
attunements come from be-ing; we don’t decide whether to have dismay, man must “be seized 
by”256 it as something that “throws from out of itself the ‘time-space’ of fundamental decisions.” 
Man, in the epoch of technology, is exposed to the possibility of dismay as an attunement, an 
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attunement that opens up certain possibilities, including those that extend beyond technology’s 
grasp. In other periods, on the other hand, there are “epochs from which philosophy has to 
withhold the distress of decision in order to let them move towards their own completion.”257 
Sometimes be-ing giveth distress, and sometimes it taketh away. 
 Finally, there is activism with regard to the pursuit of possibilities. Assume that the epoch 
in question is one where dismay makes itself clear: is it up to man to be-ing whether that is 
pursued? When dismay is recognized for what it is, it is recognized by those who Heidegger here 
calls the grounders, the founders, the few, or the ones to come. They are the ones who bear 
distress, “those of the deep awe who, for the sake of a moment of the necessary ‘going under,’ 
bear up the dismay that sets-free – bear it up indeed so that because of them dismay does not lose 
its dismayedness but will be received instead as a hint of the foremost shifting-apart of be-ing’s 
‘time-space’.”258 The grounders are the ones who first experience the dismay of the age, and they 
act almost as prophets (though they are more likely poets), making sure to sustain the sense of 
dismay that is lurking underneath the ravages of the technological age. Their grounding is a 
‘going-under,’ in a phrase reminiscent of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra going under to the world of 
men, so as to teach them of the Übermensch. ““I teach you the overman,” Zarathustra says in the 
Prologue; “Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome 
him?”259 On receiving a notable lack of enthusiastic response, Zarathustra proceeds to rail 
against the last man, “‘What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ – thus 
asks the last human being, blinking. Then the earth has become small, and on it hops the last 
human being, who makes everything small. His kind is ineradicable, like the flea beetle; the last 
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human being lives longest.”260 The few who go under for Heidegger aim to engender awareness 
of the dismay that rests at the base of the modern epoch, of the hollowness of the world as it is: a 
small, over-connected, over-strained world, one that fits the small, insipid world of the last man. 
 But there is no guarantee that the grounders will pursue this path. It is possible, for 
instance, that “those who since long ago are destined to prepare for the other beginning would be 
unequal to this task insofar as they would rescue themselves in the diversions offered to them by 
what is still contemporary: evoking something new; organizing something promising, and 
reckoning with discipleship.”261 Zarathustra’s ape, it seems, remains a threat to Heidegger’s 
grounders. Nor is even persisting in the awareness of be-ing an easy task, once one has arrived at 
dismay: “The hour of be-ing is refused to us, and for the same reason it demands from us the 
perseverance in the prolonged preparation of the crossing.”262 Language of persistence and 
perseverance is common when describing the way in which the grounders must pursue the 
openness of be-ing; it is something they must sustain, that takes work to preserve and requires 
“the specific resiliency of be-ing-historical thinking that must be sterner and more enduring than 
any “attack”.”263 The chance of going astray and losing sight of be-ing appears to be always 
present; for instance, if man “does not ward it [the understanding of man’s nature] off by veering 
into the subterfuge of a presumed “science” of “man,””264 or if he “evades . . . mindfulness” by 
“[rescuing] himself into an explanation of all beings as a product of human “imagination.””265 
These are real possibilities for Heidegger, and they do not appear to be settled one way or 
another; they are things that could happen or not to those who experience dismay, but they 
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happen as reactions to it on the part of the grounders, not as something that be-ing has 
determined as the character of the epoch; be-ing has determined the current epoch as that of 
technology (the grounders do not overcome technology even if they persist; they merely 
experience their understanding of the world via technology as dismaying rather than comforting), 
and the attunement of the grounders as that of distress, but whether they fall into the 
misinterpretations that the epoch offers from there is up to them. Hence, sustained effort is 
needed in order to ward off such misinterpretations. 
 Somewhat less disparate elaboration of this point can be found once again in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art.” There, Heidegger speaks of the work of art as that which opens up and 
makes a world available. Works of art need creators, of course, but creators create only because 
there is an opening of be-ing already there. What is of interest here is the preservers of such 
works, those who come after the creators. The goal of philosophy, Heidegger says in 
Mindfulness, is “to be the foundational knowing-awareness (preserve the grounded truth).”266  
This definition carries over from the idea of preservation in the realm of art: “Preserving the 
work means: standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work.”267 What is such 
preservation? It is a form of knowing, but not merely in the intellectual sense: “He who truly 
knows what is, knows what he wills to do in the midst of what is.”268 “The willing here referred 
to,” Heidegger continues in an explicit link to earlier work, “is thought of in terms of the basic 
experience of thinking in Being and Time.” Preserving the truth of a work of art, which is 
preserving the truth that is opened up in a given sphere, is a sort of willing. Not, of course, 
willing in the sense of striving. To clarify, Heidegger adds that “The resoluteness intended in 
Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out 
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of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being.”269 Recall Being and Time: “As 
resolute, Dasein is already taking action . . . . [T]his term must be taken so broadly that “activity” 
[Aktivität] will also embrace the passivity of resistance.”270 Or in this case, will embrace 
preservation of opennss against those forces that would distort it. 
 Zimmerman argued that Being and Time fell prey to subjectivity “insofar as Dasein is 
owned, to the extent that it resolves to anticipate the call of conscience, i.e., insofar as owned 
existence is possible only because Dasein steels itself to face its own finitude . . . . According to 
Heidegger [in Being and Time], resolve and will lie on the side of the subject.”271 If “On the 
Origin of the Work of Art” is to be trusted, and if Mindfulness is to be trusted when it speaks of 
“the will to mindfulness”272 as what can transform how we understand man, then Zimmerman is 
right about the need for Dasein to resolve upon its possibilities, in a senes. However, Heidegger 
appears to disagree about the purportedly changing role of will and resoluteness; it is apparently 
not a vestige of subjectivity, as it persists into the 1930s. And given what I have argued with 
regards to Heidegger’s view of activity and passivity in the 1930s, it appears as though we 
should trust Heidegger on this. 
 
 Certainly, something has changed in Heidegger’s writings when one moves from Being 
and Time to the 1930s and beyond. But the question remains what that is. It should not be taken 
as given that, because Heidegger uses different terms (which he certainly does) and speaks in a 
different way (which he certainly does), Heidegger must be saying something different in terms 
of substance. A close examination of Mindfulness, with some reference to “On the Origin of the 
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Work of Art,” has in fact shown it not to be the case. If there was a Kehre, then, either it did not 
happen by the time of Mindfulness or it was not a change in content. No one thinks that nothing 
has changed by the late 1930s; if there is a Kehre at all, it is generally agreed, it is in full swing 
by then. But that is far from the whole story. For one, the changes in Heidegger’s writing did not 
stop with Mindfulness. ‘Machination’ and ‘power overpowering itself,’ and even ‘mindfulness,’ 
will not remain central terms in his lexicon, or be used much at all after the 1930s; likewise, the 
fragmented style of the be-ing-historical treatises will not be repeated. Some terms, such as 
‘technology,’ will remain, but much has yet to happen. Are there perhaps further changes in store 
after the 30s? And if there are not, that still doesn’t answer the real driving question, which is 
just what is going on through all of these changes in Heidegger’s writings. What is behind these 
transformations? What is the purpose, if it is not to revamp the basic concepts in Heidegger’s 
thought? How will the changes in works after Mindfulness fit into the picture and do they align 
with the basic story established thus far? Finally, what, at the end of the day, is the Kehre, and 
how is Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity affected by it through the course of his career? 
To answer these questions in sufficient depth, the account must continue, into the 1940s and 
beyond. Only then will the perspective be reached to determine what Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity is if there is a consistent one, or what happens to it if it changes. Then, one might 
start to ask the question of just what is going on with the Kehre. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE LATE HEIDEGGER 
 
 
 
 Whatever changes there are in Heidegger’s works throughout his career, there is usually 
little discussion of whether much shifts in the last decades of his life. It is generally taken for 
granted that, by the mid-1940s, Heidegger’s views are settling. Much of historical interest 
happens in this time, of course, such as the end of Heidegger’s relation to the Nazi party with the 
end of the party itself in 1945, Heidegger’s banishment from teaching for the rest of the decade, 
his eventual resumption of lecturing in the early 1950s, and the slowing down of his work until 
only the occasional lecture or essay is composed in the mid-1960s, with the 1966 Der Spiegel 
interview in many ways marking the endpoint of Heidegger’s productive career. Since I have 
been arguing that the content changes in Heidegger’s career are not nearly as drastic as most 
think, and there is far less debate about whether there is much change in this period compared to 
the late 30s, there is little need to argue year by year about the wide variety of essays, lectures, 
notes, and other materials that Heidegger produces towards the end. 
 However, just because few argue for substantial content changes in the last decades does 
not mean that no notice should be taken of this period. Recall that, if one starts from Being and 
Time, there appear to be roughly three periods in Heidegger’s mature body of work: Being and 
Time and the works through the late 1920s or early 1930s, the more experimental works of the 
mid- to late-1930s to around 1940, and the fully ‘later Heidegger’ of the 1940s on. And indeed, 
there is once again a fairly dramatic shift from the 1930s to the 1940, one that should be 
discussed. There are no more equivalents to Contributions or Mindfulness after 1940, either in 
terms of language or style. The dramatic tone of the be-ing historical treatises appears to settle, 
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leaving in its place (according to the strong reading) the mystical, quietist Heidegger of the later 
years. In terms of topics, Heidegger spends more time talking about the history of philosophy 
than directly about his own views. How does this Heidegger square with the Heidegger who 
wrote Being and Time, and who I have argued is also the Heidegger behind Mindfulness? If there 
is a shift in the discussion towards mysticism and history at this point, then based on what was 
argued in the previous chapters it is likely not as dramatic a shift as many argue. But that leaves 
much open. For instance: many call Heidegger a mystic in his later years, and the style of his 
final works appears to endorse such a reading. Is mysticism a fair lens through which to read 
mindfulness, or as Heidegger calls it in this later period, releasement (Gelassenheit)? Does 
Heidegger’s discussion of technology and mindfulness, and their relation to Western history, 
develop in any way past what he says in Mindfulness? What should be said of Heidegger’s 
reflections, in his later years, on his own previous works? 
 Following the general direction set by the above questions, this chapter will serve several 
purposes. Above all, as before, will be the question of whether there is any shift in Heidegger’s 
view of authenticity as compared to previous periods. However, this will not be done only 
through a direct comparative discussion, as was the case in Chapter 3. While such work will be 
done, the discussion will also follow a series of guiding questions which arise from consideration 
of authenticity and of the Kehre generally. 
 The first question will be about Heidegger’s interpretation of himself, specifically with 
regard to authenticity and inauthenticity in Being and Time: does Heidegger fairly portray his 
own previous views when he interprets them through the lens of his later conceptual apparatus? 
He claims to just be clarifying his own views to the reader, but it is tempting to say of 
Heidegger’s reading of himself what he, in 1935, identifies as a common accusation against his 
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interpretations in general: that “what we have said is in fact just a result of that violent character 
and one-sidedness, which has already become proverbial, of the Heideggerian mode of 
interpretation.”273 Working especially from “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” but with additional support 
as the chapter progresses, I will argue that Heidegger can and does fairly explain Being and 
Time’s conception of authenticity through the terminology of the later period. 
 That opening discussion will provide an initial look at some of Heidegger’s terminology 
in the 1940s, which will be expanded through further discussion of the two addenda to “What is 
Metaphysics?” written in the same decade (which will also show examples of Heidegger fairly 
interpreting himself). Next, more straightforwardly comparative discussions of technology as it 
appears in “The Question Concerning Technology,” revised in the mid-1950s, and readiness for 
the god in the Der Spiegel interview will round out the discussion of history’s relation to 
authenticity in the final decades. It will be shown that, by the time of these final works, 
Heidegger has clarified and elaborated the somewhat unclear discussion of authentic history in 
Being and Time, offering a more complete picture that is both consistent with his previous 
writings and easier to grasp. This addresses the second question, of whether Heidegger’s view of 
Western history develops. It does indeed, but in terms of depth, not orientation. 
 Finally, I will turn once again to the active-passive dimension via a discussion of 
mysticism. Should Heidegger’s views be taken as mystical or quasi-mystical? I will approach 
this question through a discussion of releasement, Gelassenheit in German, and a comparison 
with one of Heidegger’s favorite (though not most quoted) thinkers, the thirteenth century 
German mystic Meister Eckhart. Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit will be elaborated 
alongside Eckhart’s corresponding notion of Gelassenheit, typically translated as ‘detachment.’ 
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Is Heidegger’s Gelassenheit a total detachment from and passivity with respect to worldly 
affairs, like that of the mystics? Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, unlike that of Eckhart, will be shown 
to retain the active aspect found in Heidegger’s previous works; Gelassenheit is not a total 
surrender of the will, but an altogether different type relation to the world that does not involve 
the sort of assertion epitomized by technology. More specifically, Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is 
not a surrendering of the will to history, but a preservation in the sense of guarding one’s 
historical destiny against that which would disguise or distort it; one does not choose one’s 
destiny, but neither does one simply lose oneself in, and become for practical purposes a tool of, 
the flow of history, in the way that Eckhart’s detached person becomes, for all intents and 
purposes, a mere extension of God’s will. There is no History-thing or Being-thing that guides 
man’s destiny for Heidegger; history is what Dasein lives, neither controlling nor controlled by 
it. And thus is authenticity, from Being and Time on: a recognition of that which is beyond one’s 
power but must be chosen in order to be realized. 
 
4.1 HEIDEGGER ON HEIDEGGER 
 
  From the 1940s on, as in the 1930s, Heidegger rarely uses the terms ‘authenticity’ and 
‘inauthenticity,’ and by this point they all but disappear. One of the very few times that they are 
explicitly discussed is in the “Letter on Humanism,” and the exact import of the passage, as is 
the case frustratingly often, is initially unclear. There, in the midst of discussing several concepts 
from Being and Time, Heidegger says that 
 
the terms “authenticity” and “inauthenticity,” which are used in a provisional fashion, do 
not imply a moral-existentiell or an “anthropological” distinction but rather a relation 
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that, because it has been hitherto concealed from philosophy, has yet to be thought for the 
first time, an “ecstatic” relation of the essence of the human being to the truth of being.274 
 
 
At least some of what Heidegger says here, about what authenticity and inauthenticity do not 
refer to, is unchanged from Being and Time, where he says that “the analytic of Dasein is not 
aimed at laying an ontological basis for anthropology; its purpose is one of fundamental 
ontology,”275 one “far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein.”276 What 
comes across as entirely new is his positive claim that the terms ‘authenticity’ and 
‘inauthenticity’ refer to “an “ecstatic” relation of the essence of the human being to the truth of 
being.” Heidegger adds, apparently with the intention of clarifying, that “this relation is as it is 
not by reason of ek-sistence [which, recall, is Dasein’s or man’s essence]; on the contrary, the 
essence of ek-sistence is destined existentially-ecstatically from the essence of the truth of 
being.” Taking a first stab at interpreting the passage, Heidegger seems to be saying that in Being 
and Time, ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ refer not to moral or anthropological concepts, but 
specifically to how the essence of the human being, ek-sistence, relates to the truth of being, a 
relation that is ecstatic. Further, the establishment of this relation does not come about, is not the 
specific way it is, because of man (because of ek-sistence), but because of the truth of being. 
 How does Heidegger’s explanation square with the interpretation of authenticity and 
inauthenticity offered thus far? “An “ecstatic” relation of the essence of the human being to the 
truth of being” is not the easiest definition to work with. However, it is also not indecipherable. 
In the 1940s Heidegger speaks frequently of the truth of being and how it relates to the human 
essence; in fact, it is one of his guiding preoccupations at that time. The terms “authenticity” and 
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“inauthenticity,” Heidegger says in the passage currently in question, refer to the relation 
between man’s essence, which he calls ek-sistence, and the truth of being, with the relation 
between the two itself being ecstatic. What do all of these pieces mean? 
 First, what is man’s essence? What exactly is ek-sistence? Heidegger defines the term 
fairly straightforwardly: “In terms of content ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of 
being.”277 Ek-sistence, in brief, refers to the fact that man in some way is in the truth of being, 
taking part in it or “standing out into” it. Taking part in the truth of being is man’s essence; but 
what does it mean to say that it is man’s essence? A complete discussion of Heidegger’s concept 
of essence is beyond the scope of this study, but the “Letter” itself offers some clarification. 
While explaining the famous assertion in Being and Time that “the essence of Dasein lies in its 
existence,”278 Heidegger explains it as saying that “the human being occurs essentially in such a 
way that he is the “there” [das “Da”], that is, the clearing of being.”279 Heidegger’s explanation 
here indicates that the essence of something is the way in which it essentially occurs. In Being 
and Time man, as Dasein, always includes the Da, understood as a particular finite set of 
possibilities, the ‘there’ or ‘wherein’ in which it finds itself, as a part of it. Being in such a 
‘wherein’ is part of man’s existential constitution: ““Being-in” is thus the formal existential 
expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.”280 
Though ‘essence’ isn’t meant in the typical sense of an abstract, timeless characteristic, it 
maintains the sense of a feature a thing has so long as it is that type of thing.  To say that man 
‘occurs essentially’ as the Da, then, is to say that man always is as the Da whenever he appears; 
so long as man is, man is in a ‘there.’ Carrying this over, man, whenever he occurs as man, does 
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so as something that is standing out into the truth of being. In brief, the essence of the human 
being, according to this passage, is always the occurrence of standing out into the truth of being; 
man is always standing out into the truth of being as long as he is man. 
 Next, what is the truth of being, and what is it to stand out into it? The truth of being 
receives the beginnings of an explanation when Heidegger refers to “the Da, the clearing as the 
truth of being itself,”281 the Da being once again the Da of Dasein. Recall that the term ‘Dasein’ 
can be read etymologically in German as ‘to be [sein] there [da],’ a point Heidegger makes 
frequently. The truth of being is the Da, the there in which Dasein finds itself, which Heidegger 
also refers to here as the clearing. In speaking of the Da, Heidegger says that, “As ek-sisting, the 
human being sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the clearing of being, into “care.” But Da-
sein itself occurs essentially as “thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of being as a destinal 
sending.”282 ‘Care,’ in Being and Time, is the term for the Being of Dasein, Dasein having 
previously been discussed in Being and Time in terms of possibility and Being-in-the-world. 
Several terms besides authenticity from Being and Time have cropped up; do they clarify 
Heidegger’s self-interpretation? 
  ‘Care’ is defined with precision in Being and Time as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-
(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).”283 As the definition 
shows, care and Being-in-the-world have an important connection, one that cannot be 
understated: “Being-in-the-world is essentially care.”284 Heidegger’s use of the term ‘care’ in 
Being and Time does not, unsurprisingly, reflect a psychological state of worry or concern; later 
in Being and Time, Heidegger explains care as a temporal unity with three parts: “Temporality 
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makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes 
primordially the totality of the structure of care.”285 Care is temporality, not understood as the 
time measured by the clock but as time lived in the world: foregoing extensive definitions of 
existence and falling, and recalling the previous discussion of facticity, care consists of Dasein’s 
relation to the future grasped in terms of possibilities, Dasein’s past grasped as facticity, and 
Dasein’s present grasped as falling into entities as what one is concerned with. To explain in 
somewhat more detail: Dasein, as long as it exists, has possibilities that it moves towards 
(existence) that are not infinite, but limited in some way (facticity) and which it pursues in the 
midst of a world of entities with which it is already engaged, one that it understands in terms of 
its existence and facticity and one which it tends to get absorbed in, a tendency exacerbated by 
das Man (falling). These three are not separable: possibilities, recall, are only graspable in terms 
of factical limitations, for instance, and the entities one is currently concerned with are only 
graspable in terms of historical limits and futural possibilities through which to grasp them. Care, 
then, delineates Dasein’s existence as a temporal phenomenon consisting of features which are 
also the major features of Being-in-the-world, describable in terms of Dasein as the (present) 
pursuit of (historically founded) possibilities (which reach into the indeterminate future). 
 Returning to the “Letter on Humanism,” the truth of being is the clearing of being. It 
must be taken into care, which is to say into man’s way of Being-in-the-world, into the specific 
way in which man understands his possibilities. To use a post-Being and Time term, the truth of 
being must be appropriated (ereignen) by man in man’s historical world. But to say that it must 
be appropriated in man’s world, since Being-in-the-world is temporal, is to say that it must be 
taken on temporally, via the temporal structure of care. Adding here that the phenomena of 
temporality, past, present, and future, are referred to in Being and Time as the three ecstases (in 
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German, Ekstasen; Heidegger draws on the etymological root of ‘ek-stase’ as ‘standing out’) of 
temporality,
286
 one part of the puzzling passage is explained: the relation of the essence of human 
being, ek-sistence, to the truth of being is an ecstatic one by definition, because that relation is 
the taking into care of the particular ‘there’ of man’s world, which is temporal by definition; 
anything taken into care is taken into care ecstatically, there is no other way. 
 Thus far, we have seen that care is in some ways a more complete, temporally inflected 
understanding of Being-in-the-world. Ek-sistence is man’s essence. But man is also Being-in-
the-world; the ‘human way to be,’ if it is anything in Being and Time, is Being-in-the-world. 
This solves the second part of the puzzle: in short, ek-sistence is another way of describing care, 
which is the complete description of Being-in-the-world, accounting for past, present, and future. 
 Recall that the clearing, the Da, is the truth of being. Here once again is the passage 
where ‘the clearing of being’ is discussed: “As ek-sisting, the human being sustains Da-sein in 
that he takes the Da, the clearing of being, into “care.” But Da-sein itself occurs essentially as 
“thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of being as a destinal sending.” Heidegger says of 
the clearing of being that ““World” is the clearing of being into which the human being stands 
out on the basis of his thrown essence;”287 that is, the world of Being-in-the-world is the clearing 
of being, the Da (which again confirms that taking the Da into care is ecstatic, since we now see 
that it fully means taking man’s particular Being-in-the-world, his possibilities, into care). This 
explanation of clearing [Lichtung], when taken as the Da, matches the usage of ‘clearing’ in 
Being and Time: “as Being-in-the-world [Dasein] is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any 
other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is 
existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light 
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or hidden in the dark.”288 In other words, the clearing is that wherein entities appear, and “Dasein 
is its world existingly,”289 insofar as its essence is to exist in a world, Dasein being the pursuit of 
possibilities that are manifest through and with a world. When Heidegger was quoted at the start 
of this discussion as saying that “the human being occurs essentially in such a way that he is the 
“there” [das “Da”], that is, the clearing of being,” he is saying that the clearing of being is the 
world of Being-in-the-world, which is what man is. Man must take his Being-in-the-world, 
which means must take his world, his possibilities, into care, that is, grasp it temporally, 
ecstatically. The pieces now fall into place: to say that ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ refer to 
“an “ecstatic” relation of the essence of the human being to the truth of being” is precisely to say 
that those two terms refer to ways in which man, as Being-in-the-world, relates to his world as 
the temporal wherein of his possibilities, that they refer to ways in which man ek-sists (grasps 
possibilities) with regard to the clearing of being (the world); that is, they refer to how man takes 
on the possibilities that make up his Being-in-the-world. 
 The picture is not quite complete, however, for Heidegger adds that “Da-sein itself occurs 
essentially as “thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of being as a destinal sending.” Dasein 
is thrown, and it is thrown in a destinal sending. Recall that in Being and Time destiny is 
understood as the authentic historizing of a community, as opposed to the fate of an individual 
historizing Dasein. Recall also that little more is said on the matter, and that the concept is left 
rather unclear. How exactly does an individual Dasein take part in its destiny, and how does that 
relate to its fate? Heidegger does not answer these questions in Being and Time. What is clear is 
what is indicated in the reference to thrownness: fate and destiny alike require the taking over of 
Dasein’s historicity, which means the authentic grasping of Dasein’s thrownness. 
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 To say, then, that in Being and Time authenticity and inauthenticity refer to ways in 
which man grasps his Being-in-the-world, and to say that this Being-in-the-world as the clearing 
(or truth) of being is unfolded as a destinal sending (where “sending” is the translation of 
schicken, etymologically tied by Heidegger to “destiny” [Geschick]), is to say that these terms 
refer to two ways in which man, as Dasein, can grasp his historical situation, that into which he 
is thrown, which comes not from the individual but from the throw of being. To say “the throw 
of being” here almost seems to make being an agent intentionally throwing Dasein into history 
(something that is discussed more in the section on mysticism), but if it is recalled that the truth 
of being is the clearing of being, that the clearing of being is Dasein’s Da, and that the Da is the 
there of Being-in-the-world into which Dasein is thrown, such that the throw refers to Dasein’s 
being in the midst of a world, then everything comes together: according to Heidegger’s self-
interpretation, in Being and Time the terms ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity,’ refer to two ways 
in which man can grasp his historical situation, the world into which he was thrown without 
choice, but which man can respond to. This matches Being and Time’s account of authentic 
historicity, with two differences: (1) it puts stronger rhetorical emphasis on being, understood as 
the clearing of being, understood as the particular historical locality of man’s Being-in-the-
world, as the site of authenticity or inauthenticity, and (2) it removes any reference to fate, 
placing the weight instead on destiny as the realm of choice. But these differences do not change 
the substance of the account; in this discussion, Heidegger is a fair interpreter of himself. 
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4.2 QUESTIONS ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 
 
 Thus far the focus has been on on Heidegger’s retrospective look at authenticity and 
inauthenticity in Being and Time. That aside, what becomes of Heidegger’s discussions of 
technology and mindfulness as he currently understands them? 
 In Mindfulness, an apparent major change appeared with the introduction of technology, 
understood in a sense that extended beyond technological objects to a specific way of 
understanding the world. Technology continues to be front and center in the 1940s and beyond. 
In particular, Heidegger moves into detailed discussions of technology in the 1950s, such as in 
“The Question Concerning Technology.” There, technology is defined as “the challenging 
setting-upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve,”290 a way of 
grasping the world which Heidegger gives the name of ‘enframing’ (Ge-stell). As before, 
technology is a particular way in which the world is understood or revealed and with respect to 
which everything is interpreted. Here, though, Heidegger finally provides some of the clear 
examples lacking in previous explanations of technology. For instance, Heidegger says that “a 
tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a 
coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.”291 Natural resources are seen as orderable, 
calculable quantities of expendable resource to be used for a practical purpose; the river Rhine is 
so much potential hydroelectric power to be unlocked, the earth a source of coal energy to be 
extracted for power. 
 While an environmentalist reading is sometimes tempting, Heidegger’s view of 
technology, like before, is not about machinery versus nature. Heidegger’s is not a critique of 
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industry, at least not industry alone; industry is a symptom of technology, not the cause of its 
dominance. The way of understanding the world engendered by technology, its essence or 
“coming to presence,”292 is a way the world reveals (or, using Heidegger’s term, unconceals) 
itself to man. But a revealing of the world is not, and never was for Heidegger, limited to one 
aspect of life; the orderability and calculability of technology apply to man, the supposed orderer 
and calculator, as much as to everything else. “Only to the extent that man for his part is already 
challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is 
challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than 
nature within the standing-reserve?”293 Heidegger once again provides concrete examples: “The 
current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of 
this.”294 When we talk of manpower for a construction project or a war, when advertisers talk of 
‘target demographics,’ when people discuss what polls say about the electorate, human beings 
are treated as resources to be used for the purposes of construction, conflict, sales, or elections. 
Man is as orderable as the coal deposit or the river; human resources can be counted, analyzed, 
and used for a purpose. In this way man is under the sway of the epoch of technology, which is 
not something under his control, not something he decides to accept or not: “When man, in his 
way, from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of 
unconcealment even when he contradicts it.”295 When man sees the world in terms of 
orderability, he is already subject to it; as said in Mindfulness, man’s striving for power offers 
only “the appearance of self-assertion vis-à-vis beings,”296 not actual control. 
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 As seen in the above examples, the element of power and control that is central to the 
discussion of technology Mindfulness persists here. Natural resources are harnessed, taken over, 
transformed into resources for human consumption. Nature is subjected to a “challenging-
forth”297 by man, and Enframing itself, as the way of grasping the world established by 
technology, “sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth,”298 in turn. “Unlocking, transforming, 
storing, distributing, and switching about,” Heidegger says, are the ways in which the world is 
grasped and interpreted under Enframing. Control of the calculable and orderable, whether it be 
people or things, remains the common thread of technology. Though technology has been given 
a new definition and some new terminology, the basic aspects of it change little, if at all, from 
the discussion in Mindfulness; the account is perhaps more refined, but it continues to be taken as 
an understanding of the world focused on control, which it attains via interpreting the world as 
calculable, discrete resources subject to exploitation for the ends of the user, an understanding 
that envelops everything, including man and man’s existence, at the same time. 
 The connection between Heidegger’s account of technology and inauthenticity in Being 
and Time can be seen more clearly by looking back at a passage from Heidegger’s discussion of 
technology in “Letter on ‘Humanism’”: “technological human beings, delivered over to mass 
society, can attain reliable constancy only by gathering and ordering all their plans and activities 
in a way that corresponds to technology.”299 The reference to ordering mirrors the emphasis on 
control in works both before and after the “Letter,” but of particular note here is the reference to 
mass society as what man is taken over by in the epoch of technology, which draws obvious 
parallels to inauthenticity in Being and Time; more noteworthy still is that the paragraph in the 
“Letter” where technology is first mentioned proceeds into a discussion of the “peculiar 
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dictatorship of the public realm,”300 closely echoing the “dictatorship of [das Man]” and 
publicness in Being and Time. Heidegger is not subtle about the connection, as he repeats the 
phrase “dictatorship of the public realm” further down, with an elaboration. Technology, he says 
there, leads to the unconditional objectification of reality. Heidegger goes on: 
 
Language thereby falls into the service of expediting communication along routes where 
objectification – the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone – branches out and 
disregards all limits. In this way language comes under the dictatorship of the public 
realm, which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as 
unintelligible. What is said in Being and Time (1927), sections 27 and 35, about [das 
Man] in no way means to furnish an incidental contribution to sociology.
301
 
 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger says of das Man’s form of communication, idle talk, that “What is 
said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things 
are so because one says so.”302 “[I]dle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and 
in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back.”303 Das Man’s dominance of language 
through idle talk, which Heidegger also refers to as the “dominance of the public way in which 
things have been interpreted,”304 exercises power over what can and cannot be said, over what, as 
he says in the “Letter,” makes sense and what does not. 
 The power of idle talk is not limited to language, however. Discourse, in Being and Time, 
is equiprimordial with, which is to say co-existent with, understanding and discourse, the three of 
which together constitute Dasein’s grasp of its world.305 Accordingly, idle talk as inauthentic 
discourse always co-exists with the inauthentic forms of understanding and interpretation, which 
                                                 
300
 Pathmarks 242. 
301
 Pathmarks 242-3. 
302
 Being and Time 212. 
303
 Being and Time 213. 
304
 Ibid. 
305
 Being and Time 172. 
153 
 
are curiosity and ambiguity, respectively. Curiosity is the form of understanding that does not 
take the time to understand; it drifts from one thing to the next, “seeks novelty only in order to 
leap from it anew to another novelty.”306 It is always distracted as a result, never standing still, 
and it is through curiosity that Dasein receives the impression, related to Mindfulness’ discussion 
of lived-experience, of a “’life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’.”307 Ambiguity, for its 
part, is incapable of interpreting anything. In the everyday public understanding which is 
ambiguous, “it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, 
and what is not.”308 “Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood”309 because everyone 
knows what they are supposed to say about it, and yet this presumed clarity prevents any real 
investigation into the matter at hand. (As when a person will give a view but, when pressed, just 
shrug her shoulders and say, “I don’t know.”) And as implied above, these three features of 
inauthenticity reinforce each other. For example, “Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen 
everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that . . . the possibilities of 
[Dasein’s] Being will be secure, genuine, and full;”310 curiosity “says what one “must” have read 
and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is delivered over to idle talk.”311 Idle talk 
is part of a broader phenomenon, one that imposes a way of grasping the world and interpreting 
things in it, and one that “is constantly going wrong [versieht sich] in its projects, as regards the 
genuine possibilities of Being.”312 
 Close analogies between the description of inauthenticity in Being and Time and 
discussions of technology are not limited to the “Letter.” In “The Question Concerning 
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Technology,” Heidegger again uses the example of language. In 1955, as in 1927, he says that 
“newspapers and illustrated magazines . . . set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so 
that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand,”313 instantly and common 
understood by everyone and, at the same time, not fully understood by anyone. Besides 
mentioning mass media in the initial discussion of das Man, Heidegger says in Being and Time 
that idle talk, the inauthentic form of communication, affects the written as well as the spoken 
word, where it “feeds upon superficial reading [dem Angelesenen]”314 so that everyone can claim 
to understand it, while no one really does. In the lecture “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . ,” 
composed and revised around the same time as “The Question Concerning Technology,” 
Heidegger claims that “there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and 
broadcasting of spoken words . . . . Language becomes the means of expression. As expression, 
language can decay into a mere medium for the printed word.”315 
 Heidegger’s concern with the ways in which mass society controls man’s understanding 
of the world, in particular through language, and his stated aim in Being and Time “to preserve 
the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common 
understanding from levelling them off,”316 are part of the same project, and that project is one 
that persists throughout Heidegger’s works. Compare the account of inauthentic communication 
in the 1950s with the uniform objectification and communication of technological thinking 
discussed in the “Letter,” where “objectification – the uniform accessibility of everything to 
everyone — branches out and disregards all limits,” allowing the public realm to determine “in 
advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as unintelligible.” Then compare this to 
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Mindfulness, where technology imposes a universal, unquestionable understanding of reality that 
gives man the impression of control while simultaneously controlling his understanding. In all of 
these works it is Das Man in the sense of the public realm, and the public realm in the sense of a 
grasp of the world that establishes a single, universal interpretation of beings as things to be 
reckoned with in a single way, that is the target. The connection is merely made more explicit 
when Heidegger ties “technological human beings” and mass society together in the “Letter.” 
Das Man as a distorting influence persists in terms of its role in grasping possibilities; what 
changes is that it is now explicitly tied to technology as such, and the features previously 
ascribed to it without explicit historical determinations are now ascribed specifically to the 
technological epoch. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, this interpretation of the relationship between 
technology and inauthenticity is compatible with the view that inauthenticity represents a 
transhistorical, rather than an ahistorical, phenomenon, where inauthenticity is something whose 
broad features persist in different epochs, but whose features always and necessarily take on 
certain historical forms—inauthenticity apart from historical circumstances may be conceptually 
graspable, but it never exists in such a way. That inauthenticity has the very same features as 
technology does not imply that either of them is purely historical or purely ahistorical; rather, the 
picture remains coherent, and the differences in rhetorical perspective are accounted for, when 
one takes technology to be an instantiation of inauthenticity, the latter only actually existing in 
historical forms. That is, if one has an argument for such a view. 
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4.3 INAUTHENTICITY AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ERROR 
 
 On their face, the features of technology outlined above are the same as they have always 
been, which would also mean, on my interpretation, that they are fully compatible with the 
account of inauthenticity in Being and Time. But here the persistent concern about the respective 
roles of history in inauthenticity and in technology arises once more, with renewed vigor. 
Heidegger says of technology that it is a particular destining of being. In “The Question 
Concerning Technology” Heidegger defines destining, and technology as a destining, by saying 
that “We shall call that sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts man upon 
a way of revealing, destining [Geschick]. It is from out of this destining that the essence of all 
history [Geschichte] is determined.”317 Destining is the happening (geschehen) or appropriation 
(ereignen) that sets man on a particular way of revealing, that is, a particular way of grasping the 
world. Destining, in other words, is the specific grasp of the world that appears in a given epoch, 
being different for the Greeks, the Romans, medieval Europe, the Enlightenment, and our own 
age.
318
 In medieval Europe, for example, reality was seen through the perspective of Christianity, 
everything in the world being grasped as the created product of an uncreated God. To be a thing, 
for the medieval Christian, exactly is to be the result of an eternal, perfect, uncreated God. On 
Heidegger’s view of history, while religious belief did not disappear with the Enlightenment, the 
medieval Christian understanding of what the world is, of what it means to be a thing, did. With 
the Enlightenment the world came to be seen as something graspable scientifically, which is to 
say by way of measurement, with the standard of scientific precision being mathematical 
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physics. One destining is replaced in time by another, and so one way of grasping the world is 
replaced by another. As Heidegger says in “The Turning” (Die Kehre), the follow-up lecture to 
“The Question Concerning Technology” given in 1949, “the surmounting of a destining of 
Being—here and now, the surmounting of Enframing—each time comes to pass out of the 
arrival of another destining, a destining that does not allow itself either to be logically and 
historiographically predicted or to be metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to a 
process of history.”319 
 Looking in particular at the italicized portion of the passage above, a problem appears: if 
one destining, an epoch in the history of Being such as the epoch of technology, only disappears 
through the emergence of another which it leads into, what role can there be for authenticity and 
inauthenticity? If authenticity and inauthenticity are grafted onto technology and mindfulness, 
and the latter are merely aspects of the current destining of Being, wouldn’t they disappear 
altogether with the arrival of another destining? In which case, isn’t there indeed a drastic change 
in the role of authenticity and inauthenticity compared to Being and Time? Do authenticity and 
inauthenticity, or any transhistorical factors, have any purpose? (This last question may pertain 
more directly to the active-passive dimension, but is important here insofar as one can ask 
whether authenticity and inauthenticity have any bearing to the transitions between epochs.) 
 The objection as it is now being presented is much stronger than before, insofar as 
epochs, along with their particular ways of understanding the world and all that comes with, 
appear to be eliminated by the arrival of a new epoch. If technology as Enframing is just an 
epoch, one that supplanted a previous epoch and will in turn be supplanted by another, then its 
features appear to be nothing more than features of an epoch. There would be no general features 
of which technology is a particular variant, as the transhistorical reading of inauthenticity 
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indicates. This leaves one of two options. First, technology and inauthenticity are indeed the 
same, but it is wrong to read inauthenticity as transhistorical; it must be a purely contemporary 
phenomenon, a far more difficult position to defend. Second, technology is not an instantiation 
of inauthenticity, the two accounts do not fit together, and so there must have been a drastic 
change in the content of Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity. 
 This objection poses a problem for mindfulness as well. If technology is just the product 
of one epoch, one should ask what role mindfulness has outside of that epoch. Mindfulness, it 
has been said before, is mindfulness of the epoch. But will it have some general features that 
transcend epochs? Mindfulness appears to have no power to bring about a shift in epochs, since 
that is up to the destining of Being, i.e., the flow of history. Rather, mindfulness just is awareness 
of the epoch, which has been defined as awareness of lostness to beings, of anxiety or distress at 
the lack of distress. But, pressing further, such awareness of anxiety or distress is associated with 
the technological epoch in particular. What is there to be mindful of if technology disappears? 
And what of those epochs before the modern one? Can they be fairly called inauthentic, or 
anyone in them in authentic, if authenticity is mindfulness and mindfulness only makes sense 
relative to technology? People prior to the modern epoch weren’t under the sway of technology, 
after all. At that time was there no inauthenticity, and thus no mindfulness or authenticity, either? 
Here Haar’s claim, that “the importance of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic, 
originary and derivative, becomes attenuated . . . [, that] Dasein moves towards neutrality,”320 
becomes plausible once again. 
 On the other hand, in “The Question Concerning Technology” is included the following 
passage, which should be examined in its entirety: 
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In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which 
everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger that man may quail at 
the unconcealed and may misinterpret it. Thus where everything that presences exhibits 
itself in the light of a cause-effect coherence, even God can, for representational thinking, 
lose all that is exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. In the light of 
causality, God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficiens. He then becomes, even 
in theology, the god of the philosophers, namely, of those who define the unconcealed 
and the concealed in terms of the causality of making, without ever considering the 
essential origin of this causality. 
In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a 
calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations but 
precisely through these successes the danger can remain that in the midst of all that is 
correct the true will withdraw.
321
 
 
 
 According to Thomas Aquinas, no small figure in medieval philosophy, the being which 
we think of as God, the creator of the medieval worldview can be argued to exist as (1) the 
unmoved mover, (2) the uncaused cause, (3) the necessary being, (4) the most perfect being, and 
(5) the intelligent creator. This is shown via Aquinas’ five ways in the Summa Theologica, based 
respectively on motion, cause, necessary and sufficient existence, degrees of goodness, and 
design. In a work of several thousand pages, each proof takes up a single paragraph, none of 
them being more than half a page, and each ending in a similar fashion: “we must come at last to 
a First Cause of motion; and there do we find God,” “not to proceed indefinitely, there must be a 
First Efficient Cause; and there too we find God,”322 and so on. But is this what, so to speak, 
finding God is all about? Aquinas admits at the start of his proofs that with them, “Although we 
know God in a general way, we do not therefore know Him absolutely,”323 i.e., by knowing 
God’s essence in the way that an ontological argument such as that of St. Anselm claims to. But 
there may be a greater concern than methods of proof here. What do proofs, and arguments in 
                                                 
321
 The Question Concerning Technology 26. Italics in the first sentence mine. 
322
 See Bonjoannes, Berardus. Compendium of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas Pars Prima (London: 
Thomas Baker, Newman Street W, 1906) 5-7. 
323
 Bonjoannes 7. 
160 
 
general, have to do with knowing God in the first place? Is knowing by way of an argument that 
the Christian God who created the earth and heavens, who came to earth in human guise, who 
suffered and died on the cross for the sins of man, exists, knowing God in what Heidegger or 
anyone else would call an authentic sense? Or might God, when considered solely in this way, 
just be “the god of the philosophers,” as Heidegger says, a God who lacks “all that is exalted and 
holy, the mysteriousness of his distance?” What does it mean for a believing Christian to know 
God, and do either Aquinas or Anselm, the latter with his proof of a “being than which nothing 
greater can be conceived,”324 touch on that question in their proofs? 
 It would be grossly unfair to both Aquinas and Anselm to accuse them of reducing the 
knowledge of God to mere proofs. Indeed, both think that a proper understanding of God’s 
nature is something beyond what philosophical argument is capable of, a point they make 
unambiguously.
325
 This does not mean, however, that their efforts cannot be distorted if they are 
appropriated in a way that fails to properly grasp their intent and purpose, and Heidegger appears 
to think that just something like this can happen. (In Being and Time, Heidegger has a story for 
just how this might happen: “And because [idle talk] has lost its primary relationship-of-Being 
towards the entity talked about [as, presumably, ‘the Blessed’ comprehend God], or else has 
never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be 
appropriated in a primordial manner.”326) Such a distortion is not just one view rather than 
another, but a particular sort of mistake, according to Heidegger; to claim to know God merely 
through knowing His role in an argument as causa efficiens, as the causally efficacious thing that 
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explains the existence of the world, is to distort the role of God in religious belief. It is to take a 
philosophical argument from Aristotle, which was not meant to be a religious argument in the 
first place, and appropriate it to a central object of religious faith.
327
 
 Moving to the second part of the passage, Heidegger says that such a distortion is similar 
to what happens when “nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces,” 
i.e., when nature is understood in accordance with the epoch of technology. It should not go 
without noting that Heidegger refers to the misunderstanding of God he is explaining in terms of 
“representational thinking,” which is the modern epoch’s form of thinking, and that his 
discussion is present-tense, so that he may appear to be referring specifically to modern-day 
views of God. But look again the first sentence of the passage: “In whatever way the destining of 
revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any 
given time harbors the danger that man may quail at the unconcealed and may misinterpret it.” 
“In whatever way destining may hold sway” means that such misinterpretation may happen in 
whatever understanding of Being guides a historical epoch, since destining just is the 
understanding of Being; the discussion of God is then given as an example of this. Each epoch 
has its own destining that holds sway in which something like this can happen. So this form of 
misinterpretation, Heidegger says explicitly, can happen in multiple epochs. Such an order of 
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error, then, wherein “in the midst of all that is correct328 the true will withdraw,” is not a form of 
error exclusive to the epoch of technology. This class of mistake, which is the same class of 
mistake committed by technology, is something that can happen in any given epoch, regardless 
of the particular form of understanding that holds in that epoch. This just is to say that such a 
form of error is transhistorical. 
 However, just because technology is an instantiation of inauthenticity does not mean that 
it has the same role in history as every other form of inauthenticity. Heidegger has more to say 
about the modern epoch’s form of inauthenticity in particular, something that does make it a 
target of special concern, and not merely because it is the contemporary form of inauthenticity: 
 
The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such. 
Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger. This 
danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer 
concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and 
man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then 
he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he 
himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve . . . . But Enframing does not simply 
endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it 
banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds 
sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing . . . . Where Enframing holds sway, 
regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even 
let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.
329
 
 
 
 
The key feature of technology as Enframing, as opposed to other forms of inauthenticity, is the 
degree of its domination over the modern epoch. This domination manifests itself in two ways. 
These two ways are general features of inauthenticity, but in the epoch of technology they have a 
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peculiar power. First, as previously discussed, man himself becomes another element of the 
standing reserve; man becomes a being in the same manner as all other beings, and to be a being 
for technology is to be an orderable, calculable quantity.  This is different from previous forms of 
inauthenticity; compare, for example, the medieval worldview. An inauthentic understanding of 
the world at that time would take the world, including man, first and foremost as the created 
effect of an uncreated cause, God, where creation is understood primarily causally. While that 
understanding of the world, if taken without deeper understanding, will miss much what it means 
to say that existence is God’s creation, will miss the true import and specialness of the claim 
about man’s creation, it will still generally take man as a unique creation, one made in God’s 
image. Man is understood as the causal product of God, but at least as one that is unique, not like 
other beings. This is important, for according to Heidegger man as Dasein is indeed unique; 
recall from Being and Time that it is that being for whom its Being is a concern; it has a relation 
to the world that other created objects, such as animals (though that is complicated) or rocks, do 
not, and even the inauthentic medieval worldview acknowledges that. 
 The technological epoch, on the other hand, does not allow for such a distinction; it treats 
man exactly like everything else, as a resource to be consumed. Besides the examples given 
previously, one might include the darker observation that in the epoch of technology, our general 
treatment of human life mirrors the way that das Man explains death in Being and Time: “One of 
these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us.”330 One 
watches the news and sees how many soldiers have died this week; they are so many resources, 
used up for the purposes of victory. The danger is that we too “will have to be taken as standing-
reserve,” ready to be used up. Man as Dasein thus loses awareness of his uniqueness as Dasein, 
as that Being that can decide about its Being, which is to say, act on possibilities. Instead, man 
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interprets himself in the same way as everything else, as a thing that can be used in the services 
of ends, where that end may be something such as his own happiness. In Mindfulness Heidegger 
refers to this as ‘anthropomorphism,’ where man is taken as a rational animal that represents 
beings rather than as Da-sein. In this case, reality becomes a product of human imagination or 
determination, but at the same time man is subject to the determination of reality as a whole: 
“The heightening of man to an unbridled being of power and surrendering him to the 
unknowable destiny of the course taken by ‘beings in the whole’ belong together, they are the 
same.”331 Similarly for Being and Time, when Heidegger is discussing how das Man interprets 
Dasein’s Being: 
 
From the kind of Being which belongs to [das Man]—the kind which is closest—everyday 
Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being . . . : it understands Dasein in 
terms of the world and comes across it as an entity within-the-world . . . . But because the 
phenomenon of the world itself gets passed over in this absorption in the world, its place gets 
taken [tritt an seine Stelle] by what is present-at-hand within-the-world, namely, Things.
332
 
 
 
What is being described in the above passage is a general structure of inauthenticity, which is 
then instantiated in different ways. In the medieval epoch, for example, what is present at hand is 
the thing qua created. In such a worldview, there is the possibility of interpreting man as the 
created effect of God as cause, which is a distortion of the medieval notion of createdness. Yet 
man’s creation by God, and in God’s image, remains an essential part of the worldview, 
preserving man’s uniqueness even if in a derivative and inauthentic way. Technology is 
different, however: in the technological world, present-at-hand things are mere accumulations of 
resources, and nothing more; no divinity, no uniqueness, to be found in any respect. An 
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inauthentic interpretation of man, then, takes man as a mere thing like other things. But as such, 
he is something to be reckoned with, to manipulate, to control, to be counted, and perhaps to 
satisfy in the manner of Nietzsche’s last man.333 This is an order of magnitude beyond 
inauthenticity in the medieval epoch: there is no room for any interesting role for a thing, any 
deeper grasp of its meaning and possibilities, beyond manipulation of its forces. 
 Such is the first special danger of technology. But not only is man taken up into the 
ordering of technology; technology, unlike other forms of inauthenticity, utterly dominates over 
all other forms of revealing. Technology takes itself to be not only the most important, but the 
sole arbiter of what it is to exist and be part of a world. All other forms of revealing, be they 
those of literature, myth, history, and so on, are rejected as irrational and false. Anselm and 
Aquinas, writing about God, took both argument and faith to be ways in which God could be 
understood; they did not posit logical argument as being supreme or alone, but nor did they think 
argument was nothing: as Anselm says, “I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I 
believe in order to understand.”334 Belief comes first, but understanding is not false, or sinful, or 
to be avoided. One expects that even those in Anselm’s time who might misinterpret him, and 
take his argument to be providing some sort of privileged knowledge of God, would think that 
there is more to God than what arguments say, that e.g. salvation, judgment, and the like are 
important to understanding God, even if they are the realm of revelation not argument.
335
 
Technology, on the other hand, with science as its handmaiden and mathematical physics as the 
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exemplary science, decides on its own what is true and what is not by deciding what it means to 
be true at all. Technological thinking takes itself to provide the exclusive ground of truth.
336
 
 To see how technology becomes supreme in this way, and what standard of truth it offers, 
one can look back to the philosopher who, more than any other, spurred the modern era, and who 
for Heidegger has a special place in Western history: Descartes. In the Meditations, Descartes 
says that I never see an actual thing, such as a piece of wax. For the qualities that I perceive in 
the wax change; how could the shape, the color, the size of the wax be true aspects of the piece 
wax, if they can change and yet the same piece of wax remains? What is essential to the piece of 
wax must be what always belongs to the wax so long as it is that particular piece of wax. 
Because all that we learn about the wax via sensation can change while the piece of wax itself 
remains the same thing, Descartes concludes that if I know what the wax is, then that knowing 
includes “nothing of all that I observe by means of the senses, since all the things that fell under 
taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing are changed, and yet the same wax remains.”337 But if it is 
not the senses, then, “it is the mind alone (mens, Lat., entendement, F.) which perceives”338 the 
wax, and by analogy any real thing. Since, according to Descartes, what belongs essentially to a 
thing is what belongs to that thing through all of its changes, the mind can grasp the essence of 
the wax only “when I distinguish the wax from its exterior forms, and when, as if I had stripped 
it of its vestments, I consider it quite naked.”339 Real objects, as a result, are objects stripped of 
anything about them that changes, which includes any and every sensible quality of an object. 
Even when Descartes goes on to prove that external objects exist, he argues that they cannot 
                                                 
336
 A point that Braver recognizes: see, for instance, Braver 299. 
337
 Descartes, Rene. The Method, Meditations, and Selections from the Principles of Descartes, Fourteenth Edition, 
trans. J. Veitch (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1907) 111. 
338
 Meditations 112. 
339
 Meditations 113. 
167 
 
exist as we typically perceive them. Things, he says in passage that Heidegger would think 
pivotal in the history of Western thought, 
 
are not perhaps exactly as we perceive by the senses, for their comprehension by the senses 
is, in many instances very obscure and confused; but it is at least necessary to admit that all 
which I clearly and distinctly conceive as in them, that is, generally speaking, all that is 
comprehended in the object of speculative geometry, really exists externally to me.
340
 
 
 
What really exist in the world are things, but only in those respects and possessing those qualities 
which can be grasped by speculative geometry, that not including qualities such as color, heat, 
and so on. Those apparent features of reality are not truly out there as part of the objects, but just, 
so to speak, in our heads; only that which meets the standard of speculative geometry as a 
mathematical science, things which are described ‘clear and distinct’ as opposed to ‘obscure and 
confused,’ can be considered to be part of external reality.  The world of things is taken to exist 
in one and one sense only, whereas all other interpretations of reality are not just uncertain, 
fuzzy, or incomplete, but utterly mistaken. Speculative geometry, in this way, as what is truly 
clear and distinct (i.e., what can be calculated—the link to calculability needs no big interpretive 
leap here) becomes the universal standard for what is real;  This is an especially strong version of 
what happens when public interpretation and idle talk takes over in Being and Time, such that it 
“has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood—that is, for the basic way 
in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. [Das Man] prescribes one's state-of-mind, and 
determines what and how one ‘sees’.”341 Though most people are not speculative geometers, all 
people in the epoch of technology can still grasp the world in terms discrete resources to be used 
for discrete, measurable ends, even when it comes to their own lives, as Heidegger discusses in 
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Mindfulness; after all, what else is there, one might ask, but quantities of matter and force in 
motion according to laws? Things are just matter, and we can use that to produce energy or solve 
problems, all in the most efficient way. Isn’t everything else poetry and superstition? 
 The epoch of technology, then, represents both one instantiation of inauthenticity among 
others and a uniquely insidious one, which helps to make more sense of the question of whether 
inauthenticity is historical, transhistorical, or ahistorical. Following the hint given in Mindfulness 
about misinterpretation of the idea of creation, and the fuller discussion of the passage from “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” it can be said with confidence that inauthenticity is a 
transhistorical phenomenon in Heidegger’s thought, technology being as a a uniquely powerful 
historical manifestation of it. As the example of medieval views of God showed, what Heidegger 
calls inauthenticity in Being and Time cannot be isolated to the epoch of technology alone, even 
in his later work. However, Heidegger also makes it clear that technology has a peculiar status 
among forms of inauthenticity, one that poses a unique threat, thus implying that inauthenticity 
manifests itself in sometimes very different ways in different historical epochs.
342
 In Being and 
Time, it appears as though Heidegger takes inauthenticity as a timeless phenomenon, always 
being the way it is; it is, after all, the way Dasein is “proximally and for the most part.” As 
pointed out previously, however, Heidegger’s actual language remains either ambiguous or 
inexplicit in distinguishing between transhistorical and ahistorical readings, and on closer 
examination it was seen that inauthenticity is transhistorical. But to say that inauthenticity is 
transhistorical does not mean that history has no say in how inauthenticity develops, or what 
becomes of it. When Heidegger describes newspapers as the prime example of idle talk in the 
written medium in Being and Time, he is not using a timeless example; it is one that can be dated 
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to a specific point in history, before which inauthentic communication in writing was, at best, not 
possible at nearly the scale it is now.Thus, even in Being and Time the account of inauthenticity 
makes reference to specific historical developments that can shift the scope and specific 
manifestations of inauthenticity. Nevertheless, after Being and Time there does appear to be a 
shift in Heidegger’s interest: with the introduction of technology, his interest unambiguously 
turns to the contemporary epoch and its form of inauthenticity. Yet the fact that technology 
shares all the features of inauthenticity does not mean that das Man and all that goes with it 
suddenly become mere phenomena of the contemporary moment, but rather that the features of 
inauthenticity, including das Man, must be addressed as they appear in actual historical 
circumstances, and they appear to us today in the form of technological thinking. 
 
4.4 WHO SAVES US? 
 
 Inauthenticity and technology have been discussed at length. What of of authenticity and 
mindfulness? And what of the transitional role played by anxiety or the distress at the lack of 
distress? Starting with anxiety, which comes next in conceptual order, the two addenda to “What 
Is Metaphysics?” help supplement the picture. According to these addenda, anxiety, ostensibly 
understood in the same way as in Being and Time and “What is Metaphysics?” is the proper 
reaction to what Heidegger in the 1940s begins to call ‘the oblivion of Being.’ The oblivion of 
Being, in brief, is the loss of awareness of “the primordial relation of Being to the human 
essence.”343 Recalling what was said earlier in this chapter about Being and the human essence, 
this means that man loses touch with his particular historical form of Being-in-the-world, which 
is to say, with the proper relation to his historical possibilities. “If,” Heidegger asks, “the 
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oblivion of Being that has been described here should be our situation, would there not be 
occasion enough for a thinking that recalls Being to experience a genuine horror? What can such 
thinking do other than to endure anxiously this destiny of Being, so as first of all to bring the 
oblivion of Being to bear upon us?”344 Anxiety to the point of horror is the proper attitude 
towards the current epoch in which man’s primordial relation to his Being-in-the-world is hidden 
from him, and this absence is in its turn hidden from him: “What if the absence of Being 
abandoned man more and more exclusively to beings, leaving him forsaken . . . , while this 
forsakenness itself remained veiled.”345 Compare the veiling of man’s forsakenness to the lack in 
‘distress at the lack of distress’ in Mindfulness: the forsakenness must be brought out into the 
open, unveiled to man, as anxiety must be acknowledged by authentic Dasein. 
 Compare as well this picture to that given by Heidegger at the end of his career, in his 
1966 interview with Der Spiegel. What starts as an interview about Heidegger’s Nazi affiliations 
becomes a wide-ranging discussion of the modern era, one of his last, where Heidegger lays out 
his positions not ex cathedra but in dialogue with two interviewers. At one point, Heidegger 
brings up and considers an objection to the view that we are being controlled by technology, 
namely, that things are going well in the modern age; production is increasing, things are 
working, men are employed. What, then, is there to be afraid of in the age of technology? 
“Everything is functioning,” Heidegger says in response. “This is exactly what is so uncanny, 
that everything is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further 
functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them.”346 
Heidegger’s use of ‘uncanny’ here, where it is followed by uprootedness and being torn loose 
from the earth, fits well with his use of the term in Being and Time, where, recall, uncanniness is 
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the feeling of being not at home (unheimlich), of being unsettled, and in this way is the state of 
mind of anxiety. (In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” from the 1950s, Heidegger links dwelling, 
as the proper way of living in the world, and preservation of the earth, earth understood in a way 
closer to being at home than to the dirt beneath our feet: “we reflect that human being consists in 
dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth.”347) In the Der 
Spiegel quotation, the continuous, unimpeded functionality of technology is opposed to the 
rootedness of man, to his connection to the earth; modern man is functioning but uprooted, and 
this uprootedness in the face of a successfully functioning world is what is uncanny. The 
uncanniness described here is not a concern with any specific process or event, because 
everything is functioning, which is to say that everything works as intended: “We have peak 
production. Men in the highly technological parts of the world are well provided for. We live in 
prosperity.”348 It’s what that functionality is doing to us that is uncanny; it tears us from our 
roots. Because everything works so well, this uncanniness is not explicitly noticed. But that 
uncanniness can become a threat to our current sense of progress, can call it into question. As 
Heidegger says in 1927, uncanniness, which is “a threat to [Dasein’s] everyday lostness in [das 
Man] . . . , can go together factically with complete assurance and self-sufficiency in one's 
everyday concern.”349 If man in the age of technology is being inauthentic, then a lack of concern 
for such rootedness would be what man pursues, as something that threatens progress. 
 Looking to “The Question Concerning Technology,” written between the addenda and 
the Der Spiegel interview, the state in which one should feel uncanny is life when it is under the 
spell of of ‘the danger,’ which “is both nowhere and everywhere. It has no place as something 
other than itself. It is itself the placeless dwelling place of all presencing. The danger is the epoch 
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of Being coming to presence as Enframing;”350 that is, the danger is the modern epoch. One 
should feel unsettled not by particular beings (in Being and Time, fear is the inauthentic form of 
anxiety, one directed to particular beings), but by the epoch of technology, which says that 
everything is working well. 
 As Being and Time had it, anxiety and uncanniness must be faced in order for Dasein to 
exist authentically. The “Postscript” to “What is Metaphysics?” keeps to this perspective, 
arguing that anxiety must brought into the open in order for authentic decisions to be made: 
“Readiness for anxiety is a Yes to assuming a stance that fulfills the highest claim, a claim that is 
made upon the human essence alone . . . . The lucid courage for essential anxiety assures us the 
enigmatic possibility of experiencing being.”351 The oblivion of Being must be acknowledged 
and affirmed rather than avoided, so that Being can be recognized. And that acknowledgement is 
all that can be done; the destiny of Being which is signified by man’s obliviousness to his own 
history must be recognized and “brought to bear.” Recall that in Mindfulness, mindfulness itself 
started not with a plan to change the world, but with an awareness that “prepares the decision” 
without actually carrying out the decision on its own; mindfulness was preparation for genuine 
historical possibilities, not a recognition of what those possibilities are. This motif carries into 
the expression that gives the Der Spiegel interview its title: “Only a god can save us. The sole 
possibility that is left for us is to prepare a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for 
the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in the time of foundering (Untergang); 
for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder.”352 The absence of the god, and our 
uprootedness, our uncanniness in the god’s absence when all is otherwise going well, is the cause 
of foundering. We must prepare for its appearance, or alternatively, Heidegger says, for its 
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absence. What is meant here is not initially clear. What, exactly, is the god that will save us? Do 
preparing for its appearance and preparing for its absence amount to the same thing? If not, what 
is the difference? 
 It is safe to assume that Heidegger does not mean by ‘god’ a causa efficiens. The god is 
what keeps us from foundering, and is what can save us from our age of foundering. It seems fair 
to suspect that the god is what roots us to the earth in some sense, though that itself must be 
made clearer. Instead of simply asking what the god is, it may be better to ask what is to be 
preserved, what prepared for. Heidegger invokes old terms to clarify the preparation: 
 
S: You have just said that philosophy and the individual are capable of nothing other 
than . . . 
H: . . . this preparation of the readiness, of keeping oneself open for the arrival of or the 
absence of the god. Moreover the experience of this absence is not nothing, but rather a 
liberation of man from what I called “fallenness amidst beings” in Being and Time. A 
meditation on what is today belongs to the preparation of the readiness we referred to.
353
 
 
 
Preparation requires being open for the arrival of or absence of the god, Heidegger repeats. He 
goes on to put weight on experiencing the absence; such experience of absence is, directly 
referencing Being and Time, a liberation from the state of fallenness into the world of beings 
(i.e., being engrossed by them, a general tendency exacerbated by das Man), and the associated 
lostness to Being; in Being and Time, such liberation was the role given specifically to anxiety. 
Part of the readiness, then, includes anxiety about the absence of the god in spite of everything 
going well, which is another way of distress at the lack of distress. To experience the lack of the 
god is to experience anxiety. This recognition, Heidegger says further, includes “meditation on 
what is today,” on what defines the current age. As seen above, it is in the essence of technology 
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that the hope of a saving power, of liberation from the technological epoch, lies; in other words, 
the current age is one of lostness to technology andof the god’s absence (where the former seems 
to follow from the latter), and looking forward, one might find either the freedom from 
technology, or the loss of any such possibility. To put it all together, meditation on and 
awareness of the epoch of technology, which is recognition of man’s uprootedness, which is also 
recognition of the current absence of the god, is how man prepares for the potential arrival of the 
god. The god appears in this account as the opposite of what uproots us (technology), as what we 
have lost in our uprooted era and what has the hope of rooting us once more, something we 
cannot do on our own.
354
 But for any of this to happen, man must face the source of anxiety and 
recognize it as such. Resolute Dasein is anxious, and resolute, anxious man prepares the way for 
the absence of the god. 
 At this point one might again offer the familiar objection: is this account of anxiety, and 
the general account of anxiety since the 1930s, historical in a way that the account from Being 
and Time (as well as “What is Metaphysics?”) is not? Anxiety is presented in the later works, 
according to this objection, as a reaction to the oblivion brought about by technology, which is 
the circumstance of a specific epoch, rather than as a general feature of man’s existence. On the 
other hand, in Being and Time and “What is Metaphysics” authentic Dasein is existentially 
anxious, which means always anxious: “the originary anxiety in Dasein is usually repressed. 
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Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping.”355 Is anxiety only sleeping in us in the current epoch, or is 
there something beyond that? Has anxiety lost its status as a universal feature of Dasein in the 
later works, and become the phenomenon of a particular historical period? It was anxiety that 
Dreyfus focused on as producing tension with the historical aspects of Being and Time; might 
anxiety, rather than inauthenticity, be where a transhistorical interpretation breaks down? 
 In the “Postscript” to “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger repeats a basic claim about 
anxiety from the original lecture, that “Without being, whose abyssal but yet to be unfolded 
essence dispenses the nothing to us in essential anxiety, all beings would remain in an absence of 
being.”356 In “What is Metaphysics?” itself, the function of anxiety is that it “makes manifest the 
nothing,”357 and only because the nothing is manifest to us, only because beings are able to slip 
away and have a distance from us, does Dasein have any relation to beings as beings, and thus to 
Being: “Human Dasein can comport itself toward beings only if it holds itself out into the 
nothing.”358 Anxiety, in “What is Metaphysics?” is therefore not just an element of authenticity, 
but an essential component of being something for whom there are any beings at all, and 
certainly beings haven’t been present to man only in a single epoch. In the “Postscript” 
Heidegger repeats the claim that anxiety makes manifest the nothing, so that, by way of anxiety, 
“we must prepare ourselves solely in readiness to experience in the nothing the pervasive 
expanse of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is being itself.”359 Recall as well 
something quoted previously when discussing anxiety in the later works, that “The lucid courage 
for essential anxiety assures us the enigmatic possibility of experiencing being.” Through anxiety 
we experience being; without it, there would be no beings (since they would have no being; they 
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would not ‘be’ in any particular way for us, would not be taken as something rather than 
something else). Anxiety, as in “What is Metaphysics?” provides the distance necessary to 
experience beings as beings. Without anxiety, no being. Man is always anxious, then, in the later 
works as well as the earlier ones, because it remains just as essential for having the experience of 
beings, for being man. (It might be more intuitive to say that man is unsettled in all epochs, 
capable of existing at a distance from beings, and so taking them as something, via the nothing in 
all epochs. The point, however, remains the same.) 
 Finally, what becomes of authenticity, which in the 1930s became mindfulness? In the 
“Postscript” Heidegger speaks of what he calls ‘essential thinking’ as follows: 
 
That thinking whose thoughts not only cannot be calculated, but are in general 
determined by that which is other than beings, may be called essential thinking. Instead 
of calculatively counting on beings by means of beings, it expends itself in being for the 
truth of being. Such thinking responds to the claim of being, through the human being 
letting his historical essence be responsible to the simplicity of a singular necessity . . . . 
The need is for the truth of being to be preserved, whatever may happen to human beings 
and to all beings . . . . Sacrifice is the departure from beings on the path to preserving the 
favor of being . . . . Its accomplishment stems from that inherent stance [Instandigkeit] 
out of which every historical human being through action – and essential thinking is an 
action – preserves the Dasein he has attained for the preservation of the dignity of 
being.
360
 
 
 
‘Essential thinking’ takes the place of ‘mindfulness’ in the 1940s and is used through to the end. 
Heidegger opposes essential thinking to mere calculative thought of the kind epitomized by 
technology, which he describes in the passage above as thought in the sense of “calculatively 
counting on beings by means of beings,” similar to the “absorption in the world . . . [in terms of] 
what is present at hand within the world”361 found in Being and Time’s discussion of das Man. 
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As opposed to the technological way of grasping the world, essential thinking responds to “that 
which is other than beings,” i.e., to Being itself. It responds to Being, not to beings, in terms of 
the truth of Being, i.e., of man’s Being-in-the-world. Recalling once again what Being-in-the-
world is, essential thinking is a response to man’s history, a response to the oblivion of Being in 
the current historical epoch and thus a response to anxiety—the passage ends with a reference to 
“the clarity of the awe, ready for anxiety, that belongs to the courage of sacrifice.”362  
 In the passage above, man is said to be responsible specifically in terms of “his historical 
essence.” That man’s essence is historical follows simply enough from man being a being that is 
always in a world with historically determined possibilities, a historical being, a point made in 
Being and Time though given little emphasis until late in the work. A brief recap: in Being and 
Time, because Dasein is always in a historical, factical Situation, authentic Dasein is responsible 
for his historicity, and authentically takes it on in destiny. It is only in a historical Situation that 
an authentic decision about Dasein’s possibilities can be made, and those possibilities are limited 
by what that Dasein’s heritage is. Thus, according to Being and Time the possibilities open to 
authentic Dasein do not equate to a simple free choice, but to “the power of its finite freedom, so 
that . . . it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment [to its having made a choice], and can 
thus have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.”363 Dasein 
chooses its history, which means accepting the possibilities that have come down to it, though 
they are not of its choosing. 
 In the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being,” Heidegger elaborates further on the role of 
history in thinking. “Thinking,” he says there, “remains bound to the tradition of the epochs of 
the destiny of Being, even when and especially when it recalls in what way and from what source 
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Being itself receives its appropriate determination.”364 Thinking is a confrontation with the 
destiny of Being, which is to say the ways in which Being is understood in the different historical 
epochs. For example, thinking in medieval era would not simply think about God, but move 
beyond God as a particular being to createdness itself as the fundamental way of being real, as 
what gives things their significance. In the modern era, on the other hand, man must confront the 
essence of technology as Enframing and how that determines what it means to be real for the 
current epoch. Heidegger refers to these epochs as ‘the history of Being:’ “The history 
(Geschichte) of Being means destiny (Geschick) of Being in whose sendings (Schicken) both the 
sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation.”365 The “history of 
Being,” of which much fuss is made in the secondary literature, is basically the various 
understandings of the world as they manifest in history, each of which must be confronted by 
those who are in it. History itself is a series of sendings from Being, where ‘sending’ is once 
again the translation of schicken, related to “destiny” as Geschick. Thinking meditates on the 
unthought essence of its particular epoch, questioning what grounds the meaning of Being of that 
epoch; for the contemporary age, thinking must confront the essence of technology, which is the 
source of the uprootedness that defines this epoch. This thinking prepares the way for the rooting 
of man once again. 
 The result is a sacrifice of beings (i.e., the letting go of beings, the “liberation from the 
‘fallenness from beings’” Heidegger speaks of in the Der Spiegel interview) for the sake of 
being, “for the preservation of the dignity of being.” Man, as historical, must confront the 
essence of his epoch. Thus, the response to technology is essential thinking, which is anxious 
about the loss of being in this epoch. In anxiety, man finds himself turning away from the 
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preoccupation with beings (including, in the current age, objectivity as the standard of reality) 
towards the preservation of being, leading to a historically-minded stance against calculation. 
 In Being and Time destiny makes an appearance, though it is not described as the history 
of Being. There it is defined instead as “the historizing of the community, of a people,”366 as 
opposed to the individual historizing of fate. ‘Fate,’ for its part, disappears from the discussion in 
the 1930s, and its absence persists here. To understand why this is, recall the somewhat unclear 
relationship between fate and destiny and Being and Time, in addition to the unclear explanation 
of the terms themselves. Fate was Dasein handing itself its own heritage; but at the same time, 
“if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing 
is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick].” So Dasein hands itself its 
heritage, which is fate, but its historizing (its handing itself its heritage) is at the same time 
historizing with others, which is destiny. Dasein is always Being-with, so fate is, in some way, 
always destiny. Can fate and destiny come apart? Is there any concrete difference between the 
two? Can Dasein, for instance, accept its fate without authentic co-historizing? If authentic 
history is something that involves one’s heritage, and a heritage is always shared, that possibility 
is difficult to make sense of. On the other hand, can a people accept its destiny without the 
particular individuals who constitute that people accepting their fate? By the 1940s these issues 
are not answered, but rather dissolved, by dropping ‘fate’ altogether as a separate concept in 
favor of destiny. Man, in these later works, must acknowledge his destiny. But this destiny is the 
history of Being, which includes man’s Being-in-the-world, which includes man’s Being-with 
Others. This must be done, as the quotation above says, by “every historical human being,” and 
originary thinking is the act of particular thinkers, as in the account of fate. Yet Heidegger also 
says of originary thinking that it “is attentive to the truth of being and thus helps the being of 
                                                 
366
 Being and Time 436. 
180 
 
truth to find its site within historical mankind.”367 The thinker, seeking the truth of being, i.e., the 
ground of the historical epoch, is always working to help the being of truth (the happening of 
truth, the way in which the world manifests) to “find its site within historical mankind,” to help 
to bring about the recognition of the epoch and the possibilities therein. What was represented by 
‘fate’ was the individual’s authentic grasping of history; this is maintained in the fact that the 
thinker, i.e., the individual thinker, must embrace history, like the grounders in Mindfulness. But 
to think on history is to bring it to the fore, so that “a particular humankind,”368 or historical 
mankind, may recognize it. ‘Destiny’ was the co-historizing aspect of Dasein’s historicity; it is 
incorporated into essential thinking by saying that part of essential thinking includes bringing (or 
attempting to bring) a Dasein’s people into recognition of the history of Being. There can still be 
a distinction between an individual grasping his destiny and his entire people grasping it, but 
there is no separate concept; the essential thinker works to help others to think essentially as 
well, as part of his essential thinking; if Being-in-the-world is Being-with Others, and essential 
thinking properly grasps this fact, there can be no other way of essential thinking. 
 The introduction of the history of Being helps fill in what is left over in the account of 
destiny. The history of Being is the history of Being’s sendings, which is to say man’s 
destinings, which is to say epochs, which is to say the different ways in which historical peoples 
experience the world, i.e., their possibilities. The history of Being persists beyond individual 
persons even as a collective; it is the commonly shared fundamental experience of beings qua 
Being of a given time and place. When man grasps his heritage, he grasps something that 
transcends both himself and the collected members of those in his culture, race, or nationality; he 
grasps the sending of Being, the current understanding of the world, in terms of its source in his 
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history, his heritage. To grasp this heritage, as a passage from the “Postscript” suggests, includes 
helping to make a site for it, to bring it into the common experiential sphere, to speak about it, 
reveal it, and make it manifest to others. ‘Fate’ actually does appear as a term, but it is now used 
to describe the mistaken understanding of destiny as a sort of brute determinism: “Always the 
destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that 
compels.”369 In Being and Time, it is not clear how authentic Dasein could relate authentically to 
history as an individual; it must encounter its Situation, and that includes das Man and all else 
that constitutes Dasein’s facticity. The introduction there of the separate term ‘fate’ to describe 
Dasein handing its heritage down to itself, as though that could happen separately from handing 
down destiny, introduces confusion, and saying things like “Dasein's fateful destiny”370 doesn’t 
help matters. Further, merely defining destiny as not being a collection of individual fates says 
nothing positively about what destiny is. Eliminating ‘fate’ as a separate term, and explaining 
more clearly the role of history in destiny via the history of Being, provides a positive account of 
destiny and what authentic historizing amounts to, one that reconciles individual and group. In 
the language of Being and Time: authentic historicity is a reckoning, in anticipatory resoluteness, 
with Dasein’s factical Situation, one determined by Dasein’s history, which always includes the 
shared tradition Dasein is a part of. In later language: Thinking is the meditation by man on his 
historical destiny and that of his people in the history of Being, in which Being destines man to a 
particular epoch. In the cases of inauthenticity and technology, of authenticity and thinking, 
history plays an essential and identical role in both. 
 The language of Being and Time has, of course, been replaced by more historically 
sensitive language, and technology provides the appearance of distinctly contemporary concerns 
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in the 1940s and 1950s (as well as the 1930s) on Heidegger’s part. But even granting that there is 
a new role for history in the terminology, it is newly historical in what sense? According to 
supporters of the strong Kehre reading, the change that occurs is in terms of the role of history in 
the account itself. Being and Time, following the strong reading, describes authenticity as taking 
no regard of history, whereas in the later work history is everything. What has emerged, 
however, is that insofar as history “permeates everything” in the later work, as Braver says, it is 
not because Being and Time’s version of authenticity avoids contact with Dasein’s history, as 
Braver and many others argue. Rather, something else is going on as the form of inauthenticity 
peculiar of the modern era moves to the fore, and the description of authenticity in terms that 
depict a more general (though never ahistorical) phenomenon seems to recede. What that 
something might be I will discuss in the Conclusion; for now, however, the discussion of 
activism and passivism remains incomplete and must be addressed. 
 
4.5 GELASSENHEIT AND MYSTICAL DISUNION 
 
 In a 1955 memorial address given in his hometown, Heidegger touches on many of the 
fundamental concepts seen so far in the discussion of authenticity in this period—he speaks of 
technology, of groundlessness (the lack of a god) in the age of technology, and of what in the 
address he calls meditative thinking as opposed to technological thinking. While explaining 
meditative thinking, he also offers a brief description of the particular stance or comportment 
which meditative thinking takes with regard to the products of technology. Meditative thinking is 
not a denial of technological things, for such things are an inevitable part of our lives now; 
Heidegger does not aim to turn back the clock. (Besides, technological devices are not the 
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essence of the epoch of technology anyway, as previously discussed.) This ideal stance both 
accepts the existence and usefulness of technological devices and denies them control over our 
lives: “We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to 
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.”371 Heidegger has a name for 
this stance, a term that is of some importance: “I would call this comportment toward technology 
which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, releasement toward things.”372 
 ‘Releasement’ is the translation of ‘Gelassenheit,’ which will remain untranslated from 
here on for reasons to be explained shortly. ‘Gelassenheit’ is also the title of a 1959 book 
(translated into English under the title “Discourse on Thinking”—I will identify the book by its 
English title, so as to prevent confusion with the concept discussed here and in that book) that 
includes the memorial address just quoted, as well as a 1944-5 dialogue where the concept of 
Gelassenheit plays a central role. Gelassenheit, as Heidegger’s main term in this period for the 
authentic, mindful comportment towards technology, is central for any discussion of the activism 
issue in Heidegger’s late works, which is what I now turn to. 
 The term also, however, carries special connotations of its own, connotations which lend 
themselves to the reading of the later Heidegger as a mystic. In particular, one cannot properly 
discuss Gelassenheit in Heidegger without discussing Gelassenheit in works of the thirteenth-
century German mystic Meister Eckhart, a man who Heidegger himself makes specific and 
significant references to. As the charge of mysticism is usually imputed to Heidegger in the time 
period currently under discussion, and mysticism is generally taken to be a passive, receptive 
orientation (at the least, interpreters of Heidegger as a mystic associate the two), discussing 
Heidegger’s relation to mysticism is one way of orienting the active-passive discussion in this 
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chapter, one with the benefit of addressing the frequent claim that Heidegger becomes a mystic 
or pseudo-mystic by the end of his life. Is this claim accurate? If so, what sort of mystic is 
Heidegger, and how does that relate to his earlier work? If not, how does he differ from 
mysticism and particularly from Eckhart, to whom Heidegger imputes such importance? 
 Jumping off from the above questions, the following discussion will be oriented around 
mysticism as it relates to Gelassenheit. First, some sign should be given of the importance of 
Eckhart for Heidegger, which Heidegger’s own words on Eckhart make clear. A brief discussion 
of Eckhart’s actual views shows that Heidegger is not off the mark, either, as there are many 
important connections between the two. But Heidegger also has a very specific criticism to make 
of Eckhart in Discourse on Thinking, one that reveals his point of separation from Eckhart and 
mysticism more generally. Heidegger is not a mystic, I will argue, because he has no notion of 
mystical union or of anything to unite with—there is no thing, strictly speaking, not even 
something like Eckhart’s ‘God beyond God,’ for man to come into union with, and there is no 
divine will with which to align oneself. Further, in a point more directly relevant to the issue of 
activism, Heidegger’s position is not passive; he maintains the limited activism of Being and 
Time. As Heidegger says himself in the same dialogue, Gelassenheit is not a matter of denying 
one’s will for some other will, not even that of Being. Gelassenheit, and authenticity more 
generally, is an activity one takes on oneself, though not in terms of either the approval or denial 
of one’s will or desires—in fact, Heidegger says, it is the very resoluteness of Being and Time 
that describes that active element of Gelassenheit, thus filling in the picture of how the third, 
weakest form of activism is still central in the last years. 
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 Heidegger makes only occasional references mysticism in his lectures and writings, and 
when he does, it is often through the lens of Meister Eckhart, who himself is rarely mentioned. 
Eckhart, a medieval Christian theologian, appears to be the mystic who Heidegger takes as the 
best exemplar of mysticism itself, and his few direct references to Eckhart are often as weighty 
and generally positive as they are fleeting. For now I will cite only one, which both comes in the 
period under investigation and shows how important Heidegger takes Eckhart to be. In a 1957 
lecture series titled The Principle of Reason, Heidegger is discussing an apparent 
counterexample to the principle of sufficient reason offered by the mystic poet Angelus Silesius. 
Leibniz claimed, in brief, that everything that is, has a reason; Silesius, who was both Leibniz’ 
contemporary and influenced by Eckhart, writes on the contrary that “The rose is without why, it 
blooms because it blooms,/It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.”373 The 
details of the discussion are not important here; after explaining that Silesius’ verses make a 
subtle distinction about the nature of reasons which is clarified in the second verse, Heidegger 
comments that, “The entire fragment is so astoundingly clear and neatly constructed that one is 
inclined to get the idea that the most extreme sharpness and depth of thought belongs to the 
genuine and great mystics. This is also true. Meister Eckehart [sic] proves it.”374 Coming from 
Heidegger, this is no small praise. 
 Heidegger takes (genuine and great) mysticism to be of real significance, and Eckhart as 
the (presumably genuine and great) exemplar. Given the oft-heard claim that Heidegger is, if not 
a full mystic, at least quasi-mystical, this should not be too surprising. The connection to Eckhart 
in particular, though, comes to be of special importance when one considers Gelassenheit. As 
mentioned above, Heidegger takes Gelassenheit to be the comportment definitive of meditative 
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thinking, the comportment that responds properly to technology. Eckhart also uses the term 
‘Gelassenheit,’ though in English translations of Eckhart it is typically rendered as ‘detachment’ 
(Heidegger knows that he is using Eckhart’s term, which is why I stick to the German term in 
both; there should be no difference implied by different English terms). Heidegger himself 
claims to take mysticism, and Eckhart in particular, seriously, and he and Eckhart share this key 
term. How close are Heidegger’s and Eckhart’s versions of Gelassenheit? 
 Closer than a skeptic might expect. Gelassenheit, says one of the speakers in the dialogue 
portion of “Discourse on Thinking,” is not a matter of willing. In fact, it is something that has to 
be let in, something that comes to us, provided that we are open to it in the right way: 
 
 
Scholar: So far as we can wean ourselves from willing, we contribute to the awakening of 
[Gelassenheit]. 
Teacher: Say rather, to keeping awake for [Gelassenheit]. 
Scholar: Why not, to the awakening? 
Teacher: Because on our own we do not awaken [Gelassenheit] in ourselves. 
Scientist: Thus [Gelassenheit] is effected from somewhere else. 
Teacher: Not effected, but let in.
375
 
 
 
 
Several features of Gelassenheit appear in the above quotation. First, Gelassenheit is not 
something willed or brought about by us, but allowed in. Second, the allowing is something that 
we prepare for—while we do not enact Gelassenheit, we in some way prepare ourselves for it to 
become our state (recall from the Der Spiegel interview that we do not bring about the god that 
saves us—we only prepare the readiness to receive it, should it come). Third, Gelassenheit 
comes from outside of us. In sum, Gelassenheit is a state that comes from outside of us that we 
do not will into existence, but that we prepare for by opening ourselves up to receive it. 
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 Where does Gelassenheit come from, if not us? Gelassenheit, the speakers in the 
dialogue agree, is a form of waiting (which makes sense, since it cannot be willed), where 
“waiting means: to [gelasst, ‘release’] oneself into the openness of that-which-regions.”376 What 
is that-which-regions? “That-which-regions is an abiding expanse which, gathering all, opens 
itself, so that in it openness is halted and held, letting everything merge in its own resting.”377 
That-which-regions is the open space or horizon within which everything comes to rest, which 
means comes to be that which it on its own is—it is that wherein things appears as things. That-
which-regions itself withdraws as something explicitly known, so that those things within it can 
come to the forefront as they are. Simply enough, and putting the linguistic gymnastics aside, 
that-which-regions is Being, i.e., that which allows beings to be the particular beings that they 
are. Gelassenheit is openness to Being, and Being, recall, is really the history of epochal 
sendings of Being, the different ways in which the Being of particular entities is understood.
378
 
Gelassenheit is openness to the history of Being, so that man can be released [gelassen] towards 
his particular historical epoch. Man cannot force such an opening to happen, cannot decide 
whether to be released [gelasst] or not: “Scholar: If authentic [Gelassenheit] is to be the proper 
relation to that-which-regions, and if this relation is determined solely by what it is related to, 
then authentic [Gelassenheit] must be based upon that-which-regions, and must have received 
from it movement toward it.”379 Thus, on man’s part there can only be a waiting. Finally, 
thinking itself, as the authentic activity which has Gelassenheit as its comportment, is likewise 
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dependent on that-which-regions, or Being: “the nature of thinking lies, if I may say so, in the 
regioning of [Gelassenheit] by that-which-regions.”380 
 This is the basic picture of Gelassenheit in Heidegger: does Eckhart differ? The answer 
is, seemingly not much. At first blush, Eckhart may appear to be something of an ascetic as many 
mystics do, for he says of Gelassenheit that “all other virtues have some regard for created 
things, but [Gelassenheit] is free from all created things.”381 One would think, then, that 
Eckhart’s gelasst person must give up all material goods for the sake of better, divine goods. But 
Eckhart’s notion of createdness is not limited to material or finite objects, and the gelasst person 
does not simply reject the world of creation for the divine world. Gelassenheit, for Eckhart, goes 
altogether beyond the distinction between created and divine. Our essential core, which Eckhart 
calls the ‘spark’ of the divine, does reject created things, but also far more than that: 
 
This spark rejects all created things, and wants nothing but its naked God, as he is in himself.  
It is not content with the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, or with the three Persons as far 
as each of them persists in his properties.  I say truly that this light is not content with the 
divine nature’s generative or fruitful qualities.  I will say more, surprising though this is.  I 
say in all truth, truth that is eternal and enduring, that this same light is not content with the 
simple divine essence in its repose, as it neither gives nor receives; but it wants to know the 
source of this essence; it wants to go into the simple ground, into the quiet desert, into which 
distinction never gazed—not the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit.382 
 
 
It was likely in part because of words like these that Eckhart was accused in his time of heresy: 
he rejects that the true God is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, he rejects the Trinity of the three, 
and he even rejects a “simple divine essence in its repose.” He goes beyond all of those, to 
something that is not distinguished as a particular being that is the object of prayer or worship, 
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not even one with a divine essence: “if all images are [gelasst] from the soul, and it contemplates 
only the simple One, then the soul’s naked being finds the naked, formless being of the divine 
unity, which is there a being above being, accepting and reposing in itself.”383 Eckhart’s God is 
not a bearded man sitting up in heaven, by all accounts. 
 When Gelassenheit relates to God, therefore, it is not to God qua divine or uncreated 
being. In what sense is God understood? The gelasst person sees God in no particular place, but 
also sees God everywhere. “All created things are God’s speech.  The being of a stone speaks 
and manifests the same as does my mouth about God.”384 Even though created things are not the 
object of desire for Gelassenheit, they are still present and important as that through which God’s 
presence is manifested. They speak to God’s presence, which is not just figuratively in all things: 
“The authorities say that God is a being, and a rational one, and that he knows all things.  I say 
that God is neither being nor rational, and that he does not know this or that.  Therefore God is 
free of all things, and therefore he is all things.”385 God is not a being; God’s presence is in all 
things, including in us as the spark of the divine; God allows things to be. God unambiguously 
holds the same place for Eckhart that Being holds for Heidegger. 
 How exactly does Gelassenheit relate to God, for Eckhart? The person who is properly 
gelasst achieves a mystical union with God—not only is one together with God, the gelasst 
person and God are the same being: “You ought to sink out of all your your-ness, and flow into 
his his-ness, and your “yours” and his “his” ought to become one “mind,” so completely that you 
with him perceive forever his uncreated is-ness, and his nothingness, for which there is no 
name.”386 This is the (metaphysically) original state of man, for Eckhart, before there was ever 
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any distinction between God and man: “For in the same being of God where God is above being 
and above distinction, there I myself was; there I willed myself and committed myself to create 
this man. Therefore I am the cause of myself in the order of my being, which is eternal.”387 
Gelassenheit is a return to the source of all beings, God, and a union with God as that which is 
beyond all things. 
 What does this mystical union mean in practice? What does Eckhart’s discussion have to 
say about activity and passivity? The ‘detachment’ definitive of Eckhart’s Gelassenheit, as noted 
at the start of the discussion, is not an ascetic rejection of worldly things for the sake of divine 
things.  It is, however, a rejection of creation qua created, including one’s created will: 
 
When a man in obedience goes out of himself and renounces what he possesses, God must 
necessarily respond by going in there . . . . If I deny my own will, putting it in the hands of 
my superior, and want nothing for myself, then God must want it for me, and if he fails me in 
this matter, he will be failing himself.”388 
 
 
Gelassenheit is a denial of one’s own will for the will of God, which means allowing God to 
enter into and act through oneself. One opens oneself up to God within via the spark, and God 
effectively takes over and becomes oneself. “Pure [Gelassenheit] reposes in the highest place.  If 
a man has repose in the highest place, God can work in him according to his whole will . . . . 
[God] cannot work except where he finds or creates a willing cooperation.”389 The person who is 
gelasst in this manner acts not merely like a good or holy person, then, but essentially becomes 
one with God’s will, to the point where God’s will and the will of the person are the same: “The 
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just have no will at all; what God wills is all the same to them.”390 Like Aristotle’s magnanimous 
man, there is no temptation to sin for the person who is gelasst; such a person does what is 
correct because, being one with God’s will, he cannot want anything else: 
 
So long as a man has this as his will, that he wants to fulfill God’s dearest will, he has not the 
poverty about which we want to talk. Such a person has a will with which he wants to fulfill 
God’s will, and that is not true poverty.  For if a person wants really to have poverty, he 
ought to be as free of his own created will as he was when he did not exist.
391
 
 
 
One’s own will is eliminated, replaced by the will of God, which in our core we are. “But to 
submit oneself to God with one’s desire and one’s heart, to make one’s will wholly God’s will, 
never once to look upon created things—anyone who had so forsaken himself, he would truly be 
given back to himself.”392 
 For Eckhart, the gelasst person goes in her concern beyond created beings (where 
‘created’ here has the broad definition outlined above, basically synonymous with beings in 
general) and the will that desires them, uniting with the source of beings that is present in beings 
but not itself a being, even a divine one. This person is not only receptive to God’s will, but 
becomes one with and acts out God’s will as his, and his as God’s. For Heidegger, the gelasst 
person goes beyond particular beings to that which grounds them, which can be found through 
them but is not itself a being. This person becomes open to Being, carrying out her destiny as 
allotted by the history of Being. The similarities are not coincidental. 
 No doubt Eckhart offers much of value from Heidegger’s perspective, such that the 
importance Heidegger imputes to him is warranted. Eckhart’s understanding of the source of 
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beings as not itself a being, something that he sometimes refers to as a nothingness (as Heidegger 
does with Being); how the source of beings can be seen in particular beings, though again not as 
some particular aspect or feature of them; and how the gelasst person must transcend not just the 
created aspect but the being aspect of beings, all point to Heidegger’s own conception of 
Gelassenheit and how it relates to Being. But once the individual reaches the state of 
Gelassenheit, just what, for Heidegger, would he be uniting with? Whose will does the gelasst 
person carry out? This is the sticking point, and ultimately the foundation for why Heidegger is 
not a mystic. A further explanation of why will further the discussion of Gelassenheit in general, 
and in particular draw out the ways in which activism remains at this stage in Heidegger’s views. 
 Recall that Heidegger mentions Eckhart several times, always significantly and generally 
positive. Perhaps the most suggestive of the less than uniformly positive mentions in fact appears 
in the dialogue from Discourse on Thinking. The same passage also points the way in the broader 
discussion of activity and passivity, to be discussed thereafter, and so is worth quoting at length: 
 
Scholar: To be sure I don't know yet what the word [Gelassenheit] means; but I seem to 
presage that [Gelassenheit] awakens when our nature is let-in so as to have dealings with that 
which is not a willing. 
Scientist: You speak without letup of a letting-be and give the impression that what is meant 
is a kind of passivity. All the same, I think I understand that it is in no way a matter of 
weakly allowing things to slide and drift along. 
Scholar: Perhaps a higher acting is concealed in [Gelassenheit] than is found in all the 
actions within the world and in the machinations of all mankind . . . 
Teacher: . . . which higher acting is yet no activity. 
Scientist: Then [Gelassenheit] lies—if we may use the word lie—beyond the distinction 
between activity and passivity . . . 
Scholar: . . . because [Gelassenheit] does not belong to the domain of the will. 
Scientist: The transition from willing into [Gelassenheit] is what seems difficult to me. 
Teacher: And all the more, since the nature of [Gelassenheit] is still hidden. 
Scholar: Especially so because even [Gelassenheit] can still be thought of as within the 
domain of will, as is the case with old masters of thought such as Meister Eckhart. 
Teacher: From whom, all the same, much can be learned. 
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Scholar: Certainly; but what we have called [Gelassenheit] evidently does not mean casting 
off sinful selfishness and letting self-will go in favor of the divine will.
393
 
 
 
Again there is praise of Eckhart, but the focus of the passage is on a criticism, one for which 
Eckhart is singled out. The criticism being that Eckhart still thinks of Gelassenheit as “within the 
domain of will,” specifically with “letting self-will go in favor of the divine will.” Based on what 
was said above about Eckhart, there seem to be fair grounds for this claim: for Eckhart, after all, 
one’s will and that of God become one and the same. 
 One might object, however, that Eckhart does not really intend to invoke the will at all. 
The gelasst person does not want to enact God’s will, at least not according to any traditional 
sense of the will; the gelasst person simply becomes part of that will, in whatever sense it is a 
will. For it is not as though God is some being who has specific desires which the gelasst person 
then carries out as though they were his own. The true God is not a being, Eckhart says, and so 
there can’t be a will, in the traditional sense, for it to have. The gelasst person just is, we might 
say, liberating himself of all such traces: “in the breaking through, when I come to be free of the 
will of myself and of God’s will and of all his works and of God himself, then I am above all 
created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what I was and what I shall remain, 
now and eternally.”394 If God is beyond being, then the gelasst person is not acting out the will of 
some agent. The denial of one’s own will is the denial of a certain way of regarding beings, one 
that takes its orientation from created things and the desire for them, much as, for Heidegger, the 
authentic person does not deny inauthentic things, but inauthenticity as a way of regarding 
things, as a correct understanding of the world. Heidegger, then, appears to be taking Eckhart as 
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a fairly standard ascetic-type mystic here, which not only appears to be a flat-footed 
misinterpretation, but seems especially unusual given the high place he gives to Eckhart. 
 But there is a subtler point at work here, for Eckhart’s thought, says Heidegger, is in the 
domain of the will, that domain being something Heidegger associates with the history of 
Western metaphysics.
395
 Heidegger, in short, thinks that Eckhart is still trapped within standard 
metaphysical concepts, though Eckhart goes to great lengths to move beyond them, and is even 
successful to some extent. Indeed, a specifically Heideggerian case can be constructed for this 
criticism of Eckhart. While Eckhart says, for example, that God is beyond beings, he also says 
that “when the free spirit has attained true [Gelassenheit], it compels God to its being; and if the 
spirit could attain formlessness, and be without all accidents, it would take on God’s 
properties.”396 What those properties are isn’t exactly clear, when God is supposed to be 
formless. It’s certainly not something utterly simplistic—it’s not as though Eckhart would say 
that we take on God’s height or hair color. However, at least one such characteristic is the 
standardly imputed trait of goodness: “Yes, God’s will has savor for me only in his unity, where 
God’s peace is for the goodness of all created things . . . . There you must love the Holy Spirit, as 
he is there, in unity—not in himself, but there where he, alone with God’s goodness, has savor in 
that unity from which all goodness flows out of the overflowing of the goodness of God.”397 
God, whatever else cannot be said, is good in some way. But if I were Heidegger, I would then 
ask whether such goodness has been clarified ontologically. What sense of goodness is this? Is 
this notion fundamentally a moral one? Is God good like a hearty breakfast is good? What is the 
                                                 
395
 This should be fairly apparent given the style of Heidegger’s opposition to the idea of willing and how it relates 
to power. Recall the discussion of power and technology in Chapter 3. Mindfulness, which was the focus of that 
discussion, is a good primary reference; to see a discussion closer in time to the works currently being examined, see 
the 1951-2 lecture course What is Called Thinking? and its discussion of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. 
396
 Meister Eckhart 108. (Emphasis mine.) 
397
 Meister Eckhart 71. 
195 
 
notion of good that underlies both of these notions, what are its foundations? The answer to these 
questions is negative; Eckhart offers no clarification of God’s goodness, or, as Heidegger would 
frame it, even seems to recognize it as a problem. Eckhart’s answer would satisfy the negative 
theologian, but Heidegger would not at all be satisfied. Eckhart, Heidegger would say, though he 
seeks to liberate our notion of God from conventional theological and philosophical 
commitments, does not fully succeed in doing so. He does move forward a great deal, and so 
receives Heidegger’s praise, but still takes some problematic metaphysical baggage with him. 
 Coming back to the matter of the will, and keeping in mind the point just made, one 
should ask how for Eckhart we must deny the will, and how that would compare to what 
Heidegger means by denial of the will. Eckhart thinks that, via Gelassenheit, man still operates 
according to God’s notion of goodness, if nothing else. There is a specific way in which to act in 
accordance with God, and in denying oneself and one’s will, one is instead filled with God: “in 
all things, when I do not want something for myself, God wants it for me.”398 It is God, 
admittedly the God beyond beings but still God in some way, that acts through, and all but seems 
to be identical to on some level, the gelasst person: “That man carries God in his every work and 
in every place, and it is God alone who performs all the man’s works; for whoever causes the 
work, to him it belongs more properly and truly than it does to the one who performs it.”399 In 
many ways, Being for Heidegger appeared to have an identical relationship to man that God does 
for Eckhart. But just what, if anything, is acting through the gelasst man for Heidegger? Here is 
where the fundamental difference lies, for Being, as Heidegger always says (and as can probably 
never be stated enough), is not a being. It is not even beyond being, if by ‘beyond’ one means 
something higher. Being is the way in which beings are, which is to say it is the historical 
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disclosure of the world to historical man. There can be no ‘will’ to such a thing (so to speak), but 
there can also not be anything like ‘goodness,’ ‘wanting,’ or any other such category. Being is 
that in virtue of which there are graspable (in any sense whatsoever) categories and concepts, 
which exist only in their historical manifestations for man. Nothing whatsoever applies to Being. 
Eckhart says this of God as well, but then he also says that God wants goodness and acts, in 
whatever capacity that may be.
400
 In addition, for Heidegger Being is understood in different 
ways for man in different periods, something which Eckhart does not allow for God; God is not 
something changeable. 
 All of this puts Eckhart in a dilemma from Heidegger’s viewpoint, a dilemma that holds 
for any mystic who argues similarly for a God beyond beings: if that with which we must 
achieve unity is not a being, how is unity possible?
401
 In addition, how can God be said to be, 
e.g., good, when that which is the source of all beings cannot properly be said to have goodness? 
Eckhart both wants to have a notion of God that can serve as the subject of unity and possessor 
of goodness, and wants to have it not be a being in any sense. Holding both of these positions is 
difficult for any mystic, and Eckhart’s language betrays that difficulty. God, being God, is good 
in some respect, and unity with God means wanting goodness in that respect, whatever it is, 
where ‘whatever it is’ is all that is needed for the dilemma to arise. But for Heidegger, goodness 
is only a coherent concept when the meaning of Being is already understood in some way. There 
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is no such issue with Being for Heidegger, on the other hand, because Being isn’t good (or bad, 
or anything for that matter); Being is, which is to say manifests in history through beings, and 
that’s the entire story, front to back. Similarly, there can be no unity with Being, because man is 
ultimately a being, and Being is not. There is no unified acting, willing, or anything of the sort. 
What could one unify with? Thus Eckhart s is still bound to conventional metaphysical notions 
of God in spite of himself; he can deny them as a negative theologian can, but can offer nothing 
else in their place, and so any use of them at all places his view at risk. Insofar as Eckhart stands 
for Heidegger as the best in mysticism, it is thus fair to say that Heidegger is no mystic. 
 
 How does all of this come back to the question of activism? Mysticism is generally 
considered a passive view, and rightly so; for the mystic, one must let go of one’s attachments 
and desires, and accept or achieve union with whatever is more fundamental. One wills no more. 
In Eckhart’s case, one must gelasst sich from created things qua createdness and achieve union 
with the God above God. One’s will becomes the same as God’s will and no longer acts for 
oneself. Recall: “If I deny my own will, putting it in the hands of my superior, and want nothing 
for myself, then God must want it for me.”402 The individual no longer wills anything. If Being 
has the same relationship to man for Heidegger, then it would be fair to infer that the passive 
Heidegger and the mystical Heidegger are one and the same. But Heidegger opposes the mystical 
reading via his criticism of Eckhart, and his specific grounds are centered in the role of the will, 
which in turn enters the discussion because of the relation between Gelassenheit and passivity. 
Recall the first part of the passage from the dialogue where Eckhart was mentioned: 
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Scholar: Perhaps a higher acting is concealed in [Gelassenheit] than is found in all the 
actions within the world and in the machinations of all mankind . . . 
Teacher: . . . which higher acting is yet no activity. 
Scientist: Then [Gelassenheit] lies—if we may use the word lie—beyond the distinction 
between activity and passivity . . . 
Scholar: . . . because [Gelassenheit] does not belong to the domain of the will. 
 
 
Heidegger wants to claim here that Gelassenheit is beyond activity and passivity, both of which 
are understood in terms of the Western metaphysical interpretation of the will in which Eckhart’s 
discussion is trapped. Eckhart would likely argue that this is not so, but then the Heideggerian 
argument given above could be run with respect to the will as well: how does God act through 
the gelasst person, if not via God’s will in some way? Can something that is not a being have a 
will? And if not, then in what sense is there a God at all?
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 Gelassenheit, then, is supposed to be neither active nor passive, and yet there is “a higher 
acting” of some sort in it, an acting which is not activity. This formulation of Gelassenheit is not 
as indecipherable as it appears; Heidegger returns to the topic towards the end of the dialogue, 
again examining the issue through the lens of the will. There he frames it in more familiar terms, 
where a distinction is made between the apparently good activity of Gelassenheit, and activity as 
actualization, hearkening back to the discussion of power in Mindfulness and the discussions of 
technology more generally: 
 
Scholar: Certainly the fact that on the one hand both the regioning with respect to man and 
the determining of that-which-regions, and on the other hand, all effecting and causing are 
essentially and mutually exclusive, shows how alien that is to anything pertaining to the will. 
Teacher: For every will wants to actualize, and to have actuality as its element. 
Scientist: Someone who heard us say this could easily get the impression that [Gelassenheit] 
floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking all power of action, is a 
will-less letting in of everything and, basically, the denial of the will to live! 
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Scholar: Do you then consider it necessary to counter this possible misunderstanding by 
showing in what respect something like power of action and resolve also reign in 
[Gelassenheit]? 
Scientist: Yes I do, although I don’t fail to recognize that all such names at once misinterpret 
[Gelassenheit] as pertaining to the will. 
Scholar: So, for example, one needs to understand “resolve” as it is understood in Being and 
Time: as the opening of [Dasein] particularly undertaken by him for openness. 
Teacher: . . . which we think of as that-which-regions. 
 
 
Action is involved in Gelassenheit, though action cannot be understood as some sort of willing. 
Nor is it a total denial of will in the sense of stopping all living activity. Rather, action must be 
understood as resolve, i.e., resoluteness, and Heidegger says that resoluteness must be taken 
specifically as it is in Being and Time, “as the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for 
openness,” where openness is that-which-regions, i.e., Being. 
 Recall what has been said of Gelassenheit so far. It is a form of waiting, a waiting to be 
awakened by something outside of oneself. It cannot bring about the recognition of Being on its 
own, so it waits for the regioning of Being itself. The portion just quoted adds that this opening is 
undertaken by man for Being, and emphasizes that it is done particularly so. Being is understood, 
as much at this point as at any other point in Heidegger’s works, as manifesting through the 
epochs of Being, through history. Gelassenheit is a waiting for Being, or a preparedness for 
Being’s historical advent. This waiting sounds as though it would be passive, Heidegger says in 
the above passage, but really there is a form of activity in it, an undertaking for openness 
equivalent to resoluteness in Being and Time. 
 Finally, recall the discussion of resoluteness in Being and Time which Heidegger invokes. 
Resoluteness, it was argued in Chapter 2, is a necessarily historical phenomenon. It grasps 
Dasein’s Situation, which is always historically grounded in Dasein’s particular tradition, its 
history. Therefore, resoluteness is not Dasein creating a unique possibility to pursue; this is as 
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true in Discourse on Thinking as it was in Being and Time. Nor, in Being and Time, was it up to 
Dasein whether or not to recognize that it has possibilities via willing itself into anxiety—anxiety 
happens to Dasein whether it wants it or not, without Dasein’s choosing so. However, there was 
still a form of activism in resoluteness, via the activity required to persist in acknowleding and 
pursuing one’s possibilities. Dasein, as resolute, must sustain its authentic grasp of the Situation 
against the temptations of inauthenticity, against falling into the world and das Man’s 
simplifications. Thus, Heidegger says in Being and Time, “As resolute, Dasein is already taking 
action . . . [, where] this term must be taken so broadly that “activity” [Aktivität] will also 
embrace the passivity of resistance.”404 Resistance against inauthenticity is one of the key 
significations of action Heidegger has in mind here, where that resistance is an activity initiated 
by Dasein for the sake of authenticity. 
 In Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger says of resolve that is is an undertaking, one taken 
for that-which-regions. In other words, man undertakes in some way the opening of the History 
of Being. If there is any ambiguity here, it is whether that undertaking is merely the third, 
weakest form of activism found in Being and Time and Mindfulness, or actually the second, 
stronger form of activism with regard to acknowledging one’s possibilities in the first place. 
Since there is no discussion of anxiety in the dialogue, that question is not directly answered 
there. It is, however, indirectly answered if one recalls the Der Spiegel interview, where 
Heidegger says that man can only bring about a “preparation of the readiness, of keeping oneself 
open for the arrival of or the absence of the god.”405 The most that man can do, according to the 
dialogue, is keep awake for Gelassenheit; we do not ourselves contribute to its actual awakening. 
This means that we cannot bring about the recognition of our genuine historical possibilities, 
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because awakening Gelassenheit just is awakening the right stance towards those possibilities 
should they emerge. It is anxiety, distress, or dismay, which is always present in some form, that 
allows authentic possibilities to be recognized; to keep awake for Gelassenheit or be open for it, 
is to be open to what makes authentic possibilities visible to us. Thus, the undertaking 
undertaken by man must be the persistence of the Der Spiegel interview, the maintained 
awareness of the possibility of a new beginning, an awareness which, as Heidegger says in Being 
and Time, is active in a way that “will also embrace the passivity of resistance.” In Eckhart’s 
mysticism, one opens oneself to God, and God takes action through oneself. For Heidegger there 
is not God but Being as history, and so there is nothing that will take action through oneself—
rather, one must oneself persist resolutely in carrying out historical possibilities. For a mystic 
who has achieved union with the divine, there is no need for resoluteness. But Heidegger is not a 
mystic—for him, from Being and Time to the end, man must act. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
5.1 A CONCLUSION TO HEIDEGGER’S AUTHENTICITY 
 
 If there is one point against which this study has argued with the most sustained effort, it 
is the view that Being and Time is an individualistic, proto-existentialist work. Throughout that 
work, history and tradition are not merely one part of authenticity, but essential to it. Along with 
facing death and the unsettledness of possibilities, to be authentic just is to resolutely face one’s 
history, something that follows from Dasein always being in a world whose possibilities are 
determined in the context of a specific history. Authenticity in Being and Time, to be truly 
consistent, must be historical. Given that fact, one would expect that Dasein cannot simply 
invent ahistorical possibilities to pursue, so that the strongest version of activism described in 
Chapter 1 is out. This still leaves room for other forms of activism, but Heidegger never allows 
that we choose to bring anxiety upon ourselves. Anxiety, being what it is, is not chosen; it 
happens to one, comes upon one without choice. We do not choose its occasions, and the things 
we choose do not occasion it, rather it comes upon us at the time of its choosing. But without any 
form of activism, there would be no sense in which choice or decision makes sense; Dasein 
could not choose authenticity, it would just happen or not. Since authenticity is about the relation 
to choice itself as possibility, and as Dasein is so defined by possibility (and so, in a sense, by the 
ability to choose), there must be some activism. Thus, a minimal activism remains, that of 
continuously choosing one’s history. 
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 As for the later work, no one disputes the priority history has there. What is important is 
to show, as it has been if my effort succeeded, that history has the same relation to human beings 
as history does to Dasein in Being and Time. But being so related history does not require that 
one simply lives out one’s history unquestioningly, and so a minimal form of activism can (and 
should, if there is to be any reason to be concerned that we prepare for anything) remain, the 
activism of keeping one’s history in mind, becoming a ‘guardian of Being.’ Man is passive in 
many respects, but not all; there is some room to choose, as there was in Being and Time. What 
man must choose, though, is not a totally free world, nor whether to know the truth; man must 
choose himself, which is to say his history. 
 But is all of this convincing? Is it even persuasive? An old philosophy professor of mine 
impressed (or tried to impress) upon his students the distinction between convincing someone 
and persuading someone. If someone is convinced, she fully believes and embraces the point in 
question; she is committed to what convinces her. If someone is merely persuaded, she may 
accept the point in question, but that does not mean she accepts it full-heartedly; she may even 
accept it begrudgingly, in spite of herself. Convincing includes a deeper, perhaps emotional, 
commitment to the point, and may come from many sources, so long as they ground the 
commitment firmly; persuasion, on the other hand, comes from reasons, pushing one from a 
stance of doubt or disbelief, and so can conflict with emotions, with what we want to believe. 
Even after two hundred pages, I doubt that I will convince those who disagree with me in this 
matter. At most, I might hope to persuade them. Why so little, after arguing at such length? The 
answer has to do with Heidegger himself, or rather how he writes. 
 Recall my claim that authenticity is a transhistorical concept, meaning that authenticity 
has features that persist across epochs, but is not something that can exist independently of 
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historical manifestations. One might think of this by analogy to Aristotelian hylomorphism, 
which I alluded to once before.
406
 Aristotle thinks of ordinary objects as hylomorphs, which is to 
say conceptually separable in terms of form and matter. For example, form of a plant, what 
Aristotle calls its soul, is the nutritive faculty: “The soul must,” Aristotle says, “be substance qua 
form of a natural body which has life potentially. Substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, will 
be the actuality of a body of this kind.” (De Anima I.1)407 But while the soul of a plant is 
conceptually separable from the matter, it is not actually so: 
 
If then we are to speak of something common to every soul, it will be the first actuality of a 
natural body which has organs. Hence we too should not ask whether the soul and body are 
one, any more than whether the wax and the impression are one, or in general whether the 
matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. (De Anima II.1) 
 
 
There is no point in asking whether the soul is separate from the body, whether they are two 
distinct things; the soul always is the body’s actuality, which means the actuality of some body, 
of some matter, as the imprint belongs to the wax and is not there without it. Yes, one can talk 
about form, but there is no form that exists without matter; I can talk of a wax imprint, but until I 
imprint with the wax, it is not there.
408
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 Consider the existential analysis in Being and Time in this regard. As an example, it is 
true that Dasein is characterized by mineness. But mineness is not some metaphysical thing, such 
as a structure, that exists apart from Dasein; to say that Dasein is characterized by mineness is to 
say that “we are it, each of us, we ourselves.”409 Yes, one can talk about the structural feature of 
mineness, and every Dasein has that feature, but that does not imply that there is in any way a 
mineness independent of Daseins who are their own selves, who have that mineness. To say that 
each Dasein has mineness is to say that each and every Dasein is uniquely its own; it is its 
mineness, the particular mineness it is, and to not be such would to no longer be mineness. There 
are thus two ways in which one can talk about Dasein’s mineness: the first refers (in Being and 
Time’s terminology) to the ontological, existential structure of mineness that is present in Dasein 
generally; the second refers to the ontical, existentiell fact that each of us can refer to ourselves 
with ‘me.’ The fact one can describe mineness qua existential structure separately does not mean 
that such a structure exists separately in our world somewhere, even though the structural 
description is a more general, and in a sense more fundamental, level of description. Aristotle 
likewise declares that “The form has a better claim than the matter to be called nature” (Physics 
II.1), yet that doesn’t mean that we find forms of plants, of rocks, of statues, and so on sitting out 
in the world. For a more relevant example, the meaning of Dasein’s Being, according to Being 
and Time, is temporality. But this is not just an abstract fact: “Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its 
own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.”410 As a 
result, if Dasein inquires “into the meaning of existentiality itself . . . , then one cannot fail to see 
that the inquiry into Being (the ontico-ontological necessity of which we have already indicated) 
                                                 
409
 Being and Time 36. 
410
 Being and Time 41. 
206 
 
is itself characterized by historicality.”411 These are not mere facts, but facts about the nature of 
any investigation into Dasein’s Being that Dasein, i.e., you and I, undertakes. Such investigation 
is and must be historical, because Dasein is temporal, and temporality manifests in every case as 
historicality (specifically, as the three equiprimordial ecstases of temporality, i.e., as historical 
Being-in-the-world), where this means concrete, actual history. The nature of Dasein’s 
structures, and how those structures must manifest, drive the approach. 
 All the same, just as one can discuss the form of an existing plant for Aristotle, one can 
discuss existential structures on their own terms, as Heidegger does in Being and Time. At least 
for the first half. The second, unpublished half of the work was to be the destruction of the 
history of philosophy, in which Heidegger would discuss the Western philosophical tradition 
going back to Aristotle. That would be a concrete task, necessitated because “The question of the 
meaning of Being must be carried through by explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality 
and historicality[, at which point] the question thus brings itself to the point where it understands 
itself as historiological.”412 One might ask what the necessity of such a historical study is, 
besides to show how previous philosophers were wrong. But as was just explained above, if 
Dasein in fact is historical when it exists, then the inquiry into the meaning of Being cannot 
ignore this fact; it must reckon with history, because Dasein’s ways of Being, including that way 
which consists in inquiring into the meaning of Being, always are historical. “In working out the 
question of Being, we must heed this assignment, so that by positively making the past our own, 
we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry.”413 
This follows directly from Heidegger’s understanding of what it is to be Dasein. Dasein exists, 
and existence is historical; to be historical is to be in a tradition, and authenticity can only happen 
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relative to an actual historical tradition. One must, therefore, reckon with one’s tradition. The 
second half of Being and Time is a methodological necessity, driven by how authenticity and 
Dasein are understood. 
 There are two ways in which Being can be discussed, then—formally, in terms of 
existential structures, and concretely, in terms of Dasein’s actual historical possibilities of 
existence. Heidegger means to speak to both, but Being and Time never accomplishes this, 
because it is unfinished. In fact, as intimated in Chapter 2’s discussion of authentic history, 
Heidegger may not even have fully worked out the formal existential account of historicity by 
the time of Being and Time’s publication. Following the table of contents at the end of Being and 
Time’s introduction, it is the historical part of the work, Part Two, that is completely unwritten; 
most of Part One, the formal account, is there, and the formal discussion of history comes late 
there. As a result, Being and Time comes across as a formal work discussing abstract structures. 
It is said there that every Dasein has mineness, has a history, but these discussions are left at a 
formal level. The later works focus in large part on what would have been Part Two of Being and 
Time, the destruction of the history of philosophy. Heidegger does, it should be kept in mind, 
make structural points on occasion in his later work, as discussed from time to time in the course 
of this study (recall in particular the discussions of Heidegger’s self-interpretations in Chapter 4, 
where he basically repeats his structural claims from earlier works); however, the overall focus is 
on concrete history. As a result, the two halves of Being and Time are spread not across one 
work, but across Heidegger’s career—on the one hand, one has Being and Time as we have it, 
and on the other hand, one has the greater part of what comes after. Remember, as the years go 
on more and more of Heidegger’s work is devoted to historical interpretation. The point is that 
this fact is not a fluke or a change of orientation; Heidegger always had such a project in mind.  
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 The impression of two different Heideggers, then, even if the content persists over time, 
comes in no small part from the different approaches in the surviving part of Being and Time and 
the later works. The later works are focused on concrete historical matters, which the 
Introduction and discussion of authentic historicality in Being and Time hint at, but which the 
book itself does not ultimately undertake. This also explains why there can be a fundamental 
compatibility between early and late when the scope of discussion varies so greatly: the later 
work is, in many ways, a concrete filling out of the formal story given in Being and Time. In 
terms of authenticity in particular, authenticity can only be authentic with regards to a Situation, 
which is historical. Heidegger can give a formal story, as he does in Being and Time with regard 
to (for instance) idle talk. But the actual existence of idle talk only happens historically, in 
concrete ways. Hence, Heidegger’s examples of idle talk are always historical ones such as 
newspapers and mass media, because what else could they be? Certainly the ancient Greeks and 
medieval Christians could have idle talk. But theirs happened in accord with those 
understandings of the world. Without a history in which to manifest in some way, idle talk qua 
structure of inauthenticity is an abstract concept, which is to say nothing at all. Authenticity only 
means something in the concrete, which means in the context of a tradition, a tradition that Being 
and Time sought to confront with the destruction of the history of ontology: 
 
this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological 
tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and 
this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the 
question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus 
bounded off.
414
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On the one hand, the above passage sounds like an existential description of how Dasein must 
reckon with its history. On the other hand, it is in fact Heidegger’s justification for why he must 
investigate the history of philosophy. Insofar as authenticity is our goal, we must undertake what 
is necessary to achieve authenticity. This means that the concrete investigation of history is every 
bit as necessary as the existential analytic; the results of the analytic itself demand it. 
 Occasionally, discussions in Being and Time itself even hint at something more. A single 
example: in discussing primitive Dasein Heidegger says, in one of those moments that 
desperately calls for explication, that “Perhaps even readiness-to-hand and equipment have 
nothing to contribute [nichts auszurichten] as ontological clues in Interpreting the primitive 
world; and certainly the ontology of Thinghood does even less.” Yet this is not, as the next 
sentence implies, because primitive man is not Dasein: “But if an understanding of Being is 
constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more 
urgent to work out the ‘formal’ idea of worldhood.”415 Working out the idea of worldhood, this 
passage says, is important because even primitive Dasein is Dasein, and understands Being, even 
though readiness-to-hand, taken so often to be an absolute and timeless existential structure for 
Heidegger, may not explain the primitive world. Whatever Heidegger has in mind here, he seems 
to think that Dasein is not merely the sum of the structures he is identifying in his investigation. 
 The fact that Being and Time, or rather what we have of it, weighs exclusively towards 
the formal part of the investigation, and that Heidegger’s later work focuses almost entirely on 
the concrete aspect, creates the appearance of a difference where there is none. Yet so long as 
that difference appears, and has appeared, to be so clear and distinct, so long as everything looks 
so clearly different in content, approach, and orientation, so long as the shift is so visible, one 
can appreciate the view that there are two Heideggers; it is convincing. But is it persuasive? The 
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earlier and the later work are different in an important respect, and that difference is, in a way, 
one of content. But that’s because the subject matter of Being and Time is basically all formal, 
whereas the subject matter of the later work is concrete. Not only do these two not come in 
conflict with each other; the latter is the filling out, concretizing, giving life to the former. They 
complete each other. 
 
5.2 AN INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER’S KEHRE 
 
 But in that case, why didn’t Heidegger just finish Being and Time? Why did he abandon 
the project? Is all of his later work just what he meant to do anyway? No, it is not. To finish, I 
will give a sketch, a suggestion, as to what the shift in the discussion of authenticity, and what 
the Kehre more broadly, represents. 
 In discussions of the Kehre, much is often made of the passage in “Letter on 
‘Humanism’” where Heidegger speaks of the third division of Part One of Being and Time, 
which was to be titled “Time and Being.” “Here,” Heidegger says, “everything is reversed. The 
division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning 
[Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics.”416 “Time and Being,” 
and with it Being and Time, was not sufficient for Heidegger’s aims, and perhaps that because it 
was still trapped within the metaphysical perspective. Braver quoting this passage, says that, 
“Although Heidegger intended to throw off the subjectivism of the first two divisions in the 
third, he found that he could not do so because the work as a whole was too deeply structured 
around the Kantian subject.”417 Leaving aside the particulars of Braver’s interpretation, in what 
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sense could the unpublished part of Being and Time be trapped in the metaphysical perspective, 
if I am right that it maintains the same basic positions as the later work? 
 The answer is that there is a second way to read this passage, one that follows more 
closely to the actual wording of the passage and explains the ultimate consistency of Heidegger’s 
views alongside the degree of change in his approach. “Time and Being” “did not succeed with 
the help of the language of metaphysics,” but that does not imply that the division was trapped in 
metaphysical presuppositions. In fact, in Mindfulness Heidegger seems to think otherwise: “For 
the inadequacy of the withheld section on “Time and Being” was not because of an uncertainty 
concerning the direction of the inquiry and its domain.”418 “Time and Being” did not fail because 
of its basic direction, which would be how it failed if it were following a path carved out by 
metaphysical presuppositions. Instead, it failed “because of an uncertainty that only concerned 
the appropriate elaboration.”419 “Time and Being” couldn’t be worded properly. 
 The Kehre, insofar as the premature ending of Being and Time plays a role, is a matter of 
form rather than content. Or better: style rather than substance. Being and Time, I have argued, 
maintains the same basic views as the later work, at least when it comes to authenticity and 
inauthenticity, which is not a small issue. Heidegger’s claims in the above passages are broader, 
however, and go to the heart of what the Kehre is supposed to be. I do not maintain that 
Heidegger changed nothing whatsoever, that he kept to every statement, factual or otherwise, 
maintained in Being and Time. I have argued in these pages, for instance, that his conception of 
authentic historicity in Being and Time was poorly worked out and received a more sufficient 
elaboration later on, and I do not think that that’s the only thing that changed. But that is not the 
strong Kehre thesis, anyway; the strong Kehre thesis argues that the shift is of something 
                                                 
418
 Mindfulness 367. 
419
 Ibid. 
212 
 
fundamental, a reversal of some basic, essential position that Heidegger had maintained. Were 
that the case, elaboration alone would not be the issue keeping back “Time and Being.” 
 On the other hand, elaboration is no small matter for Heidegger, a point that needs to be 
driven in. Even in Being and Time, as he concludes the Introduction to the work, Heidegger 
notes that “it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp 
entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 
‘grammar’.”420 As Heidegger himself will repeat throughout his career, language has a 
fundamental relation to how we grasp Being; “Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the 
house of Being.”421 One cannot approach the topic of Being with language suited for describing 
beings, meaning that one cannot discuss Being using the standard metaphysical approaches: 
“The necessitating for asking the question of being in a different way cannot be awakened and 
aroused out of, and through, metaphysics.”422 A drastic change in approach is therefore needed. 
On the other hand, following what has been said so often, one cannot simply invent an all-new 
way to describe Being. One must work through and confront one’s history, as that history is 
definitive for one’s possibilities. One cannot ignore or try to go around metaphysics, because 
metaphysics is the fundamental experience that shapes our understanding of Being: 
 
Sein und Zeit, which can only be one exigent pathway among other possible pathways, must 
unavoidably look like “metaphysics” and “anthropology”, nay it has to make itself initially 
“understandable” with the help of “metaphysics” and “anthropology” by going through them, 
which means that Sein und Zeit has to reckon with all possible and proximate 
misunderstandings.  And yet, all this leads nowhere and is not sustaining.
423
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On the one hand, Heidegger argues that he must go through the traditional metaphysical 
perspectives. On the other hand, in the very same passage he says that it “leads nowhere and is 
not sustaining.” Is there a way to resolve this tension? 
 There may be, if one asks whether Being and Time achieves its goal of moving beyond 
metaphysics by moving through it. Years later, in The Principle of Reason, Heidegger goes out 
of his way to make a correction to one of his previous essays. In describing the error that 
necessitates the correction, Heidegger goes beyond merely admitting a factual mistake, and his 
words get to the heart of what Heidegger aims to accomplish, something that may show how 
Being and Time ultimately failed, in his view: 
 
Sometimes we see and clearly have before our eyes a state of affairs. Nevertheless, we do not 
bring into view what is most obvious in what lies present before us. Seeing something and 
expressly bringing into view what is seen are not the same thing. Here, bringing into view 
[er-blicken] means to see into [ein-blicken] that which genuinely looks [anblickt] at us from 
out of what is seen—which means, what looks at us in terms of what is most proper to it. We 
see a great deal and bring into view very little. Even when we have brought into view what is 
seen, seldom are we capable of sustaining the aspect [Anblick] of what is brought into view 
and of holding in view what is brought into view. A constantly renewed, that is, more and 
more original appropriation is needed in order for mortals to have a true beholding of 
something.
424
 
 
 
Heidegger does have theoretical views that can be elaborated; their elaboration constitutes Part 
One of Being and Time. But what is talked about there cannot simply be described in an ordinary 
fashion, and this as a matter of method: what is to be discussed must be approached such that the 
thing inquired into reveals itself—‘bringing into view’ requires a specific sort of encounter, one 
that grasps the thing in line with mindfulness or essential thinking. This is an imperative for 
Heidegger’s own work just as much as it is for the authentic person Heidegger is describing. 
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Thus, while there must be an encounter with history, there must also be a great deal of caution 
with regards to how that encounter happens. Given Heidegger’s discussions in Mindfulness, it 
would appear that Being and Time had the right idea, both in terms of its content and its 
approach, but did not go far enough. It was still trapped in metaphysical language, even though 
“what this work strives for is often enough said in what is communicated.”425 The elaboration 
was insufficient, even though it developed an entirely new terminology and approach. In short, 
Being and Time’s methodology was insufficiently radical. 
 The works of the 1930s and beyond move more and more drastically away, stylistically 
speaking, from both Being and Time and philosophy as a whole. Of the lectures in the 1930s, 
Heidegger says that “These “approaches” do not intend to “complete” Sein und Zeit.  Rather, 
they hold fast more originarily on the entire inquiry and shift this inquiry into the proper 
perspective.”426 The lectures do not add something not present before, but shift the presentation. 
The path forward must be free of metaphysics, including its language, and yet must also force an 
encounter with the history of metaphysics, insofar as it is the history of those very people whom 
Heidegger is addressing. An appropriate approach to the investigation of Being must be a 
historically centered discussion of the history of metaphysics, but one that lets the guiding 
questions and perspectives be seen as they are in themselves, via “A constantly renewed, that is, 
more and more original appropriation,” as Heidegger says in The Principle of Reason. An 
engagement with the history of metaphysics remains essential to becoming authentic in the 
contemporary age, necessary because “We must . . . stake out the positive possibilities of that 
tradition,”427 and that in virtue of the theoretical positions Heidegger takes. The one necessitates 
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the other; Heidegger’s own position, he thinks, requires a more drastic shift in approach than 
Being and Time presents, and the later work is his attempt to carry that out. 
 
 In his letter to Father Richardson, Heidegger refers to the preface to the seventh edition of 
Being and Time, where he says that “the road [Part One of Being and Time] has taken remains 
even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being.”428 This is not 
just a general note for a preface, but an important claim about the nature of Heidegger’s work. 
One must start from the tradition, acknowledge it, discover its sources, and by steps challenge its 
dominion if one is to see the true possibilities that that same tradition offers; this is Heidegger’s 
position. Being and Time presents a view of authenticity that persists until Heidegger’s final 
years, and based on Heidegger’s own words I suspect that the same can be said for most of his 
other substantive views as well. But the approach has changed drastically. In part, that may be 
because Being and Time was insufficient to break the grip of traditional metaphysical concepts 
and understandings. But in part, that is also because one cannot start wholly anew. The very view 
to be argued for says this. To be authentic means being authentic about the world one is in. And 
so, as quoted at the opening to this study, “only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought [in 
Being and Time] does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II.”429 But that 
account cannot settle for being only a formal account, one view among others; the goal is an 
entirely different orientation, one that will inform a new grasp of the tradition and with it a new 
direction. And so “the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [the 
perspective opened up by] [Heidegger] II.”430 Heidegger II must make the reader see, and doing 
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so requires something entirely different from what metaphysics and Western history have made 
possible, a new way in which to approach the world man lives in. Authenticity demands it. 
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